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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Martin Joseph MacNeill ("Dr. MacNeill") appeals from the final order
of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, Utah, the Honorable Derek P. Pullan
~

presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-

103(2)0).
ARGUMENT
The State's untimely and verbose brief offers an abundance of information but is
lacking in legal and logical arguments. The State fails to provide any direct evidence that
supports a murder conviction but rather relies on the frailest of circumstantial evidence.
The State also concedes that the key witness, Inmate One ("Michael Buchanan"),
received a benefit for his testimony which the State failed to disclose to defense counsel.
Finally, the State fails to provide any reasonable response to Dr. MacNeill's numerous
examples of prosecutorial misconduct which deprived Dr. MacNeill of a fair trial.

I.

THE EVIDENCE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY REMAINS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF GUILT.
Despite the State's efforts to construe the evidence presented in this case as

adequate to compel a reasonable jury to find Dr. MacNeill guilty, the evidence remains
insufficient to demonstrate the elements required to convict anyone of the offense of
murder. While it is true that the Court must review the evidence in a light most favorable
to the jury verdict, 1 there simply was no evidence presented by the State, absent the
''testimony" of a jailhouse informant, that could have justified a finding of guilt by the

1

jury. The trial judge is the best unbiased source that could provide a trustworthy account
of what transpired during this trial. In the case at bar, the trial judge wrote a thorough
order parsing out the evidence that was considered by the jury in reaching their verdict.2
That order demonstrates that the jury could have only considered a limited number of
very weak circumstantial pieces of evidence, and the only direct evidence supporting the
conviction arose from the false testimony of the jailhouse informant.
The State has limited its characterization of this offense to a knowing and
intentional murder. The State argues that the testimony of Jason Poirier3 would be enough
for tQ.e Court to find there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. The record
reveals Poirier testified that the purported confession of Dr. MacNeill, admitting that he
killed his wife was given in public, but conveniently, only Poirier heard the alleged
confession. Additionally, the trial court gave specific trial instructions to the jury relating
to weighing the credibility of jailhouse informants.4 Poirier's testimony was, in all
respects, unbelievable. Poirier testified that he received immunity for many of his
charges in exchange for his testimony. The jury also heard Poirier had lied to the police,
defrauded his landlord, discussed making false police reports with his wife, along with
other false statements that Poirier made when it was convenient. R.6028: 1886, 1902,
1923-1924, 1933. The most damning evidence lies in the trial judge's order wp.ere he laid

1. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997).
2. See, Exhibit B in Brief of Appellant, filed June 19, 2015.
3. Jason Poirier was in Utah County's custody and was to receive probation in exchange
for his testimony. Poirier' s name was released to the press and he was filmed during his
testimony.
2

out all of the evidence he felt the jury had used to convict Dr. MacNeill. 5 Poirier's name
does not appear even once in the order because the trial judge, nor the jury, found him
sufficiently credible to give any weight to his testimony whatsoever. Poirier's testimony
on the alleged confession was beyond credulity, and even the trial judge refused to
acknowledge the testimony while reviewing the evidence in a post-trial motion.
Accordingly, the State simply cannot rely on such testimony in order to contend that the
evidence against Dr. MacNeill was sufficient to find him guilty of murder.
A great deal of the evidence presented against Dr. MacNeill consisted of the
testimony of Dr. MacNeill's daughter, Ms. Somers. Somers was an angry woman who
hated her father for having an affair and allowing his paramour to stay at the house
shortly following the death of her mother.6 Additionally, Somers had gone through a
vehement custody battle with Dr. MacNeill regarding her younger siblings. The trial
judge observed that Somers and her siblings' testimony was contaminated with bias.
Somers was exceedingly enraged and so bitter at her father that she accused him of sexual
assault, harangued investigators to look into her mother's death a year later, and
contaminated her younger sister's (A.M.) testimony to the extent that A.M. was
prohibited from testifying.
Somers was the sole source of the details relating to the purported relationship
between Dr. and Mrs. MacNeill. The allegation that Mrs. MacNeill knew about the

4. See, footnote 2, supra.
5. See, footnote 2, supra
6. Id.
3

affair, the allegation that Dr. MacNeill pushed his wife into a surgery she did not want,
the allegation that Dr. MacNeill got out his medical books prior to the surgery, the
allegation that Dr. MacNeill had attempted to overdose his wife after the surgery, and the
allegation of how Mrs. MacNeill was feeling the morning of her unfortunate death were
provided solely by Somers.
In contrast, Dr. Thompson claimed that he felt Mrs. MacNeill was nervous, but
excited for the surgery and ready to proceed as scheduled. R.6017:63, 124-125. The State
has offered its version of circumstantial and hearsay evidence throughout the trial, and on
this appeal, but there is no evidence corroborating Somers' testimony. For example, there
was no evidence that Mrs. MacNeill was planning on filing for divorce; there was no
evidence that Mrs. MacNeill or Somers were preoccupied enough to make a police report;
nor was there any need for Somers to remain in Utah in order to protect her mother from
Dr. MacNeill. IfMrs. MacNeill overdosed the morning after her surgery, there is still no
evidence that Somers took her mother to the hospital. Finally, contrary to the contention
of the State, there is no evidence verifying that Dr. MacNeill left his office prior to
picking up his minor child on the morning of Mrs. MacNeill's death.
The State attempts to interpret the allegation that Dr. MacNeill pretended to be
terminally ill, as some sort of premeditation to commit murder. The Court should see this
as a red herring as the State has no evidence to support this speculation.
The State further offers the bizarre premise, that the grief shown by Dr. MacNeill
was not "consistent" or ''typical" of a grieving husband. What constitutes ''typical

4

evidence of grief," if such a model exists, has not been established anywhere, much less
in this case, where the facts demonstrate the atypical circumstances of a husband
discovering his wife dead in the bathroom. 7
The deficiency in the State's case is demonstrated most clearly by the fact that
there is no agreement among the State's medical experts as to the manner or mechanism
of death. The State called four medical professionals and not one supported another's
theory. The original Medical Examiner, Maureen Frikke, M.D. ("Dr. Frikke") the only
doctor that physically examined Mrs. MacNeill, opined that the manner of death was
natural. Following the death of Dr. Frikke, the chief Medical Examiner, Todd Grey, M.E.

("Dr. Grey") modified his :finding regarding the manner of Mrs. MacNeill's death as a
result of the State asking him to look into the case since they were attempting to build a
prosecution against Dr. MacNeill. Dr. Grey testified that he would not reach an opinion
of homicide, but changed the manner of death to undetermined. The other "expert
witnesses" were brought in from other states and offered their inconsistent proffers
which, at best, only marginally supported the State's theory of the case. The trial judge
concurred that the evidence offered in the toxicology report was only suspect at best. 8 The
remaining doctors provided a different opinion on the manner and mechanism of death
that so differed from each other, and from those offered by both Dr. Frikke and Dr. Grey,
7. The State, in regard to a secondary offense, alleges that the fact Dr. MacNeill had the
pills destroyed after Mrs. MacNeill's death is an example how he was trying to cover up
his crime. However, the police had released the scene and Dr. MacNeill, as a medical
professional, knew that prescription pills had to be destroyed.
8. See, footnote 2, supra.
5

that such inconsistent testimony is entirely unpersuasive. The jury heard from many
doctors, but not a single one was able to give a medical opinion to any degree of medical
certainty that would allow a jury to find that a homicide occurred beyond a reasonable
doubt. If five medical experts are unwilling to agree on a simple manner or mechanism
of death, and the State's medical examiner refused to opine that Mrs. MacNeill was
murdered, then a reasonable jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr.
MacNeill murdered his wife.
The only other evidence the jury heard suggesting that Dr. MacNeill had some
involvement in his wife's death was the testimony of the jailhouse informants. 9 The
testimony ofjailhouse informants is known to be unreliable and has a long history of
leading to wrongful convictions. 10 Appellant will expand upon his allegations of
misconduct committed by the State in Arguments II and ill below. Nonetheless, it is
important to note that the jailhouse informants' testimony in this case also supports the
argument of the insufficiency of the evidence necessary to convict Dr. MacNeill. The
federal informants were brought to Utah just shortly before providing their testimony in
October and November 2013. However, the pervasive media attention given to this case
began long before charges were brought against Dr. MacNeill. Dr. MacNeill's impending

9. Unlike Poirier, the federal inmates, Inmates One through Five, were still in federal
custody and were receiving threats. The trial judge allowed their names to be kept
confidential and ordered the media not to film the inmates while they testified.
10. See, Russell D. Covey, Abolishing Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, 49 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 1375 (2014) attached as Exhibit A in the Addendum filed herein; See also,
Alexandra Natapoff, Comment: Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to
Wrongful Convictions, Sept. 17, 2006 attached as Exhibit B in the Addendum filed
herein.
6

trial became a classic high profile case. Prior to their alleged conversations and
confrontations with Dr. MacNeill, the informants had long seen him depicted in the news
regarding an investigation into the death of his wife.
Inmate One watched the news before the alleged confession and continued to
watch the news for an entire year before Jeff Robinson, the investigator, approached him
about testifying against Dr. MacNeill. R.6012:9-10. Inmate One continued to watch the
news, most prominently reports by Nancy Grace, even while the exclusionary order was
in place. The other inmates, although their testimonies were not confessions, they had
conversations with Dr. MacNeill. However, the content of those conversations can only
be attributed to the inescapable media influence. Even without daily and extensive media
coverage of a murder trial based upon weak circumstantial evidence, jailhouse informants
lack credibility. No reasonable jury would allow a man to be convicted of murder based
solely upon the testimony of a jailhouse informant who had received a promise of an
extraordinary benefit for his testimony. Moreover, this error is compounded where the
jury does not know of the benefit due to prosecutorial misconduct.

II.

PREJUDICE HAS OBJECTIVELY BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE
BRADY/GIGLIO VIOLATIONS OF THE STATE.

The State does not dispute Dr. MacNeill's allegations that it failed to disclose

Brady material regarding its jailhouse informants. Inmate One and Inmate Three
("Johnny Vaughn") received benefits for their testimony that the State chose not disclose
to the defense counsel. The nondisclosure regarding the benefits promised to Inmate
Three demonstrates a consistent pattern of misconduct by the State. R.6027: 1768.

7

However, it was the testimony of Inmate One that provided the questionable, yet
detrimental, evidence against Dr. MacNeill relied upon by the State. Under a Brady11
analysis as applied to these facts, Gigilo holds that a new trial is required "irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution" 12 Giglio continues to hold that, "When the
reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [Brady]." 13 The courts have held
that a Brady/Giglio violation is prejudicial when a State's witness gives false testimony
about the benefits he/she has received and has held that, "a new trial is required if, the
false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the

jury."14
The State concedes that there was false testimony. Therefore, Dr. MacNeill need
only show this Court that there was a "reasonable likelihood that the testimony affected
the judgment of the jury." The State incorrectly argues that its Brady violation was cured
by defense counsel cross-examining the informant. Any value in cross-examining the
informant was destroyed by the informant's continued perjury.
According to Inmate One's testimony, he was expecting to be released in January
of 2016. R.6012:5. However, because of the benefit conferred on Inmate One by Jeff
Robinson, the State's investigator, Inmate One was actually released December 15, 2013,

11.
12.
13.
14.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972).
Id. at 154.
Id. (emphasis supplied)

8

one month following his testimony. 15 The jury was never informed that Inmate One
would be receiving a two-year reduction of his sentence in exchange for his testifying for
the State. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury to determine the credibility of the
jailhouse informant by what his/her would be receiving in exchange for his testimony. 16
Inmate One told the jury he was not receiving any benefit for his testimony but instead
was testifying because he just had ''to do the right thing." R.6013:102.
Inmate One then falsely testified that he had not been given any consideration for
his testimony. He lied further, telling the jury that his 18:1 motion before the federal
court was still pending and it was uncertain whether he would receive a reduction in his
sentence. 17 The jury was deprived of any knowledge or facts revealing Inmate One's
release that would occur a month later, based upon the recommendation of Jeff Robinson
that he had already promised.
The impeachment value of the cross-examination was also undermined when the
prosecutor stated in his closing arguments:
"The defense challenged him about getting something in return
for his testimony. There's nothing that State investigators,
State prosecutors can give this individual. I think it's clear
from the record that was established that he was looking to get
something for his testimony. Who wouldn't, quite frankly. But
he testified it didn't look like anything was going to work out.
That he wasn't going to get something in exchange for his
testimony, because it's a State case and not a Federal case ...
15. See, Exhibit E in Brief of Appellant, filed June 19, 2015.
16. See, footnote 2, supra.
17. On September 1, 2013, Inmate One wrote to Robinson, "looks like the release thing
is dead in the water." Inmate One knew his 18:1 motion was not going to get him early
release. See, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment or for a New Trial,
attached as Exhibit C in the Addendum filed herewith.
9

Not only was he - - is not getting anything for his testimony,
ladies and gentlemen, he's suffering a significant detriment to
come forward and tell the truth, to make the right decision.
Inmate No. 1 talked about how he's got another couple of
years on his sentence. He thinks it's part of his rehabilitation.
Do the right thing and come forward." R.6018:2193-2194
While closing arguments are not evidence, the jury nevertheless was given the false
impression that Inmate One was testifying without having been promised anything. The
State bolstered its representation that Inmate One's testimony was believable because
Inmate One testified that he was providing his story in spite of the fact that he was facing
danger upon his return to prison. The prosecution spent a great deal of effort arguing that
the inmates were trustworthy because they had no jurisdiction over them and they
themselves could not provide any benefit to federal inmates. The jury was falsely led to
believe the informant was a credible witness because he was testifying out of the
goodness of his heart.
The State refers to the false testimony provided by hunate One regarding the fact
that he had previously requested a recommendation letter which Robinson had agreed to
write as a "minimal addition to the impeachment."18 There is nothing minimal about the
State failing to give a defendant exculpatory evidence, especially when the case against
him is comprised solely of weak circumstantial evidence. The fault in failing to give Dr.
MacNeill and his counsel the impeachment evidence of the entire benefit provided to
Inmate One and Inmate Three lies solely with the State. It is inexcusable after the filing
of eight discovery requests resulting in an explicit order from the trial court to fail to

18. See, Brief of Appellant, p. 86, filed June 19, 2015.
10

reveal such information. This is even more foul when the informant provided damning
testimony yet failed to disclose the benefits they would receive from the State. Without
the testimony of an informant, there was little, if any, evidence of a homicide, much less a
believable argument that Dr. MacNeill had committed the offense. The failure to provide
candid and complete impeachment evidence, regarding the informants was a critical
matter that deprived Dr. MacNeill of a fair trial. A reasonable jury, with full and
complete knowledge of incentives being provided to the inmates, would have given
substantially different weight to their testimonies and rendered a different verdict.

III. THE STATE PERFORMED INNUMERABLE ACTS OF PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT DEPRIVING DR. MACNEILL OF A FAIR TRIAL.
Dr. MacNeill was deprived of a fair trial as he was required to wade through the
minefield of prosecutorial misconduct from the very beginning of the investigation. Such
misconduct began with the investigative agency and was exacerbated when the
prosecution team became a party to the offense by refusing to remedy law enforcement's
transgressions and misrepresentations.
::;)

In its brief, the State argues that Dr. MacNeill failed to properly brief his issues on
appeal and cite legal authority establishing his claims. The Utah Supreme Court has
indicated that the "adequate briefing requirement is not a hard-and-fast default notion"
and that by relying so heavily on the briefing requirement the State is in jeopardy of
themselves being in default. 19 That being said, Dr. MacNeill's brief has been and
continues to be adequately presented to the Court. The State has rested its argument on

11

its hope that this Court will find that Dr. MacNeill has inadequately briefed his
arguments. However, such a ruling is within the Court's discretion. Rule 24(a)(9) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires Appellant's brief be adequately briefed in
order to avoid shifting the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court. 20 Dr.
MacNeill has used legal logic and appropriately citations, when applicable, to brief his
argument and in doing so has followed Rule 24(a)(9). Dr. MacNeill's brief should now
be considered on its merits.

A.

Robinson's Improper Influence over Somers Prejudiced not only A.M.'s
Testimony, but also Her CJC Interview.
The State's investigator, JeffRobinson, committed several acts of misconduct in his

capacity as an agent for the State in the course of his pursuit to build a case against Dr.
MacNeill. 21 Robinson became inappropriately familiar with Somers, even going so far as
to writing a letter to a judge on her behalf during the pending probate case lodged against
Dr. MacNeill. Somers, as pointed out hereinabove, was hostile toward her father and
worked tirelessly with Robinson to find a way to bring murder charges against Dr.
MacNeill. At Robinson's direction, Somers relentlessly coached the minor child, A.M.,
into misrepresenting the facts surrounding the discovery of Mrs. MacNeill's body. The
trial court found that both Somers and Robinson influenced the testimony of A.M. to the

19. State v. Roberts, 345 P.3d 1226 (Utah 2015).
20. State v. Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, 41 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305
(Utah 1998)).
19. Robinson was also responsible for concealing from the defense the promised benefits
the federal inmates would receive in exchange for their testimony.
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extent that she became an unreliable witness regarding the events of April 11, 2007. In
spite of this finding, the trial court allowed a CJC interview taking place over a year after
the death of Mrs. MacNeill to be received into evidence. This was plain error because the
same pervasive coaching and clandestine influence exerted by Somers and Robinson had
contaminated the CJC interview to the same extend than the proffered in-court testimony
of A.M. which was rightly suppressed.
Somers was the guardian of A.M. in October 2007, after she accused her father of
sexually assaulting her shortly after her mother's death. 22 The CJC interview took place
over a year after Mrs. MacNeill's death. Somers' constant coaching prejudiced A.M.'s
interview to the point where it cannot be considered reliable. This interview should have
been suppressed along with A.M.'s testimony.
Somers and her siblings were responsible for opening the investigation into Mrs.
MacNeill's death. Absent the constant pressure and harassment of the prosecutor's
office, it is unlikely that charges would have ever been filed. As a result, the State choose
to proceed with a case that was deficient in all evidentiary aspects and resorted to tactics
barred, by law, to prosecutors.

B.

The State Failed to Disclose Exculpatory Matters to the Defense: an Individual
who Voiced his Motive to Kill Someone.
The State failed to include in its discovecy the findings that Damian MacNeill, Dr.

22. Emails between Somers and Robinson clearly establish these individuals were in
contact a month prior to the CJC interview. See, Exhibit F in Brief of Appellant, filed
June 19, 2015.
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and Mrs. MacNeill's son, had homicidal ideations. The State had the presence of mind to
warn Damian's law school that he might be a danger to those around him but somehow
failed to extend the same consideration to its disclosures to defense counsel contrary to
the State's assertion. The State refused to even investigate Damian's potential
involvement in the death of his mother. Damian had access, ability, and was predisposed
to commit a homicide but the State ignored him in favor of a pre-determined target. Dr.
MacNeill's counsel only discovered the evidence via expert witness disclosures contained
in a flash drive. The flash drive contained several documents that were not included in the
discovery sent to defense counsel.23 The State believed it was justified because they had
an "open file" policy. Open files do not affirmatively disclose Brady and Giglio materials
because by the nature of our criminal justice system defense attorneys do not screen and
prepare cases for prosecutions. Prosecutors have an affirmative duty to disclose potential
evidence which could either exculpate the defendant or impeach a potential witness for
the State. 24 In this situation, the State had clear evidence of an alternate suspect which it
made an informed and knowing choice to withhold. The Court must now hold the State
responsible for the many instances of misconduct in this case, this being just one of many.
To do otherwise would desecrate the holdings in Brady and Giglio and give a prosecutor
carte blanche coverage to withhold evidence by stating they have an "open file policy."

23. See, Memorandwn in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment or for a New Trial,
attached as Exhibit D in the Addendum filed herewith.
24. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 153 (1972).

14

C.

The State Violated the Exclusionary Rule and the Order Prohibiting any
Witness from Watching Trial Testimony and Media.
The State argues that no prejudice occurred as a result of the State's failure to

inform the federal inmates that they could not watch any media reports of the trial. The
argument is illogical and unsound. The trial court excluded witnesses under Rule 615 of
the Utah Rules of Evidence and ordered all fact witnesses not to watch any media
coverage of the trial or watch any part of the trial. 25 The purpose of the exclusionary rule,
"is directed toward preventing witnesses from changing their testimony based on other
evidence adduced at trial."26 Inmate One, the State's key witness, watched extensive
media coverage, including actual trial testimony of other witnesses, prior to giving his
testimony. It allowed Inmate One to mold his testimony and sculpt it to the other witness
testimony he had previously viewed.
The trial court directly ordered the State to inform all of its witnesses that they
were prohibited from watching any other testimony or media reports concerning that
testimony. 27 The State directly violated that order which resulted in the contamination of
informant's testimony that was at best, extremely unreliable. During the re-direct
examination of Inmate One, again committed perjury. During the case, when the State
inquired as to whether Inmate One had made an effort to stay away from the media

25. See, Trial Witness Exclusion Order, attached as Exhibit I in Brief of Appellant, filed
June 19, 2015.
26. State v. Billsie, 131 P.3d 239,241 (Utah 2006).
27. See, footnote 23, supra.
15

regarding this case, he answered in the affirmative. However, this testimony was also
proven to be false. Following the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel discovered
jailhouse conversations between Inmate One and his family. 28 These conversations
revealed that Inmate One intentionally viewed not only media coverage of the trial but the
actual trial proceedings of this case. The perjured testimony of Inmate One is yet another
clear example of how informant testimony given in exchange for a benefit from the
government will provide, at best, unreliable testimony.
D.

The State Failed to Provide Discovery and Deprived Dr. MacNeill from
Presenting a Full Defense.

The State incorrectly asserts that Dr. MacNeill has failed to adequately brief his
argument that the State failed to provide discovery to defense counsel. However, Dr.
MacNeill has already pointed out several instances where the State failed to provide
discovery. This included exculpatory evidence, impeachment evidence and other
evidence required by Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. These failures to

~'

disclose discovery, deprived Dr. MacNeill of a fair trial.
Dr. MacNeill was prevented from presenting a thorough and competent defense
because the discovery when disclosed at all, was untimely. Dr. MacNeill was often left to
discover exculpatory evidence through his own defense counsel investigation. In the vast
majority of cases where his independent efforts to obtain matters that should have been
disclosed by the State, the exculpatory evidence was located only after the trial had
G-·

28. See, footnote 2, supra; see also, Document Entitled Michael Buchanan- Utah County
Jail Calls, attached as Exhibit C in Brief of Appellant, filed June 19, 2015.
16

concluded and that evidence was no longer useful. Moreover, the prosecution challenged
each and every discovery request made by the defense.29 The discovery of matters that
should have been disclosed regardless of whether the law required that a request be made,
were only made known or discovered after a conviction was secured by the State. Due to
the intentional failure of the State to disclose discovery to the defense, including key
exculpatory evidence, Dr. MacNeill is entitled to a new trial.
The State, through countless acts of misconduct and deceit has deprived Dr.
MacNeill of a fair trial. Compounding its error, the State circumvented due process that
must be afforded to defendants under both the Utah and United States Constitutions.
Although, any single violation of those authorities would be sufficient to require that a
conviction be overturned, in this case, the errors are so numerous that awarding a new
trial is required. Dr. MacNeill respectfully requests this Court to hold the State
responsible for its failures and errors and grant Dr. MacNeill a new trial. 30
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Dr. MacNeill respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the jury's verdicts on November 9, 2013, and the Court grant him a new trial.
DATED this

/6J!lday of February, 2016.

29. Dr. MacNeill filed eight discovery requests.
30. In Brief of Appellant, filed June 16, 2015, citations in support of this argument were
previously provided regarding cumulative error.
17
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Wake Forest Law Review
Winter, 2014
Article
ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY
Russell D. Covey al
Copyright (c) 2014 Wake Forest Law Review Association, Inc.; Russell D. Covey

INTRODUCTION
Jailhouse snitch testimony is arguably the single most unreliable type of evidence currently used in criminal trials. Snitches
are deeply unreliable witnesses. Many are con artists, congenital liars, and practiced fraudsters. AB compensated witnesses, all
snitches have deep conflicts of interest. What is worse, jailhouse snitch testimony as a class is not only the least credible type
of evidence, but it is also among the most persuasive to jurors because jailhouse informants typically allege to have personally
heard defendants confess their guilt to the crimes charged. Introduction of a defendant's confession, from any source, radically
changes the complexion of a case, particularly one lacking other evidence that directly implicates the defendant in the crime.
Research studies demonstrate that jurors are simply ill equipped to evaluate the credibility of jailhouse informant testimony
and consistently give such testimony far more weight than is due even if they are aware of the incentives jailhouse snitches
receive or expect in exchange for their testimony. The prejudicial effect of unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony is magnified
by the context in which the evidence is presented to the jury. Jailhouse snitches are States' witnesses, and the credibility of their
testimony is likely substantially bolstered as a result. Prosecutors bolster jailhouse snitch testimony simply by putting them on
the witness stand as State's witnesses, signaling to the jury that the prosecutor believes their testimony is trustworthy. Even
in cases in which bolstering crosses the line into the territory of the unethical or improper, and it often does, prosecutors are
rarely called out for their misconduct, much less face sanctions. As a result ofboth implicit and explicit prosecutorial bolstering,
jailhouse snitch testimony tends to have an even greater, and potentially more prejudicial, effect on reliable fact-finding.
Jailhouse snitch testimony, in fact, is so likely to make a material difference to the outcome of close cases, and so likely to be
*1376 false, that permitting such witnesses to testify, absent direct corroboration through electronic recording or some other
similarly reliable method, should be flatly banned. Numerous commentators have proposed modest fixes to the jailhouse snitch
problem. Some have urged the conduct of pretrial reliability hearings. Others have argued for enhanced disclosure obligations
regarding informant background and testimony. Still other fixes have been proposed. But given the depth to which jailhouse
testimony is compromised, these modest proposals are simply inadequate. Anything less than total abolition ofjailhouse snitch
testimony is fundamentally insufficient to address what is perhaps the most outrageous and destructive prosecutorial practice
currently tolerated by law.
This Article lays out that argument. Following this introduction, Part I demonstrates that jailhouse informant testimony is
inherently biased and that the temptations faced by inmates to commit perjury are overwhelming. Part II explains why jailhouse
snitch testimony is so persuasive to jurors, and why it is responsible for a disproportionate number of wrongful convictions.
Part ill examines the present devices relied upon to filter out unreliable informant testimony--cross-examination and postconviction review--and finds them wanting. Neither device has a successful track record of providing relief to wrongfully
convicted defendants nor offers any realistic mechanism to screen out unreliable snitch testimony. Part IV considers several
remedies proposed by commentators and enacted in a few jurisdictions. These remedies, if adopted, might marginally improve
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the situation in some cases, but all of these remedies ultimately fail to address the fundamental problems of unreliability and
unaccountability that are inherent to this class of evidence. Part V then advances the main thesis of the Article, urging adoption
of a total ban on jailhouse informant testimony, subject only to a possible exception for testimony corroborated with electronic
recording of any alleged confession or admission made by a criminal defendant. It assesses the grounds for such a ban by
examining other categorical evidentiary exclusions enforced through judicial, legislative, or executive action.

I. JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY IS FUNDAMENTALLY AND PERVASIVELY UNRELIABLE
Exoneration studies have identified a set of recurrent causes of wrongful convictions, including false confessions, mistaken
eyewitness testimony, and faulty forensic evidence. 1 However, no *1377 evidence is more intrinsically untrustworthy than
the allegations of a jailhouse snitch. :: According to some wrongful conviction scholars, jailhouse snitch testimony is the single
greatest cause of wrongful convictions. 3 This should not be swprising. It is hard to imagine more facially untrustworthy
evidence. One federal court characterized the practice of using jailhouse snitches as "one of the most abused aspects of the
criminal justice system," 4 another as a "fertile field□ from which truth-bending or even perjwy could grow," :'i and a third
called jailhouse snitch testimony "inherently unreliable." 6 In an address intended as advice for prosecutors, federal judge
Stephen Trott warned prosecutors not to trust criminal informants:
*1378 Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to get what they want, especially when what they
want is to get out of trouble with the law. This willingness to do anything includes not only truthfully spilling
the beans on friends and relatives, but also lying, committing perjury, manufacturing evidence, soliciting
others to corroborate their lies with more lies, and double-crossing anyone with whom they come into
contact, including-and especially-the prosecutor. A drug addict can sell out his mother to get a deal, and
burglars, robbers, murderers[,] and thieves are not far behind Criminals are remarkably manipulative and
skillfully devious. Many are outright conscienceless sociopaths to whom "truth" is a wholly meaningless
concept. To some, "conning" people is a way of life. Others are just basically unstable people. A ''reliable

informer" one day may turn into a consummate prevaricator the next. ;

Judge Trott warned that, among informants, jailhouse snitches are indisputably the worst of the bunch:
The most dangerous informer of all is the jailhouse snitch who claims another prisoner has confessed to
him. The snitch now stands ready to testify in return for some consideration in his own case. Sometimes
these snitches tell the truth, but more often they invent testimony and stray details out of the air. ~

The practice of usingjailhouse snitches in serious criminal cases is both pervasive and, as a direct result, a major cause of error
in the criminal justice system. 9 Although it had long been apparent that jailhouse snitch testimony was sometimes extremely
unreliable, the strong link between jailhouse snitches and wrongful convictions has only become clear recently thanks to the
still-breaking wave ofDNA exonerations. 10 Analysis of the causes ofwrongful convictions in these cases reveals thatjailhouse
snitches have been involved in a surprisingly large percentage ofknown wrongful convictions-twenty-one percent--according
to Innocence Project founders Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer.

11

The Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer study looked at

exonerations resulting from DNA testing, a sample that included a disproportionately large percentage ofsexual assault cases. 1~
*1379 Jailhouse informants play an even more pernicious role in capital cases. 13 One criminal defense attorney testified
before a Los Angeles County grand jury that she had conducted a study of all cases in which a California defendant received

2
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the death penalty and concluded that jailhouse informant testimony was used in approximately one-third of those cases. I-!
According to the Northwestern University Law School's Center on Wrongful Convictions, 45.9 percent ofdocumented wrongful
convictions in capital cases involved testimony by jailhouse informants or by "killers with incentives to cast suspicion away
from themselves," making "snitches the leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases." 15 The Commission on
Capital Punishment convened by former Illinois Governor George Ryan concluded that testimony from jailhouse informants
appeared to be a major cause of wrongful convictions in the cases it looked at involving persons sentenced to death in lliinois.

16

A. Jailhouse Informants Face Overwhelming Temptations to Commit Perjury

Jailhouse snitches testify not out of the goodness of their hearts but to obtain one or more of a variety of incentives typically
offered to them. These incentives range from almost trivial benefits, like cigarettes, to improved jail conditions and cash
payments, 17 up to the gold standard of "cooperation benefits"-release or reduction of *1380 jail sentences. 18 Indeed,
testifying against fellow inmates may often constitute a prisoner's only hope of escaping a substantial prison term. 1<J The
unscrupulous inmate thus faces powerful temptations to serve as a jailhouse snitch. As the Fifth Circuit has observed, "It is
difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence." 20 Another court noted that it
was "obvious" that cooperation premised on promises of leniency or immunity ''provide[s] a strong inducement to falsify"
testimony. 21 Even in cases where leniency or immunity is not at stake, the prospect of receiving some tangible reward for
false testimony can be irresistible. As one attorney commented, "When you dangle extra rewards, furloughs, money, their own
clothes, stereos, in front of people in overcrowded jails, then you have an unacceptable temptation to commit perjury." 22
Not only are the temptations to manufacture false snitch testimony powerful, the difficulty of doing so is minimal. As a Canadian
commission created to investigate the causes of one wrongful conviction observed, "In-custody confessions are often easy
to allege and difficult, if not impossible, to disprove." 23 To generate a credible confession, a snitch need only learn some
basic details about a fellow inmate's case. 24 A lying jailhouse snitch might gather information about a high profile case
simply by reading newspaper stories or watching television broadcasts about the case. 25 Snitches can also obtain details about
fellow prisoners' cases by speaking with complicit friends and relatives who can monitor preliminary hearings and other case
proceedings and feed details to the aspiring snitch.:,, In some cases, informants share knowledge about case *1381 facts with
~.,

each other, permitting multiple informants to corroborate each other's testimony. - ' Investigators have documented cases in
which prison inmates purchased information from others outside of prison in an attempt to trade it for reduced sentences. :x
And now there is the Internet As one commentator has observed, "The combination of the increasing availability of information
over the internet and inmate internet access makes fabricating confessions even easier than ever before." :,1
The ease with whichjailhouse informants can fabricate credible confessions was demonstrated by one particularly industrious
snitch, Leslie Vernon White, a "convicted kidnapper, robber[,] and car thief." -' 0 In 1990, the CBS news program 60 Minutes
aired a segment featuring White, a self-proclaimed jailhouse snitch. 3 1 Two years earlier, White demonstrated for jailers how
simple it was to concoct a confession and convince prosecutors it was genuine. 3 2 He repeated the performance while on camera
for the CBS news program. _,J White's methods were shocking in their audacity. To get information, he simply picked up the
telephone and asked for it _--1 To get government officials to talk, White posed as a law enforcement official or a government
worker, and in that guise, contacted various government agencies, including the sheriff's information bureau, the county coroner,
and the district attorney handling the case, from whom he obtained details about the facts and evidence of the case. -'' Then he

,::;
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arranged to be transported to or from the courthouse with the defendant who supposedly made the confession so that he could
plausibly establish an opportunity for the defendant's alleged confession to have been made to him. 36
Having gathered the basic case information and established a context in which the supposed confession occurred, it was easy
for *1382 White to approach a homicide detective or a prosecutor with a deal. -' 7 ''The key thing is they want to win," White
.

u:

explamed. So if I come forward with the information as detailed as that they're gonna use it Because the jury not knowing the system or
how it works, is going to believe when I get up there with all these details and facts, that this guy sat in the jail cell, or he sat
on the bus, or he sat in the holding tank somewhere, or told me through a door or something, they're gonna believe me. ·' 9

Over the course of several years, White appeared as a government witness in numerous cases and offered to appear in even
more. -1o In return, he received various rewards for doing so, including a letter recommending parole from a high-ranking
official in a district attorney's office. -l I These benefits did not always work out well for the citizens of California. On White's
last furlough, he used the opportunity to beat his wife, snatch a purse, and assault his landlady with a knife. -l 2
As a result of the furor caused by White's confession and his startling demonstration of the ease with which he could manufacture
false jailhouse confessions, Los Angeles County convened a grand jury investigation. 4J The Los Angeles County Grand Jury
commenced a year-long examination of the jailhouse informant problem in the county. 44 What it found was even more shocking
than White's demonstration. Based on extensive documentary and witness testimony, the Grand Jury learned ofthe existence ofa
complex and pervasive "informant system" at work in Los Angeles County, one that was driven by ''the unwritten understanding
between prosecutors and informants as to the benefits to be derived from their testimony." 4 ~ In its report, the Grand Jury
described a system set up to manufacture false jailhouse informant testimony. 46 At the county jail, known informants were
segregated and housed in a special unit-known as the "K-9 unit"-li Police officers and prosecutors in need of additional
evidence could request that an inmate be housed in the K-9 unit, and those requests were routinely granted. 48 The delivery
of fresh meat to the *1383 K-9 unit typically set off a feeding frenzy among the seasoned snitches housed there, and it was
not unusual for several K-9 inmates to contact officials with reports of alleged confessions only hours after the unsuspecting
prisoner's arrival. -1 9 Attempts to obtain information from the unwitting inmate might begin in minutes. 50
The Grand Jury found evidence that not only did clever informants like Leslie Vernon White find ways to gather facts needed
to fool police and prosecutors into believing that they had heard a defendant confess to a crime, but in some cases police and
prosecutors actively colluded with jailhouse informants to manufacture false evidence. 51 These officials, some informants
testified, provided them with copies of arrest reports, trial transcripts, and case files; took the informants to crime scenes; and
sometimes simply fed them the facts of the crime in order to help the informants develop convincing testimony. 52
Snitches, moreover, risk little by fabricating false testimony. Perjury prosecutions of lying jailhouse informants are almost
nonexistent 5~ As a case in point, following the I,.os Angeles County Grand Jury's investigation of the jailhouse informant
problem, and despite discovery of large-scale and pervasive deception by jailhouse informants, the only two individuals
prosecuted for providing perjured testimony in any court or case were the grand jury witnesses who had helped to expose
the problems in the jailhouse snitch system. 5-1 In contrast, snitches who helped convict other innocent defendants were never
prosecuted. 55 The message is *1384 clear- lying snitches have little to lose and everything to gain by falsely reporting to
police and testifying to juries that fellow inmates have confessed to crimes.
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Witnesses suspected of lying to benefit criminal defendants, on the other hand, do not fare nearly so well. When a witness
is thought to have lied on behalf of a criminal defendant, the witness is far more likely to be prosecuted for perjury. In one
prominent Illinois case involving the killing of a Chicago police officer, six witnesses initially gave statements to police
implicating Jonathan Tolliver as a suspect. 56 Those same witnesses later recanted their statements. 57 According to the
witnesses, the original statements had been coerced from them by police. 58 The witnesses, however, paid dearly for the
recantations. Five of the witnesses were charged with perjury and ultimately pled guilty to avoid even more serious sanctions. 59
Prosecutors then trumpeted the convictions as proof that the allegations that the witnesses' testimony had been coerced by police
were false. hO
Inmates thus fmd it easy to fabricate incriminating evidence against fellow defendants and costly to retract incriminating
statements once made. Where the rewards for providing incriminating evidence are great, and where the costs of providing
false testimony on behalf of the State are negligible, the "frequency offabrication by witnesses who have made 'deals' with the
government," as one commentator has observed, ''while impossible to ascertain with accuracy, is potentially staggering." 61
The easy availability of such powerful but unreliable evidence inevitably tempts both incautious and unethical prosecutors and
law enforcement officials. The temptation to use snitch testimony is so great, and the costs so low, that prosecutors frequently
put on such testimony despite multiple "red flags." Confirmation bias and tunnel vision are likely significant explanations
for the frequency with which jailhouse snitch testimony that was later proved false is accepted and used by prosecutors. 62
Confirmation bias descn"bes the tendency, well documented by cognitive researchers, for individuals to seek out evidence that
confirms their preexisting beliefs and *1385 minimize or ignore evidence that contradicts those beliefs. 63 Tunnel vision,
similarly, refers to the tendency of persons to ignore or downplay facts or evidence inconsistent with an individual's preexisting
beliefs. r,-1 It is a product of the "'compendium of common heuristics and logical fallacies,' to which we are all susceptible,
that lead[s] actors in the criminal justice system to 'focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will "build a case"
for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away from guilt"' 65 Prosecutorial tunnel vision has been
identified as a major cause of wrongful convictions. 66 Confirmation bias and tunnel vision help explain why prosecutors often
continue to defend the credibility of jailhouse snitch testimony even after it has been confirmed in exoneration proceedings
to have been false. 6 7
The ease with which false jailhouse snitch testimony can be manufactured also plays into the hands of corrupt police officers
and prosecutors who are seeking shortcuts to conviction or are engaged in corrupt conduct. Research on wrongful convictions,
for example, demonstrates that police are likely to set up innocent people, when they do, by using evidence that is easy
to manufacture and hard to disprove. 6R Jailhouse snitch testimony fits that description. As the *1386 first-hand accounts
provided by seasoned snitches prove, it is almost laughably simple to conjure up a plausible, albeit false, claim that a criminal
defendant made a jailhouse confession. Once such allegations have been made by an informant, the informant has much to gain
by sticking to his story, and even more to lose by retracting it 1' 9

B. Compensated Witnesses Are Inherently Biased
A jailhouse informant is the quintessential self-interested witness. Anglo-American law has long recognized the potentially
distorting effects of self-interest on the accuracy and reliability of legal proceedings. ~0 Indeed, "[s]elf-interested witnesses
were barred from testifying under early common law," - i and informers in particular were viewed as incompetent witnesses

5
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if they stood to directly gain some material benefit from their testimony. ~2 Although the common law bar on self-interested
witnesses has generally been abandoned, awareness of the effect of self-interest on decision making continues to grow. 73
Cognitive researchers have documented the powerful biasing effect of self-interest on objectivity. 74 Human judgment is almost
inevitably influenced, *1387 consciously or unconsciously, by perceived self-interest. 75 Where persons must decide which
of two positions to adopt or accept as true, those who stand to benefit from talcing one position rather than another tend to
favor the position that furthers their own self-interest. 7(, Recognition of the biasing effect of self-interest provides a basis for a
wide variety oflegal rules. Self-interest bars some witnesses from testifying in probate proceedings, 77 for instance, and "selfserving bias" has been recognized in some contexts as grounds for regulating the types of compensation that a witness might
be provided for testifying.
For example, normally ''payments to witnesses in return for testimony are considered unethical and illegal." ., 8 Lawyers who
provide such incentives to witnesses are subject to professional sanctions. 79 There are, however, exceptions to the rule. Expert
witnesses, who are retained by parties and paid significant sums to testify on the party's behalf in court, are an obvious
example. 80 Ethical rules attempt to constrain the degree to which compensated expert witnesses have a stake in the outcome of
the cases in which they testify. 81 Almost every jurisdiction forbids expert witnesses from being paid on a contingent fee basis
in recognition that such a fee arrangement would unduly bias the expert's testimony and be *1388 likely to induce the witness
to tailor her testimony to favor the party on whose behalf she is testifying. 82 Ethics experts have continued to express concern
about even non-contingent fee arrangements with expert witnesses. 83 The mere act of soliciting an initial opinion in a case
provides expert witnesses with incentives to provide a favorable assessment because doing so greatly enhances the likelihood
that they will be retained and paid for future testimony. l\.t

In criminal law, aside from experts and the parties themselves, the most common type of compensated or incentivized witness is
the informant. 85 Informants come in many shapes and sizes. There are informants on the street who are paid to feed information
to police. x6 There are accomplices, codefendants, and coconspirators who seek cooperation deals with prosecutors in order
to reduce or avoid their criminal exposure. f- 7 The use of informants pervades the criminal justice system. According to one
account, approximately one in eight federal prisoners had his or her sentence reduced as a result of providing information to
federal prosecutors. xx All such witnesses are prone to self-serving bias, as are the police and prosecutors who benefit from their
testimony. iN One might argue, therefore, that all informant testimony, and perhaps all incentivized testimony more generally,
is compromised as a result of self-serving bias. 90
Jailhouse snitches, however, pose more of a problem than paid expert witnesses or even other types of snitches. The impact of a
biased expert witness can be muted in many cases by the proffer of competing expert testimony. In a classic ''battle of experts,"
each side can call out an opposing expert whose opinion strays too far from the facts or mainstream science, or at least make
clear to the *1389 jury that the opposing expert's interpretation is subject to debate. In addition, most credible expert witnesses
face reputational constraints that limit the expert's willingness to proffer lrnowingly false or misleading testimony. 91 The same
cannot be said for jailhouse snitches whose reputations are already marginal. Nor is it realistic to think that criminal defendants
can combat jailhouse snitch testimony, or even the testimony of cooperating accomplice witnesses, street snitches, and the
like, by calling comparable witnesses of their own. A criminal defendant lacks the ability to commandeer helpful testimony
from such witnesses because, unlike the prosecutor, he lacks any power to reward such witnesses with leniency or immunity
from prosecution. 92 And whereas prosecutors routinely reward street informants for information and testimony, a criminal
defendant who paid a street informant to testify on his behalf would likely be charged with tampering or bribing witnesses. 9 ~
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Nonetheless, it is not implausible to assume that in many cases some types of cooperating accomplices and street snitches do
have a credible basis for their testimony. Testimony provided by a codefendant who admits to being present at the crime scene,
for example, can be tested against the known facts and evidence in the case, including the defendant's own account where the
defendant chooses to testify.
In contrast, a criminal defendant is typically helpless to counter testimony provided by a lyingjailhouse informant Unlike with
experts, defendants cannot usually put on their own "jailhouse snitch," so criminal defendants lack any opportunity to fight
back on an even playing field In criminal trials there is no ''battle of snitches" that might balance competing versions of events.
The criminal defendant can try, as many have, to call other inmates to testify that the defendant did not make any jailhouse

confession. 9-'I But such testimony is, on its face, usually irrelevant, and courts will often bar it as such. 95 Even when allowed,
however, it is not likely to be effective. After all, such witnesses cannot prove the negative- that an alleged confession did
not actually occur-if the jailhouse informant testifies, as an untruthfuljailhouse informant invariably will, that the confession
was made out of earshot of other prisoners. Finally, whereas ethical rules bar contingent fee agreements with experts out of
fear that such arrangements will bias witness *1390 testimony,jailhouse informants--and indeed all informants-testify almost
exclusively under arrangements that create de facto contingent payment arrangements. Because ''payment" in terms ofleniency
almost always is granted by the prosecutor after the informant testifies, the informant readily understands that the informant's
chances of getting rewarded are contingent on his delivery of credible incriminating evidence against the defendant.

II. JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY IS IDGHLY PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE

Jailhouse snitch testimony is problematic for another reason. There is, by and large, only one thing to which a jailhouse snitch
can testify: that a fellow inmate confessed, and confession evidence is widely acknowledged to possess unique potency. 96
The Supreme has Court observed that confessions are ''probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be
admitted." 97 One prominent evidence scholar asserted that "introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a trial
in court superfluous." 9 ~ Research confirms that evidence that the defendant has confessed greatly increases the odds of
conviction. 99 In a study conducted by Kassin and Neumann, researchers presented mock jurors with a variety of evidence of
guilt and found that jurors were far more likely to convict suspects when the evidence included a confession than when other
types of traditional evidence, such as eyewitness identifications or physical evidence, were presented 100 They thus concluded
that "confession evidence has a greater impact on jurors-and is seen as having a greater impact by jurors- than other potent
types of evidence." 101
Secondary confessions-that is, confessions made to witnesses (other than police officers)-are likely not as persuasive to jurors
as direct confessions. 1o::: Jurors do, as a general matter, discount secondary confession evidence to some extent, and jurors
may often be unwilling to convict based on secondary confession evidence alone. 103 However, secondary confession evidence
remains extremely potent. "Since few species of evidence are as powerful as an acknowledgement of guilt from the mouth of
the accused, *1391 jailhouse informant testimony can be highly persuasive." lO-i Secondary confession evidence is likely to
be particularly critical in "close cases." 10~ That is, jailhouse snitch testimony is likely to be most influential where the State
has some other evidence of guilt, but that other evidence is weak. 1or, And these cases are precisely the ones in which jailhouse

snitches are most likely to be used. 1o~ After all, the State must pay a price to induce the jailhouse snitch to testify, and it can be
expected to avoid doing so unless prosecutors believe that the testimony is needed. 1o;c: Accordingly,jailhouse snitch testimony
will typically only be introduced when the prosecutor is concerned about the sufficiency of her case, and the testimony will
tend to have the greatest impact in precisely those cases.

111 ' 1
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The prevailing assumption by courts, and the justification for admitting jailhouse snitch testimony absent any significant
reliability review or assessment, is that jurors are capable of discounting unreliable snitch testimony as the facts and
circumstances warrant. 110 This assumption is almost certainly incorrect. Research on fundamental attnbution error
demonstrates that jurors cannot properly discount snitch testimony, even when they know that snitches have incentives to lie. 11 1

In a recent study, a team of researchers set out to test the claim that jurors are able to effectively discount secondary confession
evidence provided by a cooperating witness with incentives to fabricate evidence. 112 Their findings undercut the assertion that
jurors are able to properly take into account the degree to which witness incentives undermine reliability.

1 13

In the study, the

researchers recruited 345 college students and persons from the community to act as mock jurors. 1 l .t All of the mock jurors
were given an abbreviated trial transcript drawn from a real criminal case. 115 The transcript set forth the testimony of two
State's witnesses, one who provided fiber evidence and another who *1392 presented knife evidence, and included opening
and closing statements. 1 16 The control group received this transcript only. 1 17 Other groups received the same transcript, plus
the testimony of an additional witness who claimed to have heard the defendant confess to the crime. 11H In some cases, mock
jurors were told that the witness had inadvertently learned of the crime and came forward as an act of civic duty. 11q In other
cases, they were told that the witness was testifying pursuant to a cooperation deal in which the witness would directly benefit
from his testimony. I2 u The researchers then asked all of the mock jurors to assess the guilt of the defendant. 12 1 Consistent
with prior research, researchers found that mock jurors who were given the confession evidence convicted the defendant at
significantly higher rates than those who were not presented the confession evidence. 122
More disturbing, however, the researchers found that the mock jurors who were presented with the confession evidence
convicted at the same rate regardless of the source of the evidence. 123 Conviction rates, their data indicated, "were unaffected
by the explicit provision of information indicating that the witness received an incentive to testify." 124 Although the mock
jurors' questionnaire responses demonstrated that they understood that the "civic duty" witness was more interested in serving
justice than the "incentivized" witness, the mock jurors failed to discount the reliability of the incentivized witness. 125
The most plausible explanation for these results, as the researchers suggest, is that the mock jurors were committing
"fundamental attribution error." 126 As they explain, "According to the fundamental attribution hypothesis, perceivers will
ignore the contextual and situational factors in favor ofa dispositional attribution. In application to a jury situation,jurors should
perceive a witness' behavior as influenced by personal factors rather than situational demands." 127
The vast majority of participants in the experiment seemed to make just this mistake, dismissing the possibility that important
contextual factors like incentives for incriminating another suspect might influence the witness's motives to provide truthful

*1393 testimony. 1~8 The mock jurors instead simply accepted the witness's testimony at face value. 129
Prior studies similarly have concluded that "attributors attach insufficient weight to situational causes and accept behavior at
'face value."'

130

To be sure, some of these studies have found evidence that subjects were able to engage in some critical

assessment of certain types of confession evidence.

131

For instance, where subjects were told that a confession was coerced

through threats or violence, they tended to more heavily discount the credibility of the confession. 1·' 2 After conducting one
such study in which investigators provided subjects with trial transcripts from a mock case presenting a variety of evidence to
the subjects, the investigators found that the subjects consistently gave some types of evidence more weight than others.

1·' 3
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Although subjects continued to be more likely to convict in confession cases than nonconfession cases, subjects generally
viewed confessions made in exchange for positive rewards as more credible than confessions made in response to threats. 13-l
When the coercive influence was operationally defmed as a threat of harm or punishment, subjects clearly discounted the
confession evidence-they viewed the confession as involuntary and manifested a relatively low rate of conviction. However,
when coercion took the form of an offer or a promise of leniency, subjects were unable or unwilling to dismiss the prior
confession. i.:;s

Although this research demonstrates that jurors have the capacity to overcome fundamental attribution bias and discount certain
·types of confession evidence, it does nothing to increase confidence in jurors' capacity to properly assess jailhouse snitch
testimony induced through positive incentives. Rather, these findings cast further doubt on jurors' ability to adequately discount
the reliability of jailhouse snitch testimony that has been induced through positive incentives.
Juror insensitivity to the increased unreliability of incentivized witness testimony is magnified by two additional factors. First,
as discussed above, typical jurors almost certainly do not understand how easy it is for jailhouse snitches to manufacture detailed
false *1394 confessions. If jailhouse snitches testify about details that seem like they could only have been learned if the
perpetrator had actually confessed to the snitch, but were actually gathered through the variety of approaches that snitches like
Sidney Storch have admitted to using. thenjailhouse snitch testimony will often be viewed as more credible than it should be.
Second, many jurors might perceive jailhouse snitch testimony as worthy of enhanced credence because of implicit or explicit
prosecutorial bolstering of the witness's credibility. The mere fact that a prosecutor calls a jailhouse informant to serve as
a State's witness suggests that the prosecutor has already determined the witness to be credible and truthful. Although the
amount of presumptive credit the jury extends to State's witnesses will vary depending on both the local community's and the
individual juror's views regarding prosecutorial honesty and integrity, in many jurisdictions the State begins with the benefit
of the doubt

13 ''

Moreover, even though it constitutes improper practice, it is not uncommon for prosecutors to affirmatively vouch for, or bolster,
the credibility of the jailhouse snitches they put on the witness stand

I J7

Take the controversial case of Troy Davis, who was

,x

executed in 2011. 1 Davis was tried for the 1989 murder of Savannah police officer Mark McPhail. 139 At Davis's trial in
1991, the State called ajailhouse snitch named Kevin McQueen to testify about an alleged confession made by Davis while
the two men were on the prison basketball court. i .in The snitch's testimony was suspect. Not only had McQueen served as an
informant for the State in other cases, 14 1 but his testimony was also seemingly implausible on its face. Numerous witnesses
testified at Davis's trial that the persons who *1395 were involved with the police officer shooting had been playing pool at
a local pool hall, that a man named Sylvester ''Red" Coles had gotten into an argument with a homeless man outside the pool
hall, and that Troy Davis and a friend-who had both also been playing pool at the hall at the time-had followed Coles and
his victim up the street to a Burger King parking lot where the police officer-who was responding to the fight between Coles
and the homeless man-was shot l-l~
When the State called jailhouse snitch McQueen to testify at trial, however, McQueen claimed that Troy Davis had "confessed"
to him a very different set of facts. 14 ., According to McQueen, Davis told him that he had gone to a party in Cloverdale, 144 a
Savannah suburb, and that after the party, he had gone to his girlfriend's house, that they had decided to get breakfast at Burger
King, and that he ran into someone who owed Davis money that was loaned to buy "dope." 145 According to McQueen, Davis
told him that "they got into some beef there, and then a whole bunch of commotion started, and a dude came in what turned
out to be Officer McPhail, and there were some shots fired" J-l<, On cross-examination, McQueen admitted that he had seen a
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story about the shooting on the news but denied "hoping to gain any advantage by testifying on behalf of the State, claiming
that he had already been sentenced for his crimes." 14 7
The supposed confession recounted by McQueen failed to match up in almost any way with the other evidence in the case.
McQueen's version of the confession put Davis in the wrong place, at the wrong time, for the wrong reasons, in light of the
evidence *1396 presented at trial and the State's own theory of the case. l-lS In fact, McQueen's account of this supposed
confession was deemed, by the federal district court judge who years later conducted a three-day habeas hearing on Troy Davis's
contention of actual innocence, to be patently false because it "totally contradict[ed) the events of the night as described by
numerous other State witnesses." 149 Indeed, the judge found that McQueen's trial testimony ''was so clearly fabricated" that
the Court could not understand "why the State persist[ed] in trying to support its veracity." 150
But the State's position at trial and beyond was that McQueen's testimony was solid and credible. 151 In his closing argument to
the jury, Savannah District Attorney Spencer Lawton beseeched the jury to credit McQueen's testimony. 15 ~ As he told the jury:
You heard from Kevin McQueen. Kevin McQueen was, in Mr. Barker's terms, the jailbird. Weli if you're
going to talk to Troy Anthony Davis about what he did, you've got to be where Troy Anthony Davis is,
and Kevin McQueen told you that he was told by Troy Anthony Davis that ... Davis had shot Officer
McPhail. There's not a reason on earth to doubt his word. There was nothing, no reason why he had to be
here, except that we subpoenaed him when we learned what he had to say. 153

Notwithstanding that the jailhouse snitch's testimony was later dismissed as "clearly fabricated," jurors were assured by the
District Attorney that "there's not a reason on earth to doubt his word." 154 It is difficult, in retrospect, to ascertain the weight that
the jury ultimately gave to McQueen's testimony, but the attempt by prosecutors to bolster McQueen's testimony and convince
the jury that the jailhouse snitch was a reliable witness certainly could have contributed to the jury's decision to convict.

m. STATUS QUO SAFEGUARDS ARE INEFFECTIVE
Despite the virtual avalanche of evidence that jailhouse snitch testimony is inherently biased, unreliable, and frequently the
cause of wrongful convictions, few jurisdictions have taken any meaningful steps to limit its use, and none bar it completely. 15 5
Defenders of the status quo contend that the traditional tools of litigation-vigorous *1397 cross-examination and postconviction review-adequately enable criminal defendants to discredit lying jailhouse snitches or, where jailhouse testimony
was only later revealed to have been perjured, to obtain post-conviction relief. 156 For reasons discussed below, neither of these
supposedly reliable litigation tools provides innocent defendants with meaningful protections from being wrongfully convicted
because of false jailhouse snitch testimony.

A. Cross-Examination Constitutes an Inadequate Means to Check False or Unreliable Jailhouse Snitch Testimony

In Kansas v. Ventris, 15 - the U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to adopt sweeping limitations on the use of jailhouse
informant testimony. 15 x Defendant Ray Ventris had been convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery after he
and an accomplice named Rhonda Theel shot and killed a man in his home and drove away with approximately $300 and
the victim's cell phone.

1" 9

Theel pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and agreed to testify against Ventris. 1<,ri In exchange,
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prosecutors agreed not to prosecute Theel for murder. l(,I At trial, Theel testified that Ventris was the main instigator, while
Ventris testified that Theel was primarily responsible for the robbery and shooting. 162
The State then called a jailhouse informant who had been planted in Ventris's holding cell for the specific purpose of
gathering "incriminating statements" from Ventris. 163 Although the State conceded that use of the jailhouse informant to elicit
incriminating statements from Ventris likely violated the Sixth Amendment, the trial court permitted the informant's testimony
regarding Ventris's statements to come in for impeachment purposes. 164 The informant then testified that Ventris confessed to
him that '"[h]e'd shot this man in his head and in his chest' and taken 'his keys, his wallet, about $350.00, and ... a vehicle."'

165

The jury acquitted Ventris on the murder count, but convicted him of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. 166 The
Kansas *1398 Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the admission ofVentris's purported confession obtained
in violation of the Sixth Amendment for impeachment purposes was erroneous. 167 When the case reached the U.S. Supreme
Court, Ventris and amici on his behalf argued, inter alia, that "jailhouse snitches are so inherently unreliable" that the Court
should "craft a broader exclusionary rule for uncorroborated statements obtained by that means." 16~ The Court rejected that
argument. 1r,9
As the Court explained, "Our legal system .•. is built on the premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of
competing witnesses, and we have long purported to avoid 'establish[ing] this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation

of state rules of criminal procedure." 170 The Court concluded that statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment
may be used for impeachment purposes, and that the credibility of the jailhouse informant's testimony regarding Ventris' alleged
jailhouse confession was a matter for the jury to determine. 171 The Court thus declined to impose more stringent regulation
of jailhouse informant testimony. Reasoning similarly, numerous state courts have also rejected calls for greater regulation of
jailhouse informant testimony.

172

The Court's holding in Ventris followed the conventional notion that credibility and reliability determinations should normally
be left to the fact finder. 17·' As the Court noted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., I 7-l "Vigorous cross
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." 1'~
The assumption, however, that vigorous cross-examination provides an effective means of exposing or defeating unreliable
*1399 evidence is increasingly being questioned with respect to certain types of evidence. The Oregon State Supreme Court
recently decided that in cases involving eyewitness identifications obtained through suggestive police procedures, "'traditional'
methods of testing reliability--like cross-examination-can be ineffective at discrediting unreliable or inaccurate eyewitness
identification evidence." 1~(, As the Oregon court noted, research studies have demonstrated that mock jurors are surprisingly
bad at distinguishing accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifications. 17 7 Prominent academic commentators have also
concluded that judges and jurors often fail to properly discount all sorts of direct and factual evidence, including eyewitness
testimony, because they are "often not aware of the factors that decrease the reliability of eyewitness perception and memory,"
and not nearly as competent at evaluating the veracity of witnesses testifying in court as commonly thought.

I is

For these same reasons, the Court's assumption in Ventris that impeachment of unreliable or untruthful witnesses is sufficient
to protect criminal defendants from wrongful convictions is wrong in the case of jailhouse snitches. As noted above, confession
evidence is a uniquely potent form of evidence in criminal trials. Jurors are almost certain to give extraordinary weight to
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evidence that a defendant has confessed. Where confession evidence has been obtained through the use of coercion, the courts
have long recognized that such evidence is inadmissible, and that the conventional means of impeaching unreliable evidencecross-examination-provides insufficient protection against undue prejudice.

179

As Justice White observed in Arizona v.

Fulminante: ;xo
A defendant's confession is "probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him," so damaging
that a jury should not be expected to ignore it even if told to do so. Moreover, it is impossible to know what credit and weight
•
--"•
181
a Juror
gave to a cowess10n.

*1400 Strict exclusion is sometimes the only appropriate remedy where extremely damaging but unreliable evidence threatens

to "distort the truth-seeking function of the trial." 1:(:
Second, because jurors are likely to proceed under the biasing influence of fundamental attribution error, the traditional stuff of
impeachment-the demonstration that a jailhouse snitch has a poor character for honesty and self-interested motives to testifywill often have little or no impact on jury decision making. Once the jury has heard the evidence that the defendant has confessed
to the crime, the damage has already been done.
Third, unlike most other types of evidence frequently used in criminal cases, jailhouse snitch testimony is often uniquely
insulated from effective impeachment. This insulation exists in part because the incentives that jailhouse informants receive in
exchange for cooperation are typically hidden. 1R., Prosecutors rarely negotiate explicit deals with jailhouse snitches prior to
their testimony. 184 Rather, prosecutors and snitches operate with a shared understanding that a snitch's positive performance
will eventually be rewarded with tangible benefits. 185 The lack of any record of benefits promised to the informant impedes
effective impeachment by defense counsel, just as it was designed to do. I ,% The usual practice of refusing to enter into any
formal deal before the snitch testifies in court was documented in one Florida case, where the prosecutor's notes memorializing
his conversation with the snitch were later discovered and became the subject of a Brady dispute. 187 Here is how the prosecutor
summarized his conversation: "Spoke with Fred Landt [Freeman's defense counsel] regarding Dennis Freeman. Told him I
would make no firm offer prior to [Ponticelli's] trial but assured him his cooperation would be remembered with favor before
mitigating judge/Sturgis. Will make no formal deal on the record prior to trial." 1Xls
At an evidentiary hearing on the Brady claim, the prosecutor denied that the note indicated that she had made any undisclosed
*1401 deal with the informant.

189

Regardless of whether that claim was technically correct, the note evidences what is already
acknowledged to be standard practice: prosecutors avoid making any formal deals prior to trial, but provide sufficient posttrial rewards to snitches to ensure a steady future supply. 1qo That practice was also apparent in the notorious case of Cameron
Todd Willingham. 191 Willingham was accused in Texas of murdering his three young daughters by arson. 192 At his capital
trial, Texas prosecutors calledjailhouse snitch Johnny Webb, who was serving a fifteen-year sentence for aggravated robbery,
to testify about a confession Willingham supposedly made. 193 After testifying improbably that Willingham, who hardly knew
Webb, confessed to him through a hole in a steel door in Willingham's cell, Webb denied that prosecutors had offered him any
inducementto testify.
Webb parole."

195

194

Nonetheless, "(f]ive years later the prosecutor asked the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles to grant

Webb later recanted his trial testimony, but then recanted his recantation.

believed to be innocent, was executed by Texas in 2004.

197

I%

Willingham, who is widely
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Jailhouse snitch testimony is also difficult to impeach effectively because it is invariably of the ''he said-she said" variety.
As long as the snitch can plausibly testify that he had an opportunity-no matter how fleeting-to speak with the defendant,
the snitch's claim that the defendant confessed to him is practically unverifiable. Defense counsel can impugn the credibility
of the snitch, but many criminal defendants-especially defendants with a criminal *1402 history-go into a jury trial with
their own credibility highly suspect and will often be unlikely to come out on top in any swearing contest. Whether or not the
jailhouse snitch is perceived to be believable may ultimately turn simply on the comparative rhetorical skills of the prosecutor
and defense counsel. l 'i:,; Defense attorneys equipped with superior cross-examination skills may successfully blunt the force
of ajailhouse snitch's testimony, but the vast majority of criminal defendants saddled with average or inferior counsel will have
no such luck. It is not unusual, moreover, for trial courts to affirmatively prevent the defense from even questioning the snitch
about the snitch's criminal history or the charges pending against him.

199

Apart from simply impeaching the character of the snitch or the circumstances or plausibility of the snitch's claim, there is very
little that defense counsel can do to counter snitch testimony. For a variety of reasons, defense lawyers can rarely call witnesses
of their own to prove that the defendant did not confess to the snitch. 200 In most cases, a lying snitch will simply testify that the
defendant confessed in private, when there were no other witnesses to overhear the alleged confession. 201 And in some cases,
inmates work together to corroborate each other's false testimony. 2<c The Los Angeles County Grand Jury investigation on the
County's use of jailhouse informants discovered several instances in which multiple inmates coordinated their trial testimony
to make their false claims more credible. 203 Not only is it difficult to find jailhouse witnesses who can effectively counter
snitch testimony, in some cases it is positively hazardous to even try. 20..i One attorney told the Los Angeles Grand Jury that
jailhouse informants were so uniformly untrustworthy that he was afraid to even interview them because he feared they might
fabricate some criminal activity that the attorney *1403 was engaged in, such as suborning perjury. 205 Whereas under current
law prosecutors are permitted to reward informants and cooperating witnesses with substantial benefits in exchange for their
helpful testimony, defense lawyers have no comparable authority. 206 Indeed, defense lawyers who offer rewards to defense
witnesses might be prosecuted for witness tampering. 207
·,:;;J

In sum, the dynamics ofjailhouse snitch testimony make cross-examination uniquely ill suited to produce reliable results. While
suffering many similar defects, other forms of incentivized testimony, such as that provided by cooperating accomplices, codefendants, and street snitches, at least provide defense counsel with some objective factual context that might be used to assess
the credibility of the witness. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACOL'') argued to the Supreme
Court in Ventris, accomplice testimony retains at least some indicia of reliability because ''the accomplice inculpates herself in
the process." 20!'( In contrast, "snitch testimony lacks even this form of corroboration." 209
For all these reasons, cross-examination cannot be relied upon to ensure that false snitch testimony is not believed or that
unreliable evidence is not given undue weight by jurors.

B. Post-Conviction Review of False Jailhouse Snitch Testimony Is Also Insufficient
If cross-examination often proves wholly ineffective in countering false jailhouse snitch testimony, the other traditional
remedy-post-conviction review--is even more dysfunctional. First, the same structural difficulties that plague efforts to impeach
snitches through cross-examination are present in a post-conviction challenge of snitch testimony. Rarely will evidence be

°

available, post-conviction, to prove that a jailhouse snitch lied at trial. 2 1 Credibility determinations are largely in the province
of the fact finder and are ahnost never disturbed on review.: 11 Second, even when reviewing courts do determine that a
jailhouse informant's testimony was unreliable, or even plainly false, courts rarely grant relief. : 12

.<' -.,

"'
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In one puzzling case, for example, a defendant had been convicted and sentenced to life in prison for allegedly participating
*1404 in the rape and murder ofa young woman. 213 The State's evidence against the defendant was weak. DNA evidence
implicated another man but not the defendant. 21 -1 The only physical evidence against the defendant was a single pubic hair
that had been recovered among sixteen others from the crime scene. 215 The hair was described as a nonexclusive match to
the defendant's hair type. 2 16 The State conceded by stipulation that the defendant was excluded as a contributor of any of the
other fifteen hairs. 217 One of these possibly matched another suspect in the case. 2 18 The State's case against the defendant
was built on this one hair and the testimony of three witnesses. 219 The first witness was a fourteen-year-old boy, described
in a psychological evaluation as having a penchant for lying, who gave inconsistent statements to police, only one of which
implicated the defendant, and who testified at trial that the defendant was not involved in the attack. 220 The other two witnesses
were jailhouse informants. 221 The first jailhouse informant, a man named Hopkins, testified that the defendant had confessed
to participating in the attack. 222 Hopkins's credibility was dubious; according to the appellate court:
Hopkins admitted to hearingjail guards talking about the case, but claimed he heard their conversations after
he first talked to the police. He said that everyone in jail was talking about what happened in defendant's
case. Hopkins also revealed that he had provided testimony in two other special circumstance murder cases.
In exchange for his testimony, Hopkins had three felony counts dismissed. His sentence of four years ten
months on the remaining counts he pled guilty to was stayed and he was released from jail. Furthermore,
Hopkins's statement that he talked with defendant while they worked mornings together at the same job in
the jail yard was shown to be untrue, as defendant never had a morning job. 213

A second jailhouse informant named Cooper also testified that defendant had admitted to participating in the rape and
murder. 22 -1 *1405 But as the appellate court pointed out, this informant also had both a record of prior cooperation and
apparently strong incentives to testify. 215
Cooper was in the San Joaquin County Jail on warrants for charges of possession of precursors with intentto manufacture drugs

,,c,

and receiving stolen property, plus prior conviction enhancements. "'- ' Cooper stated he was afraid that ifhe went to prison he
would be killed. 227 Cooper also had a lengthy record of felony and misdemeanor convictions dating to the 1970s and was on
probation at the time of his testimony. 228 In exchange for his testimony, Cooper was allowed to serve his time in Humboldt
County, where he was placed in an alternative work program. 229 After two days in that program, Cooper left. :i:,.o He remained
at large until just before the trial, when he was arrested on a probation violation and sentenced to thirty days in jail. 131 When
arrested, Cooper gave several fake names and birth dates, apparently to avoid arrest on three outstanding felony warrants. 2;, 2
Cooper also admitted he had provided information to the police to benefit himself a couple of times in the past. 23 3
Notwithstanding the obvious flimsiness of the State's case-consisting entirely of one nonexclusively matching hair, an
inconsistent statement from an untrustworthy child, and the testimony of two jailhouse snitches, one of whom was caught in
a flat lie and the other who had obvious incentives to help the State-the jury convicted and the appellate court affirmed. 23 -1
The appellate court reasoned that although there were serious problems with each of the witnesses who testified, the witnesses
corroborated each other. 235 The police statement given by the fourteen-year-old with a propensity to lie was corroborated by
the self-serving and clearly perjurious testimony of the jailhouse snitch. and vice versa. 2·1" The appellate court seems to have
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thought that while a small amount of untrustworthy evidence might provide an insufficient basis for conviction, problems with
the reliability of the State's evidence could be overcome by piling on more untrustworthy evidence.

*1406 Sometimes appellate judges simply do not know what to think but affirm anyway. In one Georgia case, a habeas court
denied relief to a defendant who had been convicted of mwder and armed robbery almost entirely on the testimony of a jailhouse
informant named Donald Bates. 23 7 At trial, Bates testified that the defendant Johnny Ashley had made a jailhouse confession to

him. 238 Defense counsel for Ashley adduced substantial impeachment evidence on cross-examination, but the jury convicted
Ashley nonetheless. 2 ·i 9 After conducting extensive post-conviction hearings, Ashley's lawyers put on extensive evidence that
Bates was mentally ill and had fabricated his trial testimony. 240
At the conclusion of the hearing on the matter, the judge summed up his thoughts on the matter:
At the trial I thought Donald Bates was lying. Now I think Donald Bates is lying on the trial, but I do not
think that affects the verdict in the case . . . I just don't believe prisoners who testify against prisoners to
get out of jail. And I don't think juries do either. I didn't believe it then; I don't believe it now. I don't think
that you've proved anything about what the truth is, either. I don't think it was what Mr. Bates swore it was
and I don't think we know. 241

Despite conceding that one of the main witnesses at Ashley's trial was an untrustworthy witness and a blatant liar, the trial court
denied Ashley's motion for a new trial, based entirely, it appears, on the judge's conviction that the snitch's testimony was so
obviously perjured that members of the jury must have realized it. 242 In so ruling, the judge failed to take into account several
factors that might have led a jury to give such testimony credence at trial, including that Mr. Bates was the State's witness whose
credibility *1407 was defended by the prosecutor, that the judge himself had permitted the witness to testify in the first place,
and that the jury's verdict itselfbelied his conclusion. In any event, the court's ruling was affirmed on appeal. 243 Ashley served
twenty years in a Georgia prison, and was released on parole on January 31, 2012. 244
What is worse, even in cases where jailhouse snitches come forward and admit that they lied at trial, courts rarely grant
defendants post-conviction relief. 245 This happened, for instance, in the Troy Davis case. 246 Five years after jailhouse snitch
Kevin McQueen testified that Davis confessed to shooting police officer Mark McPhail, McQueen executed an affidavit
recanting his trial testimony. 247 In the affidavit, McQueen explained that he had heard details of the Davis case on television
and from other inmates, and he had then contacted the detective in charge of the investigation. 24 ;,; He falsely told the detective
that Davis had confessed to him and repeated the stocy at trial. :-1 9 He also admitted that the charges against him had been
dropped or reduced as a reward for his testimony, a fact that he also lied about at trial. ~50
McQueen's recantation was presented to numerous courts during the approximately twenty years that Davis sought to prove
that he was actually innocent of the murder of the Savannah police officer. 2=- 1 Because Davis was deemed to have procedurally
defaulted most of his legal claims, few courts even addressed the significance of McQueen's recantation. ;;;; 2 When a judge
finally did consider the significance of the recantation in a habeas hearing conducted to evaluate Davis's actual innocence claim,
the judge rejected it as insignificant. ::: 53 According to the judge, McQueen's trial testimony was so patently false that the jury
must have been aware of the fact *1408 at trial. 254 Therefore, the judge concluded, McQueen's recantation was both plainly
true and inconsequential. 255 Davis's habeas petition was denied, and Davis was subsequently executed. ~56

·15
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Although it took twenty years, a better result was obtained by Bobby Joe Maxwell. Maxwell had been convicted in 1992Iargely on the testimony of infamous jailhouse snitch Sidney Storch-of committing several murders attributed to the "Skid
Row Stabber." 257 Based on extensive evidence, including the testimony given by Storch to the Los Angeles County Grand
Jury, that Storch was a serial perjurer who had made a living concocting false jaiJhouse confessions, the Ninth Circuit granted
Maxwell's habeas petition in 2012. 258 Even then, however, the Ninth Circuit was forced to expressly overrule factual findings
made by the California Superior Court, which had concluded. notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of Storch's "pattern of
perjury," that there was no basis in the Maxwell case itself to find that Storch's testimony was false. 159
California sought certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied over the dissents of Justices Scalia and
Alito. 160 Justice Scalia complained that, at best, "the evidence relied on by the Ninth Circuit might permit, but by no means
compels, the conclusion that Storch fabricated Maxwell's admission." 161 This, Scalia argued. was an insufficient basis upon
which to grant habeas relief. 261 Writing in support of the Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Sotomayor responded:
The dissent labels all of this evidence "circumstantial." It insists that it is possible that Storch
repeatedly falsely implicated other defendants, and fabricated other material facts at Maxwell's trial, but
uncharacteristically told the truth about Maxwell's supposed confession. Of course, that is possible. But it is
not reasonable, given the voluminous evidence that Storch was a habitual liar who even the State concedes
told other material lies at Maxwell's trial. 263

Maxwell's case does demonstrate that post-conviction relief for some victims of false jailhouse testimony is possible, but it is
the exception that proves the rule. The evidence ofStorch's misconduct was overwhelming, and Maxwell's victory seemingly
grudging. *1409 Plainly, post-conviction relief for defendants convicted on the basis of unreliable or false snitch testimony is
technically available but practically attainable only in extreme cases, and even then only over spirited opposition. As the state
court rulings in Maxwell's case illustrate, busy and jaded state appellate courts typically look the other way in the presence
of even blatant evidence that jailhouse snitches lied at a criminal defendant's trial, and sentiment in favor of upholding those
determinations exists in some quarters all the way up the judicial chain of command 264
This anecdotal evidence is supported by more systematic research. Professor Brandon Garrett conducted a study of the first
two hundred DNA exonerations. 265 In those cases, Garrett found that jailhouse informant testimony had been a factor in I 1.5
percent of the cases. ~66 Jailhouse informants provided testimony in forty-three percent of the capital cases that ultimately ended
in exoneration. 2(' 7 Strikingly, not one of those wrongly convicted defendants attempted to challenge their convictions based
on a claim that the jailhouse informant had fabricated testimony, likely, as Garrett surmises, ''because they could not locate
any evidence to prove that the informants testified falsely." 268 Reviewing the record ofreliefgranted in cases involving false
jaiJhouse snitch testimony, it is abundantly clear that wrongly convicted defendants cannot rely on post-conviction processes
for relief. As Anne Bowen Poulin has argued, ''When false testimony is given at trial the truth finding process is fundamentally
corrupted." 269 The courts' routine failure to grant relief to defendants who establish that jailhouse snitches presented false
testimony at trial deserves prompt and effective relief, but such relief, sadly, for most has simply not been forthcoming.

IV. REGULATION OF JAil,HOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY
SHORT OF ABOLmON IS CERTAIN TO BE INEFFECTIVE
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A wide variety of commentators have condemnedjailhouse snitch testimony for many of the reasons noted here. ::~o They have

*1410 proposed a variety of reforms, including enhanced disclosure requirements to ensure vigorous cross-examination of
jailhouse informants, pretrial reliability hearings, special jury instructions, using experts to educate the jury about the effect
of incentives on the reliability of testimony, and heightened corroboration requirements. 271 Few, however, have vigorously
called for an outright ban on use of electronically uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony. 27 ~ As I argue here, however,
nothing less than a total ban on such testimony v:ill be effective.

A. Pretrial Reliability Hearings Are Unlikely to Adequately Screen Out Lying Jailhouse Snitches
Some commentators have proposed conducting pretrial reliability hearings to screen out unreliable jailhouse snitch
testimony. :: 73 Leading snitch expert Alexandra Natapoff, for example, urges courts to conduct pretrial reliability hearings
for all informant witnesses, including jailhouse snitches that the government intends to present at trial. 274 In such hearings,
the government would have the burden to demonstrate "the reliability of any informant witness, or statements made by that
informant." 275 Moreover, as she points out, at least three states have already established pretrial reliability hearings for jailhouse
snitches. 276 Proponents argue that such hearings fall well within the comfort zone of trial courts, which regularly are asked to
screen other types *1411 of evidence, such as scientific evidence and expert witness testimony, for reliability. 277
Professor George Harris has also proposed that courts undertake extensive pretrial reliability hearings of any compensated
witness, including jailhouse snitches. 2~s Harris suggests that evidence at such hearings would include anything relevant to
the witness's credibility, including the ''nature of compensation that the witness has received or may receive," the witness's
history of cooperation in other cases, and physical or other evidence ''unknown to the witness at the time ofher initial proffer of
testimony, that is consistent with or contradicts the cooperator's testimony" in specific and unanticipated ways. ~79 "Changed
testimony, a history of repeated cooperation for compensation, compensation out of proportion to the government's legitimate
interest in the prosecution of the defendant, or overtly contingent compensation should create a presumption of insufficient
reliability that the moving party would have to overcome." 280
Although adoption of a pretrial reliability screening requirement would not be a bad thing, and might even be moderately
helpful, the proposed pretrial reliability screenings would certainly not be a panacea. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that
trial courts have the ability or inclination to screen out false jailhouse snitch testimony in the mine run of cases.
For starters, judges are unlikely to be any better than jurors at distinguishing lying witnesses from honest ones. 2~ 1 Numerous
studies have examined the extent to which training and expertise improves one's ability to assess whether others are telling the
truth. :ic Police officers in particular have been the focus of many of these studies because they regularly interview suspects
and evaluate the credibility of the stories they are told. :s., Without exception, those studies have found that "people are
poor intuitive judges of truth and deception, and that police investigators and *1412 other so-called experts who routinely
make such judgments are also highly prone to error.":::s..i Indeed, some studies indicate that specialized training might make
interviewers more likely to misinterpret the truthfulness of the interviewee and to increase the interviewer's confidence in
those misjudgments. :s~ If police investigators--who often receive special training in interrogation skills and lie detection-have not demonstrated any measurable advantage in detecting deception, there is little reason to believe judges--who deal with
individuals at far greater remove--have developed any better abilities.
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Like police officers, judges actually might be more poorly equipped than jurors to fairly evaluate the credibility of a jailhouse
snitch's incriminating testimony, and confirmation bias again may be the culprit. Research on judge and juror perceptions of guilt
indicates that judges are more likely to view criminal defendants as guilty than jurors. 2Sh In Kalven and Zeisel's classic study
of jury behavior, for example, the researchers found that judges were consistently more likely than juries to vote to convict. 287
Other researchers have found "similar patterns of trial judges unduly leaning in the prosecution's favor when appraising the
evidence." 288 Due to the volume of apparently guilty criminal defendants that judges sec regularly in their courtrooms, judges
may similarly be more strongly disinclined to question the accuracy of the jailhouse snitch's testimony, which confirms what
the judge likely assumes anyway: that the defendant is guilty.
Pro-prosecution bias by judges has been frequently noted in other contexts as well. For instance, judicial tolerance of police
perjury is widely acknowledged. ~89 Courts know that police frequently lie but tend to look the other way. 290 A variety of
scholars have concluded that trial judges "habitually accept□ the policeman's word" and may even ignore police lies "to prevent
the suppression of evidence and assure conviction." 291 At least one research study *1413 lends empirical credence to that
hypothesis. 292 One commentator summarized the most frequently advanced explanations for why judges so frequently fail to
crack down on police perjury:
1) it is impossible to determine if a witness is lying; 2) judges dislike the possibility of suppressing evidence
due to police perjury; 3) many judges believe that most defendants in the system are guilty; 4) judges are
more likely to believe an officer's testimony rather than the defendant's; and 5) judges do not enjoy accusing
other government officials oflying. ~93

The reasons judges are reluctant to make credibility determinations against police are also applicable to jailhouse snitches in
that adverse credibility findings might also impugn the motives or integrity of the prosecutors who put the snitches on the
witness stand. In many cases there will be little external basis on which to assess the credibility of a jailhouse snitch's testimony.
Because of pro-prosecution bias, judges may be more inclined to permit prosecutors to put on potentially unreliable evidence,
particularly because such evidence confirms the possible judicial assumption that most defendants are, in fact, guilty. While
judges are unlikely to be inclined to specially credit an inmate's testimony under most circumstances, they may be more willing
to credit such testimony where it has been previously vetted-or at least apparently vetted-by law enforcement officials. Finally,
just as judges are often reluctant to accuse police officers oflying, they probably are also reluctant to make an adverse credibility
determination against a witness for whom the prosecutor has-expressly or implicitly-personally vouched. After all, a judicial
determination that such a witness is lying at minimum suggests that the prosecutor who put that witness on the .stand was
negligent in proffering the evidence, and could even imply that the prosecutor knowingly attempted to use false testimony.
That judges tend, for whatever reason, to be biased when assessing the admissibility of evidence is further supported by
the judicial track record in screening scientific evidence. As Professor Suzanne Rozelle has argued, a study of evidentiary
challenges in criminal cases reveals a clear pattern of pro-prosecution admissibility rulings. 294 Courts readily admit all sorts
of questionable forensic "match" evidence proffered by prosecutors, *1414 including tool mark, bite mark, footprint, and
handwriting comparisons, that lack any scientific foundation regarding the reliability of the method or the proficiency of the
analyst. ~ 9 ~ At the same time, those same courts routinely deny defendants' requests to put on expert witnesses to testify about
the known unreliability of that evidence, even where such testimony is grounded in empirical research. 2% This pro-prosecution
bias strongly suggests that judges will conduct pretrial reliability screenings of jailhouse snitch testimony in the same onesided manner.

-----------------·----------------------------------------
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In sum, most judges' laissez-faire attitudes about State's witnesses provides little reason to expect that if given the opportunity
to conduct pretrial hearings, judges will suddenly crack down on unreliable jailhouse snitches.

B. Disclosure ofImpeachment Material

A small number of states require prosecutors to comply with enhanced disclosure obligations in certain types of cases involving
jailhouse informants. 2r As a result of recent reforms, for example, Illinois prosecutors must now disclose a substantial
amount of information about informants, including any benefit promised to the informant in exchange for testimony, the
circumstances in which the defendant's alleged confession supposedly occurred, names of witnesses present at the time,
and the informant's prior history of cooperation with the State. 29 x Oklahoma and Nebraska also require enhanced pretrial
disclosure. 299 Oklahoma's Court of Criminal Appeals recently established disclosure rules applicable to jailhouse snitch
testimony in all cases. ·' 00 According to the Oklahoma Court, at least ten days prior to trial the State must disclose the
informant's criminal history, any deal or promise extended to the informant, the circumstances in which the admission or
confession was obtained, other cases in which the informant has testified and any benefits received as a result, any statements
recanting his statement or testimony, and any other information relevant to the informant's credibility. ~O I This impeachment
evidence is undoubtedly necessary to permit defense counsel to better cross-examine informants. For these reasons, numerous
commentators *1415 have called for increased disclosure obligations along similar lines. 30~
There may, however, be inherent limits on the extent to which disclosure rules can mitigate the likely prejudice resulting from
admission of unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony. First, no matter how scathing the impeachment, jurors all begin with the
knowledge that jailhouse snitches are convicted criminals. Notwithstanding that knowledge, jurors routinely believe snitch
testimony anyway. Second, as George Harris has noted, most ofthe critical details surrounding a jailhouse informant's testimony,
including how the government "selects, prepares, and evaluates" such witnesses, are "undiscoverable," and "[e]ven that which
is discoverable often remains resistant to realistic portrayal at trial."-' 0 -' More likely, however, the critical information will
simply never be uncovered. "Given the secrecy surrounding the prosecutor's preparation of her witnesses and the inability to
review the process meaningfully, it is virtually impossible to ascertain whether and to what extent witnesses have been coached
by prosecutors and police to give false or misleading testimony." ~o--1 In addition, many types of benefits that prosecutors can
bestow on jailhouse informants-such as a promise not to bring future charges or to bring lesser charges rather than greater
charges-are protected under the guise ofprosecutorial discretion and insulated from discovery. -' 05
There are additional reasons why enhanced discovery will not resolve the jailhouse snitch problem. Perhaps most importantly,
in many cases there simply will be little to disclose. When an inmate comes forward purporting to possess incriminating
information, the State can truthfully claim that it had nothing to do with initiating contact with the witness. It simply received the
evidence that the witness reported, found it credible, and proffered it at trial. The fundamental question-whether the informant
is truthful or lying-will remain for the jury to determine. Because no formal deal will actually have been made in most cases
prior to the witness's in-court testimony, there also will be nothing to disclose regarding any benefit or inducement offered by
the State in exchange for the testimony. When questioned about whether the witness has received a benefit, the witness can
honestly state that he has not. He might add, as witnesses frequently and honestly do, that he hopes the prosecutor or judge will
look favorably upon him in the future as a result of his testimony, because the prosecutor has never *1416 made any explicit
promise to reward him, and because the prosecutor has only asked him to testify "truthfully" about what he knows.
Enhanced disclosure is an inadequate remedy for another, and perhaps even more basic, reason. Precisely in those cases in
which jailhouse snitch testimony is likely to be most sought out, prosecutors cannot be trusted to fairly and honestly disclose
the critical facts that would undennine the snitch's testimony. :;o" If police or prosecutors have affirmatively provided essential

Kasting, Patricia 6/1/2015
For Educational Use Only

ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375

details about a case to a jailhouse snitch they know to be untrustworthy, have made secret promises to reward witnesses for their
testimony in the future, or have recruited the snitch-in violation of the Sixth Amendment-to affirmatively elicit incriminating
information against a fellow inmate, then no formal disclosure requirement will induce the prosecutor to disclose such damning
information.
Finally, even if a disclosure requirement did result in discovery of important impeachment evidence that defense counsel could
use at trial to impeach the witness, it is not clear that witness impeachment alone is sufficient to blunt the prejudice caused by
testimony that the defendant has confessed to the crime. As discussed above, research suggests that while jurors have the capacity
to recognize that some witnesses are more self-interested than others, such information does not necessarily get processed in a
way that helps defendants. Due to the stickiness of fundamental attnoution error, jurors are still more likely to vote to convict,
particularly in close cases, after hearing even tainted and objectively unreliable confession evidence.

Another suggestion made by commentators is to apply heightened corroboration requirements to jailhouse snitch testimony. 307
Indeed, the American Bar Association passed a resolution "calling on federal, state, and local governments to adopt measures
so 'no prosecution should occur based solely upon uncorroborated jailhouse informant testimony."' Jos These *1417
recommendations recently have been implemented in a few states, including Texas 309 and California, 310 which have enacted
legislation to require corroboration of jailhouse informants' testimony. ·11 1
Jailhouse snitch corroboration requirements are often modeled on similar corroboration requirements for accomplice
testimony. 312 While these reforms are laudable for what they are worth, they simply are not worth that much. The main
problem with a corroboration requirement is that, as typically formulated, it is too lax. Under Texas law, for example, "all that
is required is that there be some evidence-other than the jailhouse informant's testimony-which tends to connect the accused
to the commission of the offense." 313 California's requirement is somewhat more stringent In California, it is not enough if the
corroborating evidence merely ''tends to connect" the defendant to the crime. 3 14 Rather, the corroborating evidence must, in
fact, "connect□ the defendant with the commission of the offense."-' 15 Accomplice testimony, however, can be corroborated by
jailhouse snitch testimony, and vice versa, substantially weakening the protective value of the corroboration requirement. 3 IC,
Jailhouse snitches can also presumably be corroborated by other jailhouse snitches. ·11 7
Other states rely on the "corpus delicti rule" to enforce a more modest corroboration requirement. In Tennessee, for instance,
''the corpus delicti of a crime may not be established by a confession *1418 alone." ··m: Accordingly, a conviction may not
be sustained if the only evidence in the case is testimony by a jailhouse informant. The corpus delicti rule, however, provides
even weaker protection against lying jailhouse snitches. In Tennessee, for example, as long as the prosecutor can prove that
a crime in fact occurred, the corpus delicti rule will not bar the State from relying solely on jailhouse informant testimony to
establish that a particular individual was the crime's perpetrator. 3 19
Even where the corroboration requirement has some teeth, it will rarely make much of a difference. In the vast majority of cases
in whichjailhouse snitch testimony is sought, there will be at least some other evidence implicating the defendant. 310 In those
cases, however, prosecutors want to use the jailhouse snitches for precisely the reason that they should not be allowed to do so:
the other evidence in the case is weak or equivocal, making the jailhouse snitch testimony unduly influential in determining the
outcome of the case. 321 After all, there is no reason to use jailhouse snitch testimony--and to reward convicted criminals for
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providing it-if the State has sufficient other evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is only in cases where the
prosecutor believes there to be a real risk ofacquittal that the prosecutor will be willing to 'i>ay" the price for such testimony. 322
These corroboration rules do little to prevent wrongful convictions from occurring in the types of cases in which jailhouse
snitches are typically used. Prosecutors will rarely move forward in *1419 cases where there is no evidence at all connecting
a defendant to a charged crime, and as long as there is some other evidence, even if it is quite weak, then the corroboration
requirement will not prevent the snitch's testimony from coming in.
Perhaps a truly robust corroboration rule would make a difference. For instance, reliability would not be a significant problem
under a rule that permitted jailhouse snitch testimony to come in only if the alleged confession made to the snitch bad been
electronically recorded. In that case, the snitch's testimony would be corroborated by the taped recording of the conversation. Of
course, such a rule would raise other problems-most significantly, Sixth Amendment concerns-that would preclude snitches
from being used to secretly record confessions by other inmates in most cases . ."\::!>
Given the substantial concerns, however, that police officers and prosecutors might provide jailhouse informants with crucial
details about the investigation--inadvertently or otherwise-even a strong corroboration requirement that did not actually require
electronic recording would fail to provide sufficient protection. First, there is documented evidence that law enforcement
agents have provided informants with incriminating details in some cases. ·124 More generally, research on false confessions
demonstrates that even police officers and prosecutors acting entirely in good faith can, and have, inadvertently revealed
supposedly secret details to interrogated suspects during the course of interrogation. ·' 2=' Judges and juries then concluded that
those confessions were reliable precisely because they included details about which only the perpetrator of the crime supposedly
could know. 321' Corroboration of the "details" of the suspect's confession, in these cases, actually served to bolster the false
confessions. :: 2- Courts uniformly emphasized that these confessions contained admissions that only the true murderer or rapist
could have known. 32 ~
While recording the entirety of the interrogation might have revealed the source of contamination, anything less only further

*1420 cemented its persuasiveness. 32'' The same dynamic almost certainly would be at work in cases involving jailhouse
snitches. A mandatory requirement that all conversations between a snitch and state agents be recorded, as some commentators
have urged, -' 30 would address some aspects of the problem, but given the variety of possible sources of information from which
a jailhouse snitch can potentially draw, only a tape recording of the defendant's actual confession to the snitch would adequately
ensure that the snitch's testimony was reliable.

D. Jury Instructions
Commentators have also called for juries to be instructed about the special reliability concerns presentwhenjailhouse informants
testify. 3:; 1 A few states have adopted such requirements. :;:; 2 While requiring special jwy instructions is harmless, it is, like
the other measures discussed above, almost certainly an insufficient remedy. The problems with jwy instructions are well
documented. A wealth of data suggests that jwy instructions are generally ineffective tools for channeling a juror's assessment
of evidence presented at trial. :n First, jurors generally are poor at understanding traditional jury instructions or applying
those instructions in deliberations..,.,-1 *1421 Second, studies using mock jurors have consistently shown that instructions to
disregard relevant evidence do not prevent jurors from incorporating that evidence into deliberations. '·' 5 Studies of the efficacy
of cautionary instructions are also at best mixed. '·16 There is thus substantial reason to doubt that such instructions will prove
effective in inoculating jurors after exposure to false jailhouse snitch testimony. Indeed, like with unreliable confession evidence
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generally, it is far more likely that such instructions "occur too late in the process to undo the damage" once the testimony

"has entered the stream of evidence at trial." 337 Where evidence as potentially prejudicial as a reported post-crime confession
is at issue, cautionary jury instructions--while undoubtedly better than nothing--are simply inadequate to ensure that innocent
criminal defendants receive a fair trial.
There is, in short, no reason to believe that jury instructions are an effective tool to neutralize the impact of highly prejudicial
false snitch testimony. Relying on jury instructions to redress the harm inflicted from false jailhouse snitch testimony is like
applying a Band-Aid to a gunshot wound. It merely obscures the problem.
Indeed, even if all of the above requirements were in place, there would still be no reason for confidence that false jailhouse
snitch testimony might not be admitted and relied upon by jurors to convict innocent defendants. Observations made by scholars
writing about a similar problem-the admissibility of unreliable expert forensic witness testimony-apply equally to jailhouse
snitch testimony: "Experimental research ... reinforces the need for incriminating Devidence to be reliable because the various
trial *1422 safeguards, along with lay jurors, trial, and appellate judges, have not performed well in response to prosecutions
and convictions incorporating unreliable [] evidence." -'' 8
Jailhouse snitch testimony is fundamentally and pervasively unreliable. Its use poses an irremediable threat of taint in criminal

cases.
V. ABOLITION IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE REMEDY
Abolition of jailhouse snitch testimony is perhaps a radical suggestion. After all, courts are extremely reluctant to bar use
of relevant evidence in general, and even more so to exclude an entire class of potentially material evidence altogether.
Nonetheless, there is precedent for such a ban. Indeed, several types of evidence are now considered so lacking in reliability
that they are flatly banned as admissible in-court evidence. Moreover, it is increasingly clear that nothing less than a total ban
can protect innocent criminal defendants from the substantial risk of wrongful conviction as a result of the use, and abuse, of
jailhouse snitch testimony.

A. Constitutional Precedents: Coerced Confessions
Coerced confessions are the paradigmatic example of a type of evidence that has been barred as a matter of law from use in
criminal trials..WI Although there are constitutional considerations at play in the taking as well as the use of coerced confessions,
the ban on the use of coerced confessions can be traced in substantial measure to the inherent unreliability of such evidence. ·' 40
The voluntary confession requirement is a longstanding common-law evidence rule that ultimately took on constitutional
significance in the United States. -~""' 1 The rule is premised on the presumption that freely made confessions are strongly reliable,
but that confessions induced through promises or threats lack such indicia of reliability. -' 42 The Arizona v. Fulminante case
reflects the *1423 Supreme Court's most recent recognition of both the inherent unreliability of coerced confessions and the
difficulty of repairing the prejudice done to defendants when such evidence is erroneously admitted. -' 4 ·' It is perhaps noteworthy
that Fulminante, though widely invoked as a coerced confessions case, is also a jailhouse snitch case. '4-1 In Fulminante, the
defendant was suspected of killing his eleven-year-old stepdaughter. 3-1~ While in jail for an unrelated offense, Fulminante
allegedly made statements to a fellow inmate implicating him in the killing. 346 After the inmate reported the statements to the
FBI, the inmate was instructed to "find out more." ~4 7 As a suspected child murderer, Fulminante was being threatened by other
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prisoners and was deeply concerned for his safety. _,-1~ The inmate "offered to protect Fulminante from his fellow inmates, but
told him, 'You have to tell me about it,' you know. I mean, in other words, 'For me to give you any help.'" 3-l'J Fulminante
then allegedly admitted to the inmate that he had driven his stepdaughter ''to the desert on his motorcycle, where be choked
her, sexually assaulted her, and made her beg for her life, before shooting her twice in the bead." -' 50
Fulm.inante moved to suppress the confession on grounds that it was the product of coercion. -~ 51 The trial court denied the
motion, and Fulminante was convicted and sentenced to death. ·' 52 The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the
trial court erred in finding that the confession was voluntary and that the error was not harmless. 35 ; The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari *1424 and affirmed. 35 -1 All nine justices agreed that use of coerced confession evidence at trial is per se
error. J:-i~

"Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jwy, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out
of mind even if told to do so." While some statements by a defendant may concern isolated aspects of the crime or may be
incriminating only when linked to other evidence, a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means
of the crime may tempt the jwy to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision. ·' 56

The Court was divided, however, as to whether admission of a coerced confession could ever be harmless..'> 57 A five justice
majority held that harmless error analysis was appropriate even in cases where a coerced confession had improperly been
admitted at trial, but that the error in Fulminante's case was not harmless. 35 ~ Four justices dissented from the application of
harmless error analysis, contending that such evidence was so inherently prejudicial that no trial in which such evidence had

.

. ,.,\/

been presented to a Jwy could be fair. · ·

The Court thus emphasized not only that use ofcoerced confessions was always constitutionally improper, but that any harmless
error analysis conducted by a court in a case where a coerced confession had erroneously been admitted required "extreme
caution," since ''the risk that the confession is unreliable" is magnified by the "profound impact" that confession evidence tends
•

•

,/10

to exert upon Junes. ·

Of course, the constitutional ban on involuntary confessions necessitated by due process considerations is accompanied by
the Fifth Amendment's ban on compelled self-incriminating testimony. -' 61 That ban is further expanded under Miranda v.

Arizona 362 to preclude government use of virtually all statements obtained by police during custodial interrogation in a manner
inconsistent with the procedural safeguards established by the Court. -' 6 ·'

*1425 B. Procedurally Unreliable Hearsay Evidence
A coerced confession is not the only kind of evidence categorically prohibited from use in criminal trials. The Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause similarly precludes the use, at trial, of a particular class of evidence, namely, testimonial
out-of-court statements that were either made without prior opportunity for cross-examination or by a currently available
declarant. -' 6 ~ The Court's pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was an express reflection of the constitutional
importance of evidentiary reliability. _,1,, In Ohio v. Roberts, _,;,1, the Court construed the Confrontation Clause as directed
toward the exclusion of out-of-court statements made by unavailable witnesses that lack "adequate 'indicia of reliability."' ~6 ~
Of course, with Crawford, the Court reconceptualized its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, downplaying mere evidentiary
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-------------------·-·--··----------------·--reliability as the touchstone of constitutional admissibility of hearsay evidence. 36 x Instead, the Court substituted a procedural
standard: hearsay evidence was admissible under the Confrontation Clause only if it was either nontestimonial, or if testimonial,
only if it had previously been subject to cross-examination. 369 Nonetheless, the Court was explicit that the reliability of
evidence was the primary pwpose of the Confrontation Clause:
To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than
a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not
only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about
. b·1·
. d. ·-no
how re11a
11ty can best be determme

The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause thus represents a longstanding, and well-recognized, constitutional exclusionary
principle for a class of presumptively unreliable evidence.
Judges also have the ability, although it is one that is infrequently used, to enforce wholesale exclusions on classes of *1426
evidence deemed insufficiently reliable. 371 A court might exclude jailhouse informant testimony on grounds that admission
of such unreliable evidence violates basic due process norms. J 7~
Alternatively, courts might follow the lead established in Jackson v. Denno·' 7·1 and impose stricter constitutional regulation
on the use of jailhouse snitch testimony. The defendant in Jackson, Nathan Jackson, alleged that his murder confession was
the product of coercion. 374 Pursuant to New York state procedure, the voluntariness of Jackson's confession was submitted,
along with all of the other evidence, to the jury, which was accordingly instructed that if it found that Jackson's confession
had been coerced, it should ignore it. ·175 Jackson complained that submission of a coerced confession to the jury irreparably
tainted the case. 37r, The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, ruling that questions regarding the voluntariness of confessions must be
adjudicated prior to trial in order, among other things, to ensure that jurors do not rely on unreliable involuntary confessions to
"serve as makeweights in a compromise verdict," or to prevent jurors from "accepting the confessions to overcome lingering
doubt of guilt prejudice..,·' T
The logic underlying an expansion oftheJackYon rule to jailhouse snitch cases is simple. Like involuntary confessions,jailhouse
snitch testimony is patently unreliable. Permitting a snitch to testify regarding the substance of an alleged confession is little
different from permitting a police officer to testify about an allegedly coerced confession. The only difference is the identity of
the witness--and few would argue that the credibility of inherently self-interested felons is greater than that of police officers.
Certainly, the logic undergirding the Jackson rule, at minimwn, counsels for mandatory pretrial reliability hearings for contested
jailhouse snitch testimony, as many commentators have argued and as a few states now require. But because-unlike presumably
uncoerced confessions made to trained and disinterested law enforcement officers--all jailhouse confessions are inherently
unreliable, it makes far more sense to treat those alleged confessions like coerced confessions, requiring not merely that they
*1427 be screened through pretrial reliability hearings, but that they be absolutely precluded. m

C. Statutory and Administrative Exclusions

While the federal Constitution bars the use of certain classes of presumptively unreliable evidence, such as compelled
confessions and statements obtained in violation to the Confrontation Clause, still other classes of evidence are barred by statute,
evidentiaiy rule, and administrative practice. 379

Kasting, Patricia 6/1/2015
For Educational Use Only

ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375

One familiar example is polygraph evidence. Because of deep--seated concerns about its reliability, polygraph evidence has been
banned by statute in many states ..,xo In virtually every state where it has not been banned by statute, it has been ruled per se
inadmissible by courts. -' 8 1 Such bans are appropriate, the Supreme Court has held, because of the State's "unquestionably ...
legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial." 382 Indeed, the evidence
at issue in the famous Frye v. United States 3 s3 case- setting minimum standards for the admissibility of scientific evidencewas a polygraph test. -' 84 Although the test for admissibility established in Frye has been replaced by the Daubert criteria, the
ban on polygraph evidence in criminal cases remains largely-albeit not entirely-intact. Jxs

*1428 Other types of evidence have also been deemed sufficiently unreliable in some jurisdictions and therefore categorically
inadmissible. Visual hair analysis, for example, is "a kind of evidence so inexact that it is restricted or barred in some
jurisdictions." ·' 86 Other examples include hypnotically refreshed testimony -' x7 and uncorroborated accomplice testimony. -' 88
(Of course, all of the flaws of uncorroborated accomplice testimony, and then some, exist with respect to uncorroborated
jailhouse snitch testimony as well.) Some law enforcement agencies have taken it upon themselves to refrain from using or
sanctioning the use of certain types of unreliable evidence. The FBI, for instance, stopped performing bullet lead analysis
after the ''National Research Council concluded that available data did not support expert testimony linking crime bullets to
'8')

a particular source." ·''

Because of the highly unreliable nature ofjailhouse snitch testimony, state and federal lawmakers and law enforcement agencies
can and should, consistent with the treatment of other forms of grossly unreliable evidence, ban the use of jailhouse snitch
testimony through legislative or administrative fiat. ·' 90

CONCLUSION
Jailhouse snitch testimony is an inherently unreliable type of evidence. Snitches have powerful incentives to invent incriminating
*1429 lies about other inmates in often well-founded hopes that such testimony will provide them with material benefits,
including in many cases substantial reduction of criminal charges or sentences. At the same time, false snitch testimony is
difficult if not altogether impossible to impeach. Because such testimony usually pits the word of two individuals against one
another, both of whose credibility is suspect, jurors have little ability to accurately or effectively assess or weigh the evidence.
Moreover, research suggests that jurors frequently succumb to fundamental attribution error and unwittingly fail to properly
discount the reliability of evidence supplied by biased and self-interested witnesses. Unreliability concerns are further magnified
because jailhouse snitch testimony is almost exclusively a species of confession evidence, and ample research demonstrates
that confession evidence is more persuasive to jurors than any other type of evidence.
Although some jurisdictions have placed a few modest limits on jailhouse snitch testimony, no jurisdiction has banned such
testimony outright. It continues to be assumed that the traditional tools of trial procedure- cross-examination and postconviction review-are adequate to screen out unreliable evidence and safeguard defendants' rights. These methods, however,
are plainly insufficient, as mounting evidence of wrongful convictions brought about through the use of false snitch testimony
attests. Commentators have urged adoption of a variety of additional measures intended to bolster the ability of courts to screen
such testimony for reliability, but on closer examination, none of these suggestions-while on their own terms marginally
helpful--sufficiently mitigates the high risk that false jailhouse snitch testimony will be admitted and have a material impact
onjury deliberations.

..,
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The only effective solution is to flatly preclude the use of such testimony. The constitutional infrastructure already exists to
permit courts to move in this direction. The Supreme Court's longstanding preclusion of coerced confession evidence provides
a precedent readily applicable to confession evidence from jailhouse snitches. But in all likelihood, if change in this area comes,
it will be as a result of legislative resolve to take meaningful steps to reduce wrongful convictions. There is a mature body of
research data that identifies the primary causes of wrongful convictions. Jailhouse snitch testimony is at the top of the list. It
is low fruit, waiting to be picked.

Footnotes
al
Professor of Law, Georgia State University. Thanks to Caren Morrison for her comments on earlier drafts of the Article, to Pam
Brannon and the research library staff for their diligent research support, and to the GSU College of Law for financial support for
this project.

See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 8-9
(201 I); Samuel R. Gross etal.,Ew11cwtim1s in the U.S., /989 711ro11gh :!003. lJ5 .I. CRJrvl. L. & CRlivllNOLOGY 523. 542-44 (2005 ).

e.g., THE JUSTICE PROJECT, JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW
(2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/ media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/death_penalty_ reform/
Jailhouse20snitch20testimony20policy20br (stating that "snitch testimony is widely regarded as the least reliable testimony
encountered in the criminal justice system''); see also Brief of the NACOL as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Km1sa,
See,

,·. Ventris. 556 U.S. 586 (2009) (No. 07-1356), 2008 WL 5409451'. at "2 [hereinafter Briefofthe NACDL] ("[A]jailhouse snitch's
uncorroborated claim that the defendant confessed to him.. .is notoriously unreliable."). Similarly, a state court has cautioned that
"[c] ourts should be exceedingly leery ofjailhouse infonnants, especially if there is a hint that the informant received some sort of a
benefit for his or her testimony." Dodd v. State. 993 P.2d 778. 783 (Okla. Crim. App. :woo 1.

3

See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, .\liscarriagcs 1!f .lm1icc in Po1t•111ial~r Capi1al Cases. 40 STAN. L. REV. 21. 57
( 198 7) (reporting thatjailhouse informants testified falsely in 117 ofthe 350 wrongful convictions studied). Other exoneration studies
have identified eyewitness ''misidentifications" and false confessions as factors in a greater number of known wrongful convictions.
GARRETT, supra note 1. Even if mistaken eyewitness testimony and false confessions have led to a greater absolute number of
known wrongful convictions, there is little doubt that false jailhouse snitch testimony occurs with greater frequency than mistaken
eyewitness identifications or false confessions. While eyewitness testimony and defendant confessions are two of the most common
types of evidence used in criminal prosecutions, snitch testimony appears in a quantitatively smaller subset of cases. ALEXANDRA
NATAPOFF, SNITCIIlNG: CRlMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 6 (2009). Nonetheless,
it still manages to account for a sizeable number of documented wrongful convictions. Bedau & Radelet, supra.

4

Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3<l 462. 470 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Jana Winograde, Comment,./ai/lu,me h?fiirm,111/s and 1/Je Seed
jiir.J11dicial Use /1111111111i~r in Habeas Co17ms / 1roccedings. 78 CALIF. L. REV. 755. 75611990)).

5

L'nitcd States. , . Le•\ cnitc. 277 F.3d 454. 461 (4th Cir. 2002 ).

6

Si\ak \. lfordison. <•5~ FJd :S98. <JI(, (9th Cir. 20111.

7

Stephen S. Trott, fYords of IVumi11g.fin· !'mscrn/ors L'si11g Criminal., as Wi111,·.1·s,·s, --17 IIASTIN(iS L..1. I >81. I J8J ( 19%).

C•

0

9

NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 6-7.

10

Id. at 7.

11

JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE

WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000).

r·w

Kasting, Patricia 6/1/2015
For Educational Use Only

ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375

,J

12

Id. at 244-46.

13

NATAPOFF,supra note 3, at 7.

14

REPORT OF THE 1989-90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: INVESTIGATION OF THE INVOLVEMENT
OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 37, available
at http:// www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/jai1house/expert/l 989-1990%20LA%C20County%C20Grand%C20Jury%R#eport.pdf
[hereinafter GRAND JURY REPOR'I]. Following the release of the Grand Jury Report, the L.A. County District Attorney's Office
adopted stringent controls over the use ofjaiJhouse snitches and now rarely permits their use at trial NATAPOFF, supra note 3,
at 189-90.

15

NW. UNN. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW SNITCH
TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANSTODEATHROW3(2004-2005),availableat
http:// www.innocenceproject.org/docs/SnitchSystemBooldet.pdf [hereinafter THE SNITCH SYSTEM].

16

GEORGE H. RYAN, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7-8 (2002), available at
http:// illinoismurderindictments.Iaw.northweste/docs/lllinois_Moratorium_Commission_ complete-report.pd£

17

Harris County, Texas, has recently begun a program offeringjaiJhouse informants up to $5000 for helpful information. See Renee C.
Lee, Ha"is Co. SheriffOffers Cash for Jailhouse Tipsters, ROUS. CHRON. (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houstontexas/article/Harris-Co-sheriff-offers-cash-for-jailhouse-1623204.php.

18

Caren Myers Morrison, Prin1cr. .·kco11111ahi!iz1·. and 1l1e Coupe1·,lling lJct,,nd,1111: Tmrarcl, a :\'cw Rolefiw lnt.·mct Access lo

v;j;

V!f)

-~

Co11r1

Rt'conl,. 62 VA:--1D. L. REV. 921. 935-.,6 (20091.

~

19

See Carl N. Hammarskjold, Comment, Smok,•s. C.111d1·. and 1iw Hl,,,,,1,- Su ord: !-1011 Classi(i·ing .lailhn11sc Snitch Tes1i111011_r ,is lJirccl.
Ratha 1/wn Circ111nsh111Fi,1I. Ei·idl'nn· Co111rih111,·s 10 1/"r,mgfitl Co111·i(1iom. --15 U.S.F. I.. REV. I 103. l !06 (201 l) (citing \laxwcll
\·. Roe. 628 f .3J -I 86. 505 n. IO ( 9th Cir. 20 IO)) (describing one jailhouse snitch's boast to have lied in exchange for "$30.00 from
petty cash" and "some smokes and candy"); Morrison, supra note 18 (noting that a "successful cooperator...might ultimately get
years off his sentence or even avoid prison altogether").

20

l'nitcd Stutes\". Ccn·antcs-Pachcco. 826 F.2d 31 o. J 15 (5th Cir. 19871.

21

22

United States\'. \kinstt.'r. 619 F.'.:d 10--11. 10--15 (-Ith Cir. 1980).

Robert Reinhold, California Shaken over an Informer: He Shows How to Fabricate a Prisoner's Confession, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
1989, at Al 7 (quoting Robert Berke, a lawyer for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice).
FRED KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN 599, available at http://
www.attomeygeneraIJus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/morin_ch3cd.pd£
NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 71.

25

GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 72-73.

26

Id. at 70-71.

27

28
29

Id. at 68.
See Brad Heath, Federal Prisoners Use Snitching for Personal Gain, USA TODAY (Dec. 14, 2012, 3:06 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/14/jailhouse-infonnants-for-sale/l 762013/.
Peter P. Handy, .lailhm,,e !11ti,n1w111s·

frsrim,111_1·

Cit'ls Scmii11_1·

C,1111111cmwo1<·

with Its N,·iiuhilin-. -I:\ \ICGEOR<.i!:: L. RE\'. 7'55.

759 COi:::).

- - - - - - - - ~ ~......... -·-~--..··~~....---.... - - - - - - · - - · - · - - - - · - • - · • - · - · - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - - -

Kasting, Patricia 6/1/2015
For Educational Use Only

ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375

30

Keith A. Findley, li111occ11ce l'mtfftio11 in the App<'llatc Pmcess. 93 ,vlARQ. L. REV. 591. 629 n.192 (2009) (quoting Steve Mills
& Ken Annstrong, The Inside Informant, cm. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1999, at Al).

31

NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 71.
Steve
Mills
&
Ken
Armstrong,
Part
3:
The
Jailhouse
Informant,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Nov.
16, 1999), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/l 999-l l-l 6/news/chi-99 l l l 6deathillinois3_ l _court-and-police-records-murderconfessions-jailhouse-informant.

33

Id.

3-1

Id

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 72.

-10

See Reinhold, supra note 22.

41

Id

-12

Id.

43

GRANDJURYREPORT,supranote 14, at 1-2.

4-1

Id at 2.

-15

Id. at 39.

46

See id at 19.

47

Id. at 9.

48

See id. at 54-55.

49

See id. at 56 (''Within twenty-four hours of the inmate's arrival. ..an informant called the Los Angeles Police Department and left a
message for the detective that he had information about the inmate.... [T)hree days after arranging for the inmate to be placed with
informants, the detective interviewed three informants, each of whom claimed to have obtained incriminating information from the
inmate.").

50

Ted Rohrlich, Authorities Go Fishing/or Jailhouse Confessions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990, at Al.

51

See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 27-28.

52

Id.

For example, in an infamous case lmown as the "Marietta Seven," James Creamer and six others were wrongfully convicted between
1973 and 1975 of murdering two doctors in Marietta, Georgia, based largely on the perjured testimony ofan informant testifying
under immunity. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 8-9. After extensive findings undermining the snitch's credibility, the

Kasting, Patricia 6/1/2015
For Educational Use Only

ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375

convictions were reversed and charges dropped against all seven defendants. Id. at 9-11. Despite calls to prosecute the snitch, the
District Attorney declined to bring perjury charges. Id. at 11.
54

See Ted Rohrlich, L.A. Jailhouse Informant Seized on Perjury Charge, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 20, 1992), http://
articles.latimes.com/1992-02-20/news/rnn-3537_ljailhouse-infonnant-scandal; Ted Rohrlich, Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years, L.A
TIMES (May 20, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-20/locaVme-312_ 1_law-enforcement-officer.

55

See Rohrlick, Perjurer Sentenced to 3 Years, supra note 54.

56

People v. Tolli\·er. 807 N.E.:!d 524. 534-35 (Ill.App. Ct. 2004 I.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 5.~1-34.

59

Stefano Esposito, Last ofFive Accused ofPerjury in Ceriale Slaying Trial Sentenced, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, news, at 12.

60

Id.

61

R.MichaelCassidy,PrnMc11111/ Implied lnd11n-111rnts. l)S '.\\V. U. L. REV. 1129. 1130 (20041.

62

As Peter Joy has explained, ''There are a number of psychological impediments the prosecutor faces, including tunnel vision, which
may make the prosecutor a poor judge" ofa witness's credibility. Peter A. Joy, Co11.1·1rncting S1·s1cmic Sa/i·gu,ml~ Against lnfim11a111
Pc1j111T. 7 OHIO ST. J. CRl'.\-1. L. 677. 680 (2010).

63

See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175
(1998); Barbara O'Brien, />1·i111e S11spec1: .·!11 t:rami11utim1 o/Factors That .-lggr,n·mc and Coumcract C1mfir111alim1 Bit1s ill Cri111i11al
/111·estigatio11s. 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 315 (2009).

64

See Barbara O'Brien, A Nccipc_ti,r Bi,is: .-!11 Et11f 1irical loo/.: al lh<' l111c11•la1· Be/ln'<'II /11sti1111io11<1/ fllcc111i1·cs and Bounded Ratimwli1_1·
in Prosecworial Decision :\l,1/.:i11g. 7-l !\10. L. REV. 999. l 0-14 (2009) (..An investigator exhibiting tunnel vision selects and filters
evidence with an eye toward building a case against that suspect and consequently overlooks evidence that undermines it.'').

65

Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, 71,e ,\/11/tip/1' /Ji111cmit1m o( 1i11111el I "isi1111 in Criminal Cases. 2006 \VIS. L. REV. 29 l. 292
(quoting Dianne L. Martin, Le.,su11s .!hour )usri< ,·fiw11 1/,e "Lahora1orr" ,,f Wnmg/itl Conviction.,·: T111111d I "isio11, 1/,c Co11str11crio11
o(Guil! and lnf;,,-mcr E,·idrnn:. i0 L.::vtKC L. RE\'. 1{47. 84X (2002)).
Id. at 293 (noting that "[m]ost official inquiries into specific wrongful convictions have noted the role that tunnel vision played in
those individual cases of injustice").

67

See Charles I. Lugosi, Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA, Habeas Corpus and Justice, 12 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 233, 235
(2002) (noting that "even after DNA testing has proven the innocence of a prisoner, prosecutors refuse to accept the results and rely
upon other evidence that supports guilt, or they create a new theory of how the crime occurred (never before put to the judge and
jury) to justify the continued punishment of an innocent personj.

68

See Russell Covey, Police .\/isc,,11d11cr .is a Cws,· •!f II .r,mg/itl Com•i<·rions. 90 \\" ASH. L1. L. REV. 1133. 1153 ( 2013) (observing
that corrupt law enforcement officers who framed innocent individuals in the Rampart scandal typically charged defendants with
crimes that are "easily manufactured" and difficult to defend against because they pitted the police officers' word against that of
the defendant).

69
70

In some cases, jailhouse snitch systems have operated, and may still be operating, that call into question the integrity and honesty of
law enforcement officials at a system-wide level. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 18-19.

See United States,·. Murphy. 41 L:.s. (16 Pet.I 203.110 ( lX-l~J.

29

c.

Kasting, Patricia 6/1/2015
For Educational Use Only

\Ii)

ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375

71

n

73

74

WarrenMoise,l'mBooored! Bias and the Busy Trial Lawyer, S.C. LAW, Jan.2009, at 10, 11; see also :\/1117,hl'. 41 U.S. t 16 Pet.) at
2 I O (describing the general rule at common law as "undoubtedly'' providing "in criminal cases as well as in civil cases, that a person
interested in the event of the suit or prosecution, is not a competent witness"). Justice Story, however, aclrnowledged numerous
exceptions to the general rule. For example, "a person who is to receive a reward for or upon the conviction of the offender" was
"universally recognised as a competent witness, whether the reward be offered by the public or by private persons." Id at 211; see
also Carla Spivack, Lcl'.I Get Serious: SjJ/lusal Ahusc Should Har lnhcrita11ce. 90 OR. L. REV. 247. 299(2011) (noting the historical
"common-law bar to interested witnesses testifying in any proceeding"").
As counsel argued to the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Murphy, "Informers are, generally, incompetent witnesses,
where they are to receive any portion of the decree, sentence or judgment, without the necessity of a second suit" 41 U.S. t 16 Pet.)
at 205-06 (citing United States v. The Schooner Thomas and Henry, 1 Brock. Rep. 374; Tilly's Case. I Str. 316; Rex v. Stone, 2
Ld. Raym. 1545).

See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Pmtectim1 Pml'isiom

in the Lasr /Jerind of/'11~1·.

71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899. 1947-4!{ (2003).

Id. ( stating that the existence of self-serving bias has been established in numerous studies). According to Griffith, "Self-serving bias
involves selective information processing, according to which a subject sees what it wants to see and conflates what is fair with what

benefits oneself." Id

at

1948 (internal citations omitted).

75

Id. at I 947-48.

76

See Ward Farnsworth, Thc Legal Regulation 1,( Sd(Serl'ing Bias. n U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 5<,7. 569 (2003) ("It has long been
understood that when people are better off if something is true, they become more likely to perceive it as true.").

77

Some states have enacted statutory bars on testimony by interested parties in probate proceedings. See, e.g., Howle v. Edwards, 11
So. 74X. 749 (Ala. 1892) (discussing an 1891 statute providing that "no person having a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit
shall be allowed to testify against the party to whom his interest is opposed, as to any transaction with or statement by the deceased
person whose estate is interested in the result of the suit or proceedings").

78

George C. Harris, Tesri111011yfi1r Sale: The Lm1· and Ethics o/S11i1clws a11d E,p..,.ts. 28 PEPI'. L. REV. I, I (2000).

79

See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Wohl. 842 So. 2d 81 I, 815-16 ( Fla. 2003) (imposing a ninety-day suspension on a lawyer who provided
financial inducement to a witness to provide factual testimony, because "payment of compensation other than costs to a witness
could adversely affect credibility and fact-finding functions"). See generally Joseph Swanson, Lcr'.1- Be l-lone.w: .·I Critin1I A11<1~rsis u(
Florida Bar v. Wohl and the Gc11a<1l~1· hrcn11sisrcm Approach Toward ll'i111css l11d11n•111c111 Agrn•111<·111s i11 Ch-ii and Cri111i11t1I Ci.n's.

18 GEO . .I. LEGAL ETHIC'S 10:-G (2005).

80
81

Steven Lubet, E1pcr1 llim,•s.lt's: t:1hics am/ l'rr1fi:ssim1alis111. 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465. 47i ( 1999) ("Unlike other witnesses
who can be reimbursed for only expenses, an expert may be paid a fee for preparing and testifying in court").

See, e.g., Tagatz v. Marquette Univ .. 86 I F.2d I 040. I 042 (7th Cir. J9SS){discussingethicalproblemswithcontingentfees); Swafford
"· Harris. 967 S.W.2d 319, 322-23 (Tenn. 1998) (holdingacontingencyfeevoidasagainstpublicpolicy).

O')

o_

Lubet, supra note 80.

83

Id. at 477-78.

84

Id. at 478.

85

Harris, supra note 78.

86

Id. at 3.

87

See Morrison, supra note 18, at 931 (describing how cooperating defendants are recruited by prosecutors).

r

""'

Kasting, Patricia 6/1/2015
For Educational Use Only

ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375

88
89

,4/)

90

..$)

91
92

See Heath, supra note 28.
Of course, many types of witnesses testify in contexts where it is clear that they have an interest in the outcome. Mothers testify about
the good character of their children, and husbands and wives, girlfriends and boyfriends, and friends and coworkers testify about
alibis of their friends and loved ones. Plaintiffs and defendants testify about facts surrounding civil disputes with thousands or even
millions of dollars on the line. As explained below, jailhouse snitches are demonstrably different. They have no direct knowledge
of the facts of a case, little if any reputation to protect, and direct and powerful incentives to manufacture testimony that is easy to
conjure and difficult to rebut.

That a witness has received payments from the government in exchange for infomiation or cooperation is a materially exculpatory
fact that must be disclosed pursuantto Braczy v. Maryland. See, e.g., L:nited States \. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885. 892 ( 9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that the government's failure to disclose that a witnesses had received payments from the FBI violatedBraczy).
Lubet, supra note 80, at 465.
See J. Richard Johnston, Paying the Witness, Why Is It OK/or the Prosecution, but Not the Defense?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1997,

at 21 (arguing that compensating witnesses violates the federal bribery statute).
93

Id. at 22.

9-1

See, e.g., Shon\". Sirmons. '172 F.3d 1177. 1190 110th Cir. 2006; (holding that the impeachment testimony ofa fellow "cellmate"

viJ

was not material).

\:ii)

95

See, e.g., id.

%

Bruton 1·. LniteJ Stales ..39 I L: .S. I2J. 139 ( I%X J (White, J., dissenting).

97

Id.

98

C. \ICCOR:I.IICK. H:\NDBOOK OF THE L.-\ \\ OF E\'IDE'.\CE 3 lh Cd ed. I 9X3).

99

_;;

Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power ofConfession Evidence: An Experimental Test ofthe Fundamental Difference
Hypothesis, 21 LAW &HUM. BEHAV. 469,471 (1997).

100

Id at 481.

IOI

Id

102
~

Lisa Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33
QUEEN'S L.J. 261, 274 (2008).

103

Id

! 0-1

Id

105

Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The t}i,'cts o( .·lcu11111>licl' 11 'i111c'., ,n ,md .lui/lw11sc fllfi11·111,111ts 011 J11rr Dl'cisio11111aki11g. 32 I.A\\' &
HU\1. BHL\ \'. 13"'. 13X (200~,.

!Oh

Cf, Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the "Harmless E"or" Rule, 21
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27 (1997) (noting that evidence of coerced confessions was extremely influential in a test case where
other evidence was weak).

107

Neuschatz et al., supra note 105.

10:-:

Id.

-·.

Kasting, Patricia 6/1/2015
For Educational Use Only

ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375

109

See id.

I 10

Kassin & Neumann, supra note 99, at 470.

l 11

Neuschatz et al., supra note 105, at 142.

I 12

Id. at 137.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 139.

115

Id. at 14(µ11.

116

Id. at 140.

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 142.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id.

_,

1,-

Id.

128

Id

129

Id. at 142, 146.

130
13 I
~,
I .:,_

Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Prior Confessions and Mock Juror Verdicts, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 133,
134 (1980) (citing studies).

Id.
Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id. at 143-44.

136

See Anne Bowen Poulin, l'rosern1ori11/ !11co11sis1c11q. J:.\·toppd a/Ill Due Process: Making the l'm.l'('Cutio11 GL't fls StoiT Strai!dll.
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1423. 1465 (2001) ("The prosecutor enjoys presumptive credibility in the eyes of the jury and, unlike witnesses
who take an oath and are subject to testing through cross-examination and impeachment, the prosecutor is rarely specifically so

22

Kasting, Patricia 6/1/2015
For Educational Use Only

ABOLISHING JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1375

challenged."); see also Lnited St,11.:, 1. (ionzak•z .. \·argas. 558 F.2d 63 I. h33 <1st Cir. 1977) (observing that ''the representative of
the government approaches the jury with the inevitable asset of tremendous credibility"); THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at
17 (stating that ''.jurors are somewhat predisposed to infer some degree of reliability because the witness is presented by the [S]tate''),

137

See, e.g., Cnit.:d Stat.:~'"· Young. -no L!.S. l. I X-19 < I985 l ("The prosecutor's vouchingforthecredibilityofwitnessesandexpressing
his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused...may induce the jwy to trust the Government's judgment rather than its
own view of the evidence.'').

138

DaYis v. S1a1e. -126 S.E.2d i.--1-1 (Ga. 1993) (affirming murder conviction and death sentence); Kim Severson, Georgia Inmate
Executed; Raised Racial Issues in Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at Al.

139

Trial Transcript at 1228, State v. Davis, No. 089-2467 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Davis Trial Transcript].

1-W

Id. at 1229.

141

Id at 1228.

14~

Id. at 1230.

143

Id.

144

Id. at 1230-31. McQueen also claimed that Davis had confessed to shooting someone at the party. According to McQueen, "when he
was at the party, he got into a beef with some dudes, and a whole bunch of shooting and stuff going on. So after the party-" Id. at
1230. The D.A. interrupted. "Did he say he did any shooting?" Id. "Yeah," McQueen answered. Id. The D.A. began to ask if"he was
the one that shot" an individual named Michael Cooper at the party, as Davis had been charged with that shooting in addition to the
shooting of police officer Mark McPhail. Id. at 1231. However, before the prosecutor could get the name of the shooting victim out,
defense cotmsel cut him off, asking the judge to counsel the prosecutor not to lead the witness. The judge obliged. Id The prosecutor
then rephrased bis question: "What did he say about shooting somebody at the party?" Id. McQueen's answer was vague: "Well,
exchange of gunfire. He didn't know who shot who, you know, I guess it was the wrong guy, you know, got hung up that night Id.

145

Id

146

Id. at 1231.

147

/11 re DaYi,. !\n. C\' -109-130. 2010 WL 33850:-il. at *.W (S.D. (ia. Aug. 2-1.2010); see Davis Trial Transcript, supra note 139,
at 1239, 1243 (informing the defense attorney that he "was already sentenced" and that ''the Judge was not going to go back and
review [his] case").

148

/11 r<' D.wi.1. 20 IO WL 33~50l-l. at •-N.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Davis Trial Transcript, supra note 139.

152

Id.

153

Id at 1501 (emphasis added).

154

Id.

155

See GARRETT, supra note 1, at 143 (explaining several states' limitations onjailhouse snitch testimony).

156

Id. at 142 (stating that the Supreme Court relies on traditional litigation tools, like cross-examination, to combat the potential for
error in snitch testimony).
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157

556 U.S. 586 (2008).

158

id at 594 n. * (rejecting the suggestion that the Court craft a broader rule to exclude uncorroborated jailhouse snitch testimony).

159

Id. at 588-89.

160

Id.

161

Id.

16~

Id. at 589.

163

Id.

164

Id.

165

Id (quoting State v. Ventris. ~o. 94.001. 2006 WL 2661161. at * 3 ( Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 15. 2006 J).

166

Id.

167

Id (citing State v. Ventris. 176 P.Jd 920. 928 ( Kan. 100X )).

168

Id at594n.*.

169

Id

170

Id. (quoting Spencer v. Texas. 385 U.S. 554. 564 (1967)); see also L:nitcd States v. Sd1cffrr. 523 U.S. 303. 313 (1998) ("A
fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that 'the jury is the lie detector."' (quoting Unih::d States\'. 13arn.ird, 490 F.:!d
907. 911 (9th Cir. 1973))).

171

1'<'111/'is. 556 L,:.s. at 594.

172

See, e.g., Parrish v. Commonwealth. 121 S.W.3d 198. 203 (Ky. 2003) (rejectingaclaimthattestimonyofajailhouseinfonnantshould
have been excluded because it was inherently suspect, and its reliability should have been the subject of a cautionary admonition
because the rule is that "the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given sworn testimony are matters for the jury to decide").

173

See Pomona v. SQ!vl N. Am. Corp .. 750 FJd I 036. 1049 (9th Cir. '.!014) (stating that "it is the job of the fact finder, not the trial
court, to determine which source is more credible and reliable").

174

:'-09 L'.S. 579 ( 199] l.

175

Id :115%.

176

Stat.::\'. Lawson, 191 P.3d 673. 695 (Or.1011).

177

Id. at c,9, n.9 (citing R.C.L. Lindsey et al., Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Inaccuracy Within and Across Situations?,
66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79 (1981)).

178

Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is bp<'rt L\•ide11ce Reath· Oiflc-n·,11.'. :,.;9 NOTRl: DA\11: L. REV. I. 18-19 120131
(arguing that the relevancy standard for factual evidence may be too lax).

179

See Unit1:d States\'. Karakc. 443 F. Supp. 2d 8. 50 (D.D.C. 2006) ("A long line of Supreme Court precedent makes clear, 'confessions
which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical or psychological,' are inadmissible ...." (quoting Rog~r, \.
Richmond. 365 L.S. 534. 540-41 ( 1%1 ))).

180

499 L.S. 279 ( 1991 ).
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181

Id. at 191 (quoting Cruz\'. :-.e\\ YNk. -Ii> I l.:.S. l Xh. I'15 ( 1•>~7) (White, J., dissenting)).

182

Id. at 193.

183
~

See Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1167 n.215 (noting that "[e]xamples abound of significant inducements to accomplice witnesses
that were hidden from the defense at trial"); Harvey A. Silverglate, The Decline and Fall of Mens Rea, CHAMPION, Sept-Oct.
2009, at 14, 18 (noting that "in practice, many types of inducements and threats often are implied, the subject of a knowing wink
of the eye by the prosecutor to the prospective witness's lawyer"), available at http://www.threefeloniesaday.com/LinkCiick.aspx?
fileticket=rdMd9mcf5ZA % 3D&tabid=38.

184

Cassidy, supra note 61, at 1144 n.80.

185

Id. at 1129.

186

Id. at 1142.

187

Pontics'lli \'. State. 9-1 l So. 2d I 073. I OX5 I Fla. 1006 ,.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Cassidy, supra note 6 I, at 1148.

191

\Villingham ,·. Cockrell. ~o. 01-101>3.1003 \\'L 110701 I (5th Cir. Feb.17.1001).

192

Id. at *l.

193

19-i

Paul Gianelli, Junk Scil'tu·,· and 1he Ercrntio11 u/,m lmwcmr ,\Ian. 7 :'\. Y.L. J.L. & LIBERTY 211. 13-1 (1013) (explaining that
lawyers seeking a posthumous exoneration of Willingham have uncovered records indicating that, in fact, prosecutors reduced
charges against Webb from aggravated robbery to simple robbery and also advocated on his behalf at a clemency hearing, citing his
participation in the Willingham case as a basis).
Id. at 13 3-3-1; see Brandi Grissom, Citing New Evidence, Urging a Postlmmous Pardon in 1992 Case, TEX. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2013, at
Al 9A, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/us/citing-new-evidence-urging-a-posthumous-pardon-in-l 992-case.html?
_r=O.

195

Gianelli, supra note 193, at 233-34.

196

Id. at 234-35 (noting also that Webb later admitted to a reporter from the New Yorker magazine that he might have ''misunderstood"

Willingham, adding "[t]he statute oflimitations has run out on perjury, hasn't it?").

197

·v:!)

198

See Cameron Todd Willingham: Wrongfully Convicted and Executed in Texas, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Cameron_Todd_ Willingham_Wrongfully_Convicted&uscore;and_Executed_in_Texas.php
(last visited Sept 1, 2014); David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009),
http:// www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_ fact_grann.

Stephen Bright made this point more generally in the context of death penalty litigation. See Stephen B. Bright, Co1111scl ti,r the l'unr.·
The Death Sc111<·11ce .\',,1fi,r the ll'on1 Crim<' !11afi,r th,· lli,nt L,iln-,.,.. I 03 Y ..\Lt::: L ..1. 1835. 18:1(, I 199-1 l.

199

_;;

See, e.g., Drrn,by,. H,,bbs. 7(,(, 1- ..<d S09. X2 I-S22 ( :--th Cir. 201-l) (discussing the trial court's enforcement of the motion in limine

precluding "the defense from mentioning or attempting to elicit testimony from any witness regarding the reason for [the jailhouse
snitch's] incarceration" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

36
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See, e.g., C. Blaine Elliott, Lifi:'s Uncerrailltics: Jim,· lo Deal 11·i1lr Coopcn11i11g ll'i111cs,,es and .laillmme S11i1d1('s. I(, CAP. DEF.
.1. I. 10 12003) ("A defense witness whose freedom is at stake is often too scared of retribution to come forward and offer valuable

exculpatory evidence.").

201

See, e.g., id at I (descnbing the story of one man wrongfully convicted of murder because a snitch lied about a confession).

202

See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 18, 30.

203

See id.

204

See id. at 39.

205

Id.

206

NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 186.

207

Id.

208

Brief of the NACOL, supra note 2, at 3.

209

Id.

210

See Brandon L. Garrett, .J11d!!i11g fl111ucc11cc. I ox cou.:rv1. L. REV. 55. X6-f'.;7 (200X).

211

5 A\I. .ICR. 20 Ap1•ella1c R,·1·ic11·

212

See supra Subpart III.A.

213

People v. Lop.:s. No. C04 I 5 l 6. 2004 WL 41 X350. al

214

Id.

215

Id.

216

Id.

217

Id

218

Id.

219

Id

220

Id. at *1-2.

221

~

c,41 1201-ll.

* I (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. !!. 20W ).

A fourth witness who knew nothing of the case at bar testified about an incident occurring after the attack in which the defendant
and others allegedly fondled a teenage girl. Id. at *3.

,,-)

Id at *2.

,-,~

---"

Id. at *3.

224

.Id.

225

Id.

226

Id.

227

Id.

c.,,
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228

Id.

229

Id.

230

Id

231

Id

-,~-,

-·'-'-

Id.
Id.

234

Id. at "'I.

235

Id. at *5.

236

Id at *3 (noting that a jailhouse snitch's "statement that he talked with defendant while they worked mornings together at the same
job in the jail yard was shown to be untrue, as defendant never had a morning job'').

237

Ashley v. Statc. 439 S.E.2d 91-l, l)J.5-lt> (Ga. 199-lt.

238

Id. at 916.

239

As the court noted on appeal:
During defense counsel's cross-examination of Bates, the witness admitted that he had previously given police officers false
information about the case; that he had been convicted six times for forgery; that he had just been released from the mental health unit
of a state correctional institution; and that he had mental health problems and was being treated with Prozac. Defense counsel sought
to present testimony from an assistant district attorney that, in another murder case, Bates had given authorities false information
concerning the identity of the perpetrator in exchange for favorable treatment from the authorities. The trial court refused to allow
the evidence after sustaining the State's objection that it was irrelevant and collateral.
Id.

240

See Briefof Appellant, Ashlcy v. Stmc. 439 S.E.2d 914 (Ga. 199-l) (No. S93Al989), 1993 WL 130.~5276. at *24-25.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

Ashley. -!~9 S. E.2d at 917.

244

Parolee Database, ST. BOARD. PARDONS & PAROLES (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.pap.state.ga.us/ParoleeDatabase/ (search

"Inmate Number" for "219088'').

245
246

·

See generally Anne Bowen Poulin, C0111·icriom Based 1111 Lies: Oe/i11i11g Due Pron·.,.,- l'mtel'lio11. 116 PENN ST. L. RE\". 331 (2011 ).
D~\·is \. Stal.:. h(,O S.E..~d 3:--l. 35S-59 <(ia. 200:S)

(affirming a denial ofa motion for a new trial despite recantations by several

prosecution witnesses).

247

/11 re Davis. No. C\'-!09- DO. 20 IO WL 33850S 1. at *48 (S.D. (ia. Aug. 2-l. 201 OJ.

248

Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 36-37, In re D<11·is. <0.0. O'lC\'00 I 30t. 20 IO WL t--032222.

2-t9

Id. at 27-30.

250

In

re

D,11·is. 2010 \\L 3.,~50S I. at *-IX.
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251

See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 25, Davis, 660 S.E.2d 354 (No. 08-66), 2008 WL -136(, 181 (presenting McQueen's
recantations as a reason for the Supreme Court of Georgia to reconsider Davis's conviction).
.See, e.g., Da\'is v. Turpin. 539 S.E.2d 129. 134 (Ga. 2001) (holding that Davis had procedurally defaultedonhisconstitutionalclaims
by failing to raise them on direct appeal).

~53

Ill re Dads. 2010 WL 33X50Xl. at *54.

254

.Id.

255

.Id at*60.

256

Id. at *61; Kim Severson, Georgia Inmate Executed; Raised Racial Issues in Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at Al.

257

Maxwell v. Roe. 628 F.'.ld 486. 49 I (9th Cir. 20!0).

258

/d:n513.

259

Id. at 50-1-05.

260

Cash\·. .'vl:txwell. 132 S. CL 611. 613 (2012!.

261

Id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

262

/d.,it615.

263

Id. at 612 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).

264

But see, e.g., Cr parte Weinstein. 421 S. \V.Jd 656. 659 (Tex. Crim. App.2014) (denying habeas relief despite false witness testimony
on the grounds that said testimony was immaterial to the verdict).

265

Garrett, supra note 210, at 64.

266

Id. at 86.

267

Id. at 93.

268

Id at 86-87.

269

Poulin, supra note 245, at 334.

270

See, e.g., 1HE SNITCH SYSTEM, supra note 15; Alexandra Natapoff, Comment, Bl:i-m1d l.i11rdiahle: Hm,· S11i1clies Co111rih1111: /I!
lfrongfid Co11.-ictio11s. 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107. 107-29 (2006J;DavidProtess,A TaleofTwoSnitches, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 10, 2013, 5: 12 AM ), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-protess/reynaldo-guevara_b_3397012.htrnl.

271

See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 192-99; Harris, supra note 78, at 49-58.

272

The authors of a 2007 PEW Charitable Trust study on jailhouse snitches, for instance, condemned their use but advocated a set
of reforms, including corroboration, ''pretrial disclosures, reliability hearings, and special jury instructions" instead of a categorical
ban. 1HE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2. Rory Little has urged a categorical exclusion of six types of unreliable evidence most
frequently linked to wrongful convictions, includingjailhouse informant testimony, in capital cases. See Rory K. Little, .·!ddressi11g
1hc b·id,•111h11T Su11rcl.'s of ll'ro11gfiil Co111"ic1iom: Catq;urica/ Erc/11.1iu111:{L,·idc11cc i11 Copit(I/ Stu1111,·s. 37 SW. L'. L. REV. %5.

See, e.g., Robert M. Bloom, Jailhouse Informants, 18 A.B.A.
SEC. CRIM. JUST. 20, 78 (2003) ("The best way to deal with perjured testimony is to exclude it, and in light of the evidence that
testimony from a jailhouse informant is so often false, it, too, should be subject to exclusion.").
%8-69 ( 2008 ). Other occasional calls for a total ban have been made.
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See, e.g., DWYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 157; Harris, supra note 78, at 61-62.

N ATAPOFF,supranote3,at 194.

275

Id.

~76

Id. at 194-95 (identifying lliinois, Oklahoma, and Nevada as mandating pretrial reliability hearings for jailhouse-informant
testimony);see D"Agt,stinn ,·. State. 823 P.2d 283. 285 t 1'c,·. 19911; Dodd,·. Stat.:. 993 P.2d 778. 7!-.4 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).

277

NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 195; see D,mbcrt,. \kn-ell Do\\' Pham, .. Inc .. 509 U.S. 579. 587-90 ( 1993).

278

Harris, supra note 78, at 63-64.

279

Id. at 63.

280

Id. at 64-65.

281

See, e.g., Schauer & Spellman, supra note 178, at 19 (noting the "mistaken belief that judges and juries are competent evaluators of
the veracity of those who are offering [direct evidence] testimony'').

282

Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, "I'm Innocenti": Effects ofTraining on Judgments ofTruth and Deception in the Interrogation
Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 501 (1999) (internal citations omitted); see also Gary D. Bond, Deception Dc1ec1io11
t.\7,ertisc. 32 LAW & 1-!Uivl. BEHA V. 339. 339 (200~ I (citing research studies finding that subjects were generally unable to identify
lies at a rate greater than chance).

283

See Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, "He's Guilty!": Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 469, 471 (2002).

284

Kassin & Fong, supra note 282, at 500-0 I; see also Bella M. DePaulo et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Co"elation in the Detection
ofDeception, l PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346,346 (1997).

285

DePaulo et al., supra note 284.

286

See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN ruRY 55-59 (Phoenix ed., 1971 ); Martin Guggenheim & Randy
Hertz, Rt:fh•,·ti,ms 011 .hu{~es. .furies. and .Justict': E11.1·111·i11g the Faimess o/'.f11n·11ilc /)c/i11q11,·11t:1· Trials. 33 WAKE FOREST L
REV. 553. 562-6J < 1998).

287

KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 286; see also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 286 (discussing research).

288

Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 286, at 568.

289

Melanie D. Wilson, !111pmh<1hle ( 't111sc: A ( 'ascji,r .l11,l~i11g Police /11· a Mort' .\/aicstic S1<111dard. 15 BERKELEY .I. CRH,!. L. 259.
267-6~ (20IO).

290

Id. at 26 7 (citing studies that conclude judges "knowingly acquiesce in police perjury so that they too avoid letting a guilty defendant
escape prosecution'').

291

Id. at 265.

292

Id. at 264-65 (studying judicial resolution of claims of police perjury brought by criminal defendants).

.293

See Jennifer E. Koepke, Note, 77,c Failure: 111 Breach 11,,, Blue Ir,,// ,fSilcncc: The Circling 0(1/,(' Wagons 10 Protffl Polin· Pc1:i111:r.
39 WASH13UR'.',; LI. 211. 222 (2000) (summarizing reasons that judges are reluctantto find police perjury}.

294

See Susan D. Rozelle, Dauhi:r1. Stl1111<111hcrt: Criminal llcfi-11d,11111· ,me! the Slum End o(the Science Srick. 43 TULSA L. REV. 597.
606(20071.

39
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295

Id at 599-600.

296

Id.

297

GARRETT, supra note l, at 256.

298

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / l 15-2l(c) (1993).

299

NATAPOFF, supra note 3.

300

See Dodd,.. State. 993 P.2d 778. 78-1 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000).

301

Id.

302

See NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 192; Harris, supra note 78, at 62 (calling for enhanced discovery requirements in cases of all
cooperating witnesses, including electronic recording of all ex parte discussions with the cooperator).

303

Harris, supra note 78, at 53.

304

BennettL. Gershman, Wimcss Coaching hr l'rosecutors. 23 CARDOZO L. REV. i(:9. 833 (2002).

305

Hanis, supra note 78, at 53.

306

As one commentator noted, "The likelihood of fabrication resulting from bargained-for testimony is simply too great to rely on a
prosecutor's honor and good faith in meeting his discovery obligations" with respect to incentivized witnesses. Cassidy, supra note
61, at 1176.

307

CJ Christine J. Saverda, Accomplin's in Federal Courr: A Ca.H·ji1r lllcreas<'1//;·l'idemian· S1<11ularil~. I 00 YA LE L.J. 785. 798 t 19901
(arguing that corroboration requirements should apply for all compensated informants).

308

See Peter A. Joy, Comtmcting .~rs1cma1ic S1!1<'g11ard~ Against lllfi,m1a111 Per;111:1·. 7 OHIO ST . .I. CR.11'1. L. 677. 680-81 C0I0)
(quoting ABA Res. 108(b), adopted by the House ofDelegates (Feb. 15, 2005)). Defendants have argued for adoption ofcorroboration
requirements unsuccessfully in some states. See, e.g., State,.. Walker. 82 A.3d 1,30. 635 (C'onn. App. Ct. 2013); see also ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, AClilEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 63 (Paul
C. Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) (urging reforms of state rules regardingjailhouse informants).

309

TEX. CODE C'Rl:V1. PROC. ANN. art. 38.075 (\Vcsl 201-ll.

310

CAL. PENAL CODE ~ 1111.5 (Deering 2008).

311

Id. t'The testimony of an in-custody infonnant shall be corroborated by other evidence that connects the defendant with the
commission of the offense, the special circumstance, or the evidence offered in aggravation to which the in-custody informant
testifies."); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. AN!'-J. art. 38.075 ("A defendant may not be convicted ofan offense on the testimony of
a person... imprisoned or confined in the same correctional facility as the defendant unless the testimony is corroborated by other
evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed.").

312

Compare CAL. PENAL CODE

313

~

1111.5, with CAL PENAL CODE

~

1111 (Deering 2008).

Hernandez\. State. "Jo. 03-10-00863-CR. 2013 \\'L 3723203. at *-I (Tex. App. July 11. 20 I 3 ); see also Gill \'. State. 873 S.W.2d
45. 48 (Tex. Crim. :\pp. 1994).

3 !-l

CAL. l'Ec'JAL CODI:.~ 111 l.

315

Id.; see People-\. D:J\ i,. 217 Cal. App. -Ith 14S-I. 1490 (2013 ).

----·---·~--·-·-···.......__.________

·------··------·--"-···•-----
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316

See, e.g., People,·. \Va.,hington. N,,,. A 1183--l<J. Al 2:SOxX. 200•l \VL 71--1512. at "'9 (Cal. Ct. App. :-.br. 19. 2009) (citing People,·.
Williams. 940 P.2d 710, 772 (Cal. 1997)); Ramiro,. State. 75--1 S.E.2d :-25. 327 (Ga. 2014).

317

318

See, e.g., Whitley,·. Ercole. 725 F. Supp. 2d 3%. 40--11.S.D.'.'--l.Y. 2010) (affirming conviction based on testimony ofjailhouse
informant where informant's testimony was corroborated by other jailhouse informants).
State v. Chun:hwell. ;s;o. :\COi l-00950-CCA-IU-CD. 20!3 \VL-DOl 18. at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. h:b. 4. 2013) (citing Ashby v.
State. 139 S.W. S72 (Tenn. I'll I l).

319

"1J;l

See id. (holding that the bodies of shooting victims established that a criminal offense had occurred. and therefore the corpus delicti
rule was not violated by admission of a jailhouse informant's testimony that the defendant confessed to the crime). Connecticut
makes corroboration of ajailhouse snitch's testimony a factor in determining whether a failure to instruct the jury about the potential
unreliability of ajailhouse informant was harmless error. See State,·. Ebron. 975 A.2d I 7. 2{) (Conn. 2009); Stme v. Arroyo. 973
A.2d 1254. 1262-63 (Conn. 2009).

310

RobertP. Mosteller, The Special ThrrnT of11?fim11,1111s 10 1/,e !1111t1cc111 ll"ho Are .\"01 l,111occ11ts: Pmd11ci11g
/11cc111fres. ,md Taki11g

311

-J

~,,__

,1

""Finl

Dra/is. ·· Recurdi11g

Fresh Look a1 the El"ide11ce. 6 OHIO ST. .I. CRl\1. L. 519. 551-52 t2009l.

Id.

_)

At the same time, cases in which the only evidence against a defendant is jailhouse snitch testimony-though they certainly existare likely to be highly disfavored by prosecutors. After all, even jurors prone to be misled by fundamental attribution error will be
hard-pressed to convict a defendant where there is absolutely no other evidence of guilt than the uncorroborated say-so of a single
jailhouse snitch. I say a single snitch here advisedly, because in California, at least, jailhouse snitch testimony provided by two
different snitches will satisfy the corroboration requirement, as long as the snitches did not have an opportunity to conspire among
themselves. See CAL. PEi\.-\L CODE~ 1111.5 (Deering 2008).
The Sixth Amendment bars the State from "deliberately eliciting"- either directly or through its agents-incriminating statements
from criminal defendants. See Kuhlmann ,. Wilson. --177 U.S. 436. --1:-9 ( l 986!; t:nited States Y. Henry. 4--17 U.S. 264. 270 ( 1980).
However, the prohibition only applies with respect to crimes as to which the defendant has been charged. See Texas '"· Cobb. 532
t:.S. 162. 163 (2001 I.

See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 14, at 27-28.
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Brandon L. Garrett, The Suhst,mce ,fF,i/.1·,• Cunf;•ssic111s. 62 STA\.:. L. REV. I 051. 1053 (2010).
Id at I 11 3 ( examining dozens of exonerations involving false confessions and finding that "[i}n many cases ...police likely disclosed

[[critical] details during interrogations by telling exonerees how the crime happened").
Id
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ai

I I I~.

t

Id.
Id.

3.:W
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See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 1, at 247. Some jurisdictions already require such procedures. In Los Angeles County, for
example, "the District Attorney's office... requires tape-recording of all interviews withjailhouse infonnants and preservation of these
recordings, as well as any other records of interaction and use of jailhouse informants." Handy, supra note 29, at 760; see also
Gershman, supra note 304, at 861-62; Mosteller, supra note 320, at 560-61, 560 n.193.
See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 197.
California is one such state. See CAL. PE'.\A L CUDI: ~ 1127,H bi (Deering 2008) (requiring courts to instruct thejwy on in-custody
informant testimony). Other states include Montana and Oklahoma, which require special jury instructions on informant credibility
when ajailhouse informant testifies. See Stat,:\. (inms:s. 'JX2 P.2d l 03,. l 0--13 ( \t,,111. i•N9); Dodd,·. State. 993 P.2d ::~. 7~-H Ulda.
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Crim. App. 2000). Some states require cautionary jury instructions only where ajailhouse infonnant's testimony lacks corroboration.
See People v. Pctschow. 119 P.3d 495. 50-1 (Colo. App. W04); Stale v. James. No. 96-C A-17. 1998 \VL 518135. at *5 (Ohio Ct.
App. \far. 25. 1998 ); Statc v. Spiller. No. 00-2l-97-CR. 200 I \\/ L I03 52 I 3. at *5 ( Wis. C1. App. Sept. 11. 200 I ).

See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence
Act upon an Accused, 15 CR.IM. L.Q. 88, 91-95 (1972) (finding that mock jurors who learned ofa defendant's prior convictions
were more likely to convict regardless of whether they received instructions to disregard the prior convictions). But see David Alan
Sklansky, Eridc11tiw:r lmtructions and th<' Jun- a.~ Other. <>5 ST AN. L. REV. 407. -123-.W (2013) (reviewing empirical studies and
concluding that "evidentiary instructions work, albeit imperfectly").
334

Sara Gordon, Through the £res of' .Jurors: The u~c ,f Schemas i11 the .-lppfirntio11 ,f "'J'/ai11-La11g11age ·· ./111:r /11s1ructiom. 64
HASTINGS L.J. 643. 645 (2013) (reporting that "studies have almost universally returned results fmding that, by and large,jurors
are confused by jury instructions and often disregard them'l

335

See, e.g., Thomas R. Carretta & Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects ofInadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APP. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 280, 291 (1983) {reporting that mock jurors presented with inadmissible evidence were more likely to convict than
jurors not presented with the evidence notwithstanding judicial instructions to disregard it); Saul Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers,
Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046 (1997) (finding that mock jurors exposed to incriminating evidence were more likely to view the
defendant as guilty than jurors not exposed to that evidence notwithstanding instructions to ignore it); Lisa Eichorn, Note, Social
Science Findings am/ the J111:1·'s .·I hi!it_r to Disregard f.\·idc11c<' Under the Federal Rules ,!f'E1·id<!11('('. 52 LAW & CONTEMP. !'ROBS.
34 I . 34 7 ( 1989 ).

336

Cindy E. Laub et al., Cw, the Court.1· fr!/ a11 £ar ji·om w1 E:re:' leg,,/ .·lpproach,·.1· 10 I "oice Jdc111(/ica1i1111 E1·idc11cc. 3 7 LA \V &
PSYCHOL. REV. 119. 1561:i0l 3) (evaluating research on cautionary instructions regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony);
see also Sklansky, supra note 333, at 429.

337

Richard A. Leo et al., l'ro111oti11g .krnrm:r in the Use ,!f C,mfessio11 i;"i·idemc: An .-/1;1;11111,•111Ji1r Pretrial Re/iahi/it_l" ..J.1·sc'ss111t'llls
Pre,·cm ll"m11gfii/ Co111 ic1io11s. 85 TE:vlP. L. REV. 75lJ. X23 !20 D l.

338

Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Co111c.rnwl Apprc1ewh 10th,· .-ld111issihili1y o{th,· State'.~ Forensic Science and ,\ledirnl E1·idc11ce. 61
U. TORONTO L.J. 343. 366-67 1201 l l.
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Jackson\". Dcnno, 378 L.S. 3M( 376 ( 1%'-I).

340

Id. at 386 (1964).

341

See, e.g., Ariz,rna v. Fulminantc. 499 U.S. 279. 296 ( l9<Jl ); Hopi v. Ut,1h. I 10 U.S. 574. 585 (1884).

342

As the Supreme Court long ago observed:
But the presumption upon which weight is given to such evidence, namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety
or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of
inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by
or in the presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him
of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.
Hr11>t. 110 U.S. at 585.

343

49lJ l.S. at 2%.

34-1

There was, moreover, some reason to doubt the credibility of Sarivola, the jailhouse informant. Sarivola was associated with the
Columbo crime family and convicted for loan sharking, extortion, and illegal debt-collection practices. Brief of Respondent at 11,
Arizona\'. fuhnin~nh:. --199 U.S. 279 ( 1990) (No. 89-839), 2009 W!. 50741-1. He was also a paid infonnant for the FBI who received
payment for relaying "incriminating statements from targeted suspects." Id. On one occasion, Sarivola produced a fake audio tape
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containing purportedly incriminating statements made by another inmate. Id. at 12. He ultimately admitted that the tape was a "phony,"
but the FBI continued to use his services even after learning of the fraud Id. at 6-7.

-.,;,;

345

F11/mi11a11te. 499 l'.S. .it '.!S::!.
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Id al 283.
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Id.
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Id
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Id
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Id.

351

Id. at 283-84.
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Id. at 284.
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Id.
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Id. at 284-85.
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Id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 296 (quoting Bruton v. L'nitcd Slates. 391 L' .S. 123. 139-40 { I%8 l (White, J., dissenting)).
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Id. at 288, 295.
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Id. at 295,297.
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Id at 288-90.
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Id. at 296.
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L.S. CO;,;ST . .imc•nd. V.
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384 L.S.-Bh I 1%6).
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Id. al 460-61.
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See, e.g., Crawfi.1rd ,·. Washington. 541 U.S. 36. 68 120041 (holding that testimonial evidence is only admissible where cross-

examination is unavailable).
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See, e.g., Oliio v. Roberts. 448 L·.s. 56. 66 I 19S0i.

366

Id.

367

Id.
Cra\\·fi.ird \-. \\"a,hington. :>-l 1 l .S. 3!,. (,I (.:OOhJ.
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370

Id
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See Welsh S. White, Regulating Prison /,!formers Under the Due Process Clause, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 105 (1991).

at

61.
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Cf id.; see also Rory K. Little, .-lddrcssi11g The 1::1·ide111iar1· Sourn·s ,,r IFmn:-;fid Co111'idirms: Cmcgorical E\dusir111 of'E,·idcnce i11
Capital S1a1111cs. 37 SW. L:. L.. REV. %5. 977 12009) (citing polygraph evidence as one long-standing example, and pointing out
several categories of evidence proven unreliable in wrongful conviction cases, such as junk science).
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378 U.S. 368 C1%4).
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Id. at 36()-70.
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Id m 374-75.

376

Id. at 376.
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Id. at 380 (quoting Stein \'. J\iew York. 346 U.S. 156. 177-78 ( 1956 l).
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379
380

381

Of course, judges might also presumptively exclude such evidence under Rule 403 on the theory that the probative value ofjailhouse
snitch testimony is outweighed by its prejudicial impact See FED. R. EVI D. -103.

Indeed, the common exclusion of hearsay and character evidence is based on ''the fear that certain kinds of admittedly relevant
evidence will be overvalued by the trier offacl" Schauer & Spellman, supra note 178, at 3.
See ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 12-21-701 to 12-21-704 (2009) (holding inadmissible all "stress evaluation instrument[s] [administered
by law enforcement] to test or question individuals for pwpose of determining and verifying the truth of statementsj; CAL. EV ID.
CODE § 351.1 (Deering 2004) ("[T]he results of a polygraph examination ... shall not be admitted into evidence in any criminal
proceeding."). Such evidence is also precluded in military court martials pursuant to Mi Iitm)' Ru le of J:: \'idence 707, which provides,
in relevant part: "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph
examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into
evidence." MILITARY COMM'N R. EVID. 707.
See Linitcd States v. Scheffer. 523 U.S. 303. 311 ( 1998) (affirming the military's per se ban on admissibility of polygraph evidence
in court martial proceedings).

382

Id

383

293 F. llll3 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

384

Id. at l D13-1-1.

at

30:.
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See generally Daubc11 v. Merrell Dow Phann .. Inc .. :'-09 U.S. 579 ( 1993 l; James R. McCall, Mism11cc111iom and Rcel't.1l11,11io11-Poz1:1Jraph Admissihility Afi<'r Rock and Daubc11. J 996 L'.. ILL. I.. REV. 363 ( 19%).
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James Liebman, 77,e O,·c1 1,roducTim1 o{Dcath. I 00 COLU!'vl. L. REV. 2030. 2050 n.8-1 (2000) (citing Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills,
Death Row Justice Derailed, CHJ.. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at NI).
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Michael Martin, Admission of Hypnotically Refreshed Statements, 214 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1995); Gregory G. Samo, Annotation,
Admissihilin· oj'H,j11101ic E,·idenc<' "' Cri1J1i11al Triul. 9~ A.L.R ..i D-1-12 ( ]979J.
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A.LR. 606(19381.
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COMMENT:
BEYOND UNRELIABLE:
HOW SNITCHES CONTRIBUTE TO
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
(PREPARED FOR THE FACES OF
WRONGFUL CONVICTION
CONFERENCE, APRIL 2006)
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF*

INTRODUCTION

Thanks to new DNA technologies and the heroic efforts of
innocence advocates, there is increasing public recognition that
our criminal justice system often convicts the wrong people.
Criminal informants, or "snitches," 1 play a prominent role in
this wrongful conviction phenomenon.
According to
Northwestern University Law School's Center on Wrongful
* Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. This piece is based in
part on my earlier article, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences,
73 U. CIN. L. REv. 645 (2004), which offers a global analysis of the role of snitches in
the criminal system and their impact on high crime communities.
1 By "snitchesn I mean criminals who provide information in exchange for
lenience for their own crimes or other benefits. The term "informant" therefore does
not include law-abiding citizens who provide information to the police with no benefit
to themselves.
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Convictions, 45.9 percent of documented wrongful capital
convictions have been traced to false informant testimony,
making "snitches the leading cause of wrongful convictions in
U.S. capital cases."2 Horror stories abound of lying jailhouse
snitches and paid informants who frame innocent people in
pursuit of cash or lenience for their own crimes. 3 In recognition
of the dangers of informants who lie, capital reform proposals
often contain provisions designed to restrain the use of
informant testimony. 4
But informants do not generate wrongful convictions
merely because they lie. After all, lying hardly distinguishes
informants from other sorts of witnesses. Rather, it is how and
why they lie, and how the government depends on lying
informants, that makes snitching a troubling distortion of the
truth-seeking process. Informants lie primarily in exchange for
lenience for their own crimes, although sometimes they lie for
money. 5 In order to obtain the benefit of these lies, informants
must persuade the government that their lies are true. Police
and prosecutors, in turn, often do not and cannot check these
lies because the snitch's information may be all the government
has. Additionally, police and prosecutors are heavily invested
in using informants to conduct investigations and to make
their cases. 6 As a result, they often lack the objectivity and the
information that would permit them to discern when
informants are lying. 7 This gives rise to a disturbing marriage
of convenience: both snitches and the government benefit from
inculpatory information while neither has a strong incentive to
challenge it. 8 The usual protections against false evidence,
2

Rob Warden, The Snitch System: Haw Snitch Testimony Sent Randy Steidl

and Other Innocent Americans ta Death Row, Center on Wrongful Convictions,

Northwestern
University
School
of
Law,
2004,
available
at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions.
s See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g. IWNOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 120-22
(Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter IWNOIS COMMISSION] (recommending enhanced
documentation and discovery regarding the government's use of informants); see also
ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-21 (2003) (adopting Commission recommendation
requiring reliability hearings for jailhouse informants).
6 Alexandra
Natapofl: Snitching: The Institutional and Communal
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 645, 652 (2004).
6 Id. at 671.
7 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Troth
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917, 946 (1999).
e This scenario presupposes some good faith on the part of the government; the
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particularly prosecutorial ethics and discovery, may thus be
unavailing to protect the system from informant falsehoods
precisely because prosecutors themselves have limited means
and incentives to ferret out the truth. 9
This Comment briefly surveys in Part I some of the data on
snitch-generated wrongful convictions. 10 In Part II, it describes
in more detail the institutional relationships among snitches,
police, and prosecutors that make snitch falsehoods so
pervasive and difficult to discern using the traditional tools of
the adversarial process. 11 Part III concludes with a litigation
suggestion for a judicial check on the use of informant
witnesses, namely, a Daubert-style 12 pre-trial reliability
hearing. 13 The Appendix in Part IV contains a sample motion
requesting and justifying such a hearing. 14
I.

WRONGFUL CONVICTION DATA

In 2000, the groundbreaking book Actual Innocence
estimated that twenty-one percent of wrongful capital
convictions are influenced by snitch testimony. 15 Four years
later, a study by the Center on Wrongful Convictions doubled
that number. 16 Another recent report estimates that twenty
percent of all California wrongful convictions, capital or
otherwise, result from false snitch testimony. 17 The Illinois
Commission on Capital Punishment, in reviewing that state's
wrongfully convicted capital defendants, identified "a number
of cases where it appeared that the prosecution relied unduly
on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness with something
to gain. In some cases, this was an accomplice, while in other
purposeful use of false evidence is of course more problematic.
9Yaroshefsky, supra note 7, at 947.
10 See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
12 Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring court9 to
independently evaluate the reliability of expert testimony).
13 See infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
15 JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 156
(Doubleday 2000).
16 Warden, supra note 2, at 3.
17 Nina Martin, Innocence Lost, SAN FRANCISCO MAGAZINE 87-88 (Nov. 2004)
(estimating the number of California wrongful convictions as being in the hundreds or
even thousands).
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cases it was an in-custody informant." 18 Professor Samuel
Gross's study on exonerations likewise reports that nearly fifty
percent of wrongful murder convictions involved perjury by
someone such as a "jailhouse snitch or another witness who
stood to gain from the false testimony." 19
Behind these general statistics lie numerous stories of
informant crime, deceit, secret deals and government
duplicity. 20 In Texas, in the so-called "sheetrock scandal," a
group of police officers and informants set up dozens of
individuals with fake drugs, which were actually gypsum, the
main, non-narcotic component of sheetrock.21 The suspects
were typically Mexican workers, and many pleaded guilty or
were deported before the scandal was uncovered. 22 In Los
Angeles, DEA informant Essam Magid not only avoided jail for
his many crimes but earned hundreds of thousands of dollars
by serving as an informant. 28 During this time, he framed
dozens of innocent people before one person he targeted finally
refused to plead guilty and revealed the arrangement. 24 The
now-infamous Leslie White, the prototypical jailhouse snitch,
sent dozens of suspects to prison by fabricating confessions and
evidence, reducing his own sentences by years. 25
Although such horror stories provoke outcry, little has
been done to cabin the law enforcement discretion that makes
such informant operations possible, or to impose greater
transparency and oversight onto the process in order to curtail
such abuses.

supra not.e 4, at 8.
R. Gross et al, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 528, 548-44 (2005).
20 Natapoff, supra not.e 5, at 656-57.
21 Fake Drugs, real lives: Euolution of a Scandal, DALLASNEWS.COM, available at
http://www.dallasnews.com/s/dws/spe/2008/fakedrugs/fakedrugl 108.html (last visited
Aug. 1, 2006).
22 Id.; see also Ross Milloy, Fake Drugs Force an End to 24 Cases in Dallas, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at AL
23 John Glionna and Lee Romney, Snagging a Rogue Snitch, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2005, at Al (chronicling DEA's reliance on Magid).
24 Id.
18 ILLINOIS COMMISSION,
19 Samuel

25 ROBERT BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 64-66 (Praeger 2000).
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INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED: LAW ENFORCEMENT
DEPENDENCE ON SNITCHES

Informants have become law enforcement's investigative
tool of choice, particularly in the ever-expanding world of drug
enforcement.26 Informants are part of a thriving market for
information. 27 In this market, snitches trade information with
police and prosecutors in exchange for lenience, the dismissal
of charges, reduced sentences, or even the avoidance of arrest. 28
It is a highly informal, robust market that is rarely scrutinized
by courts or the public.29 And it is growing. 30 While data is
hard to come by, federal statistics indicate that sixty percent of
drug defendants cooperate in some fashion. 31 Informants
permeate all aspects of law enforcement, from investigations to
plea-bargaining to trial.a2
The growth in the sheer number of informants reflects the
increasing dependence of police and prosecutors on
informants. 83
Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky describes
prosecutors' own complaints: "These [drug] cases are not very
well investigated. . . . [O]ur cases are developed through
cooperators and their recitation of the facts. Often, in DEA,
you have agents who do little or no follow up so when a
cooperator comes and begins to give you information outside of
the particular incident, you have no clue if what he says is
true." 84 Another prosecutor revealed that "the biggest surprise
is the amount of time you spend with criminals. You spend
most of your time with cooperators. It's bizarre."35 Another
26

Natapof( supra note 5, at 655.
Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563

27 See

(1999).
28[d.

Natapof( supra note 5 (describing the contours of the informant institution).
so Weinstein, supra note 27, at 563 ("These are boom times for sellers and buyers
of cooperation in the federal criminal justice system.").
3l See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS Table 5.34 (2001) (stating that thirty percent of federal drug defendants
received on-the-record cooperation credit under USSG § 5Kl.l); American College of
Trial LaWYUS Report and Proposal on Section 5Kl.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, 38 AM.. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2001) (citing sentencing commission
report that "fewer than half of cooperating defendants receive a departure").
32 See Natapoff, supra note 5.
33 See id.
34 Yaroshefsky, supra note 7, at 937.
ss Id. at 937-38.
29
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prosecutor describes the phenomenon of "falling in love with
your rat"86 :
You are not supposed to, of course.... But you spend time
with this guy, you get to know him and his family. You like
him. . . . [T}he reality is that the cooperator's information
often becomes your mind set.... It's a phenomenon and the
danger is that because you feel all warm and fuzzy about
your cooperator, you come to believe that you do not have to
spend much time or energy investigating the case and you
don't. Once you become chummy with your cooperator, there
is a real danger that you lose your objectivity. . . . 87

Because investigations and cases rely so heavily on
informants, protecting and rewarding informants has become
an important part of law enforcement. 88 Police and prosecutors
are well known for protecting their snitches: all too often, when
defendants or courts seek the identity of informants, cases are
dismissed or warrant applications are dropped. 39
More
fundamentally, police and prosecutors become invested in their
informants' stories, and therefore may lack the objectivity to
know when their sources are lying.40
Informants are thus punished for silence and rewarded for
producing inculpatory information, even when that information
is inaccurate. The system protects them from the consequences
of their inaccuracies by guarding their identities and making
their information the centerpiece of the government's cases.
The front line officials who handle informants - police and
prosecutors - are ill equipped to screen that information, and
once they incorporate it into their cases, they acquire a stake in
its validity. This phenomenon explains in part why snitch
testimony generates so many wrongful convictions: it
permeates the criminal system and there are few safeguards
against it.

ss Id. at 944.

B7Jd.
See Natapoff, supra note 6, at 664-67, 671-74 (documenting the nature and

38

extent of law enforcement reliance on informants).
39 See,.e.g., L. Paul Sutton, GeUing Around the Fourth Amendment, in THINKING
ABOUT POLICE 441, 443 (Carl B. Klockars & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 2d ed. 1991).
40 Yaroshefsky, supra note 7, at 943-44.
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Ill. LITIGATING SNITCHES: A DAUBERT-INSPIRED APPROACH

While the impact of informants on the criminal system
goes far beyond their role as witnesses, an important part of
the wrongful conviction phenomenon turns on the role of
snitches at trial.
Many wrongful convictions represent
instances where an innocent defendant refuses to plead guilty
and goes to trial, but is nonetheless convicted because the jury
accepts a snitch's testimony as credible and true. When this
happens, the integrity of the system is at stake. This section
proposes a limited remedy for this problem in the form of pretrial reliability hearings. Illinois has adopted this procedure
for in-custody informants (so-called "jailhouse snitches"), and
at least two U.S. jurisdictions as well as Canada have
contemplated variations of it. 41
The theory behind pre-trial reliability hearings mirrors the
reasoning in Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 42 in which the Supreme
Court established the necessity for reliability hearings for
expert witnesses. As Professor George Harris points out, there
are many similarities between snitches and expert witnesses. 43
Like experts, informants are "paid" by one party. 44 This makes
them more one-sided than typical witnesses. 45 Informants'
testimony is coached and prepared by government lawyers,
making them challenging to cross-examine. 46
Moreover,
informants' stories are hard to corroborate or contradict in
cases where their testimony is the central evidence against the
defendant. 47 Finally, like experts, informants may have an air
of "inside knowledge" about the crime that may sway the jury,
an air that is not easily dispelled by cautionary instructions. 48
41 See ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-21 (2003); Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778,
785 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (Strubhar, J., specially concurring); D'Agostino v. State,
823 P.2d 283, 285 (Nev. 1992) (holding that before "jailhouse incrimination" testimony
is admissible the "trial judge [must] first determine □ that the details of the admissions
supply a sufficient indicia of reliability"); ILLINOIS COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 122
(documenting Canadian experience).
42Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring courts to
independently evaluate reliability of expert testimony).
43 George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000).
44 Id. at 3.
46Jd. at 4.
46 Id. at 31.
47 Id. at 71.
48 See Harris, supra note 43, at 49-58 (describing inadequate procedural controls
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Indeed, the prevalence of wrongful convictions based on snitch
testimony demonstrates that juries often believe informants. 49
For these types of reasons, the Supreme Court has
recognized that discovery, cross-examination and jury
instructions - the traditional adversarial protections against
false testimony - do not guarantee a rigorous jury evaluation of
expert testimony. 50 The court must act as a preliminary "gatekeeper'' and evaluate the reliability of experts before the jury
hears them. 51 For these same reasons, courts should act as
gatekeepers and evaluate the reliability of informants before
they can testify at trial. This would permit fuller disclosure of
the deals that informants make with the government, 52 allow
more thorough testing of the truthfulness of informants, and
reduce opportunities for abuse. It would also acknowledge that
even well-meaning police and prosecutors may need help in
ascertaining the reliability of their criminal sources.
Illinois has enacted a statute that provides a potential
blueprint for the type of reliability inquiry that a trial court
should conduct in evaluating informant testim.ony. 53 This
statute places the burden on the government to prove
reliability by a preponderance of the evidence, and requires the
court to consider the following factors:
(1) the complete criminal history of the informant;
(2) any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the
offering party has made or will make in the future to the
informant;
(3) the statements made by the accused;
(4) the time and place of the statements, the time and place
of their disclosure to law enforcement officials, and the
names of all persons who were present when the statements
were made;
(5) whether at any time the informant recanted that
testimony or statement and, if so, the time and place of the
recantation, the nature of the recantation, and the names of
over cooperating witnesses).
49 Id. at 57-58.
50 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
51Jd.
62 See Justin Scheck, Circuit Gets Tough on Secret Deals, THE RECORDER, Feb.
16, 2006 (describing increasing attention to secret deals between prosecutors and
informants that are not revealed to defense or the court).
53 ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-2l(c) (2003).
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the persons who were present at the recantation;
(6) other cases in which the informant testified, provided
that the existence of such testimony can be ascertained
through reasonable inquiry and whether the informant
received any promise, inducement, or benefit in exchange for
or subsequent to that testimony or statement; and
(7) any other information relevant to the informant's
credibility.54

In effect, this model permits the court to examine the
informant's incentives to lie, his history of escaping
punishment through snitching, the existence, or lack, of
corroboration, and the government's efforts to check the
informant's story. 55 Such reliability determinations will be
more efficient and effective in avoiding wrongful convictions
because the court can evaluate the informant in the same way
that it evaluates all preliminary questions of admissibility,
without the constraints of the rules of evidence or the presence
of the jury.56
Although Illinois limits reliability hearings to in-custody
informants, all informant testimony in which a criminal
witness receives compensation for inculpating someone else is
potentially infected by the same unreliability. 57 Accordingly,
reliability hearings should be available in any case, pre-plea as
well as pre-trial, in which a compensated informant is the
source of inculpatory evidence.58 Given the prevalence of
informant falsehoods in wrongful capital convictions, such
hearings should be mandatory in capital cases, even where the
defense intends to concede guilt and move directly to the
sentencing phase. If the government's information is based on
informant testimony, the defense in turn will rely on such
testimony in assessing the likelihood of success at trial. Given
the stakes, such evaluations should not be left to the vagaries
of informant truthfulness.
The Appendix to this Comment contains a motion and
memorandum of law in support of the motion, requesting a
54Jd.
55 See id.
56 FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
67 Harris, supra note 43, at 63.
58 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629-633 (2002) (holding that the
government is not constitutionally obligated to provide impeachment information to
defendants pleading guilty).
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reliability hearing in a capital case in which the main evidence
against the defendant was supplied by three informantaccomplices. While the factual scenario is not universal, the
legal analysis could form a basis for similar requests.

9/17/2006 11:05:l6AM
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IV. APPENDIX: MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PRE-TRIAL SNITCH RELIABIIJTY HEARING59

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

*
*

v.
JOHNDOE

*

* * * * * * * * *
MOTION TO EXCLUDE COOPERATING WITNESS
TESTIMONY AND REQUEST FOR A RELIABILITY
HEARING
John Doe, by and through his attorneys, respectfully
moves, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 104, 403, and
701, to exclude the testimony of cooperating witnesses John
Smith, John Jones and John Johnson, because their testimony
is unreliable and its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Mr. Doe further
requests that the Court hold a pre-trial hearing to determine
the reliability of these witnesses. In support of this motion Mr.
Doe alleges as follows:
1. Mr. Doe has been charged by indictment with use of a
handgun in the commission of a crime of violence that results
in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924G), carjacking in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, conspiracy in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371, and related counts.
59 This
motion
is
available
for
download
at
http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/natapoff-snitching.html. Although this motion
was filed in federal district court and is thus a matter of public record. I have changed
the names and other identifying information. The motion was never ruled on.
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2. In addition to Mr. Doe, three other men were arrested
in connection with this case. Those men are John Smith, John
Jones, and John Johnson. Information provided by the
government indicates that, shortly after their arrests, these
three men gave statements to the police. Eventually each man
exonerated himself and implicated Mr. Doe in the victim's
murder. The men also portrayed Mr. Doe as the leader in the
carjacking. All three are now cooperating with the government
against Mr. Doe.
3. In exchange for having incriminated Mr. Doe, the
cooperators have all received compensation from the
government in the form of charging and sentencing
consideration. In particular, as a result of their statements
implicating Mr. Doe, they have been permitted to plead guilty
in state court to paroleable sentences of forty-five years for
Smith and Jones, and thirty-five years for Johnson. Family
members of the men have advised counsel that if Mr. Doe is
convicted, their sentences may be further reduced. In light of
the compensation that the cooperating witnesses have received
(and may expect to receive) in exchange for implicating Mr.
Doe, their testimony is biased and inherently unreliable.
4. Their testimony also will be extremely difficult to
disprove because they are the only witnesses to the crime, and
the police have recovered very little physical evidence. Crossexamination may be an insufficient tool to establish the
veracity of these unverifiable statements.
5. For these reasons, Mr. Doe moves to exclude the
testimony of the three cooperating witnesses based on its
unreliability, its lack of probative value, its prejudicial nature,
and its imperviousness to cross-examination at trial.
6. Several courts have held that pre-trial reliability
hearings are appropriate where unreliable cooperating
witnesses are propounded as witnesses. The Illinois Governor's
Commission on Capital Punishment recently has recommended
that reliability hearings be held whenever an in-custody
informant is a potential witness in a capital case. In this case,
a hearing is especially important, because the government's
entire case for guilt and for the death penalty rests on
cooperating informant testimony.
WHEREFORE, Mr. Doe requests that the Court hold a
pre-trial reliability hearing at which the cooperators shall be
made available for examination by counsel, to permit the Court

9/17/2006 11:05:16AM
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to decide whether their testimony is sufficiently reliable, and
therefore sufficiently probative, to be admissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403. A separate memorandum of law is
submitted in support of this motion.
Respectfully submitted,

9/17/2006 11:05:ISAM
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA

*
*

v.

*

JOHNDOE

*

*

* * * * * * *

MEMORANDUMINSUPPORTOFDEFENDANTS
MOTION TO EXCLUDE COOPERATING WITNESS
TESTIMONY AND REQUEST FOR A
RELIABILITY HEARING
SUMMARY

"It is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than
the inducement of a reduced sentence ...." United States v.
Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987). In this
case, the government's case for Mr. Doe's guilt, and potentially
for the death penalty, will be based primarily on the testimony
of three compensated, interested, biased witnesses whose
eventual freedom depends on their ability to obtain Mr. Doe's
conviction.. Under the circumstances, their reliability is so
compromised that their testimony lacks probative value,
thereby failing the test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have called for increased judicial
scrutiny of compensated informant witnesses, and several
courts have mandated pre-trial reliability hearings to permit
courts to evaluate the reliability of compensated witnesses such
as the cooperators in this case. Mr. Doe thus requests that the
Court hold a reliability hearing to require the government to
establish the reliability of its cooperating witnesses, to exclude
some or all of those witnesses if the Court deems it
appropriate, and to preserve Mr. Doe's right to a fair trial.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

* * *
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ARGUMENT
I.

COURTS HAVE DEEMED COMPENSATED WITNESSES
UNRELIABLE AND SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

The Fourth Circuit has recently expressed its deep concern
over the use of compensated informant testimony and its
reluctance to admit such testimony absent stringent judicial
controls. United States v. Levenite, 277 F.3d 454, 459-62 (4th
Cir. 2002). Compensated testimony "create[s] fertile fields
from which truth-bending or even perjury could grow,
threatening the core of a trial's legitimacy." Id. at 462. Such
testimony "may be approved only rarely and under the highest
scrutiny." Id. so
The Fourth Circuit has prescribed additional procedural
guarantees that the government must adhere to where the use
of compensated informant witnesses is contemplated. Before
such testimony will be permitted: (1) the compensation
arrangement must be disclosed to the defendant, (2) the
defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, and (3) the jury must be instructed to engage in
heightened scrutiny of the witness.
Finally, where the
compensation is:
contingent on the content or nature of the testimony given,
the court must ascertain (I) that the government has
independent means, such as corroborating evidence, by
which to measure the truthfulness of the witness's testimony
and (2) that the contingency is expressly linked to the
witness testifying truthfully. Moreover, when a witness is
testifying under such a contingent payment arrangement,
the government has a duty to inform the court and opposing
counsel when the witness' testimony is inconsistent with the
government's expectation.

Levenite, 277 F.3d at 462-63.
60 Although Leuenite concerned a witness who was testifying in exchange for
money, the same concerns arise when the compensation consists of reduced criminal
sanctions. Indeed, the promise of a reduced sentence or the elimination of the capital
sentencing option may be far more valuable to a defendant than cash. See CervantesPacheco, 826 F.2d at 315 (the same analysis is applied by analogy when lenience is
provided as compensation for information).
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Similarly the Ninth Circuit has called for increased
judicial scrutiny of deals between informants and the
government, holding that "where the prosecution fails to
disclose evidence such as the existence of a leniency deal or
promise that would be valuable in impeaching a witness whose
testimony is central to the prosecution's case, it violates the
due process rights of the accused and undermines confidence in
the outcome of the trial," Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 581
(9th Cir. 2005), and calling such lack of disclosure
"unscrupulous." Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir.
2005).
In this case, the three cooperators are being compensated
specifically for testimony adverse to Mr. Doe. They have
already received the benefit of reduced charges and have been
promised low, agreed-upon sentences, and may have their
sentences further reduced if Mr. Doe is convicted. Their
testimony is thus compensated, contingent testimony precisely
of the sort that so troubled the Fourth Circuit in Levenite. The
Court therefore has an obligation to ascertain whether the
government can corroborate the cooperators' truthfulness, the
nature of the contingency arrangement, and the means the
government intends to use to assure that the cooperators
testify truthfully. Because of the difficulty ascertaining these
matters in the heat of trial in the presence of the jury, a pretrial reliability hearing is warranted.
II. COMPENSATED WITNESSES ARE INHERENTLY
UNRELIABLE
A growing body of literature documents the inherent
unreliability of compensated witnesses, cooperating coconspirators, "jailhouse snitches," and other types of
informants. Numerous horror stories of wrongful convictions
based on perjurious informant testimony have emerged, and
they have prompted official review of the practice of permitting
compensated informant testimony. The following list contains
just a few of the efforts to document and control informant
unreliability:
l. The founders of the Innocence Project discovered that
twenty-one percent of the innocent defendants on death row

9/17/2006 11:05:lSAM
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were placed there by false informant testimony. 61
2. The Illinois Governor's Commission on Capital
Punishment unanimously concluded that "[t]estimony from
in-custody witnesses has often been shown to have been
false, and several of the thirteen cases of men released from
death row involved, at least in part, testimony from an incustody informant."62 The Commission recommended the
holding of reliability hearings to mitigate the chances of
perjury.
3. In their comprehensive historical study, Bedau and
Radelet discovered that one-third of the 350 erroneous
convictions they studied were due to "perjury by prosecution
witnesses." This was twice as many as the next leading
source - erroneous eyewitness identification - and stemmed
in large part from the prevalence of co-conspirator
testimony. 63

·..J

Courts likewise have recognized the inherent unreliability
of compensated informants, going so far as to take judicial
notice of their tendency to lie. "The use of informants to
investigate and prosecute persons engaged in clandestine
criminal activity is fraught with peril. This hazard is a matter
'capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned' and
thus of which we can take judicial notice." United States v.
Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993). "Our judicial
history is speckled with cases where informants falsely pointed
the finger of guilt at suspects and defendants, creating the risk
of sending innocent persons to prison." Id. Another court has
noted that "[n]ever has it been more true that a criminal
charged with a serious crime understands that a fast and easy
way out of trouble with the law is . . . to cut a deal at someone
else's expense and to purchase leniency from the government
by offering testimony in return for immunity, or in return for
reduced incarceration." Commonwealth of Northern Mariana
Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1123 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed,
long before snitching became a pervasive aspect of the criminal
61 BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD

& JThi DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 126-57

(Doubleday 2000).
62 !LLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Chapter 8 (April

2002).
68

Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital

Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 173 (1987).
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justice system, the Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he use of
informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the
other betrayals which are 'dirty business' may raise serious
questions of credibility." On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,
755 (1952).
Where the unreliability of a particular type of witness is so
well-established, it is appropriate for the court to take
protective steps to guarantee the integrity of the process. Cf.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 595
(1993) (court to act as "gatekeeper" to ensure reliability of
scientific evidence).
Ill. CROSS EXAMINATION IS AN INSUFFICIENT
GUARANTEE OF RELIABILITY IN THIS CASE

Despite the recognized unreliability of compensated
informant witnesses, courts have traditionally permitted them
to testify on the assumption that cross-examination will
adequately test an informant's truthfulness. See, e.g., Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293,311 (1966). In Hoffa, the Supreme
Court upheld the use of a compensated informant, holding that
his testimony did not violate the defendant's right to due
process, in large part because of the availability of crossexamination, reasoning that "[t]he established safeguards of
, the Anglo-American legal system leave the veracity of a
witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of
his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury."
Id. at 311; see also Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 315
(procedural protections of discovery, cross-examination, and
jury instructions regarding informants satisfy due process).
The cooperators' testimony in this case, however, will be
nearly impossible for defense counsel to penetrate on crossexamination. The cooperators are the only witnesses to the
crime, and their stories can be neither independently confirmed
nor disproved. The assertion that Mr. Doe was the shooter-the
most important single disputed fact in the entire case-rests
entirely upon the self-serving, unverifiable statements of the
cooperating witnesses. Their mere ipse dixit, if maintained,
could suffice to persuade a jury to impose the death penalty on
Mr. Doe.
Cross-examination will be further hampered because the
defense lacks pre-trial access to the cooperators. At this stage
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in the proceedings, the defense has not yet seen the
cooperators' plea agreements. The cooperators, on the other
hand, have had multiple opportunities to hone their version of
events in preparation for court, both in the state proceedings
and in connection with this federal case. This combination of
one-sided access and government preparation will render these
witnesses overly prepared and difficult to examine at trial.
Finally, unlike uncharged lay witnesses, the cooperators
have compelling incentives to pin responsibility on Mr. Doe.
Their future literally hangs in the balance, based on their
ability to maintain a consistent story. For all these reasons, intrial cross-examination may be insufficient to determine
whether the cooperators are being truthful.
Professor George Harris has analyzed the difficulty of
cross-examining informants whose compensation depends on
their usefulness to the prosecutor. As Professor Harris
explains:
Paradoxically, the more a witness's fate depends on the
success of the prosecution, the more resistant the witness
will be to cross-examination. A witness whose future
depends on currying the government's favor will formulate a
consistent and credible story calculated to procure an
agreement with the government and will ad.here religiously
at trial to her prior statements.64

In this case, the motivations of the cooperators are
precisely those described by Professor Harris. Years of their
lives literally depend on the success of this prosecution, and
therefore they will be more resistant to cross-examination than
the typical witness.
For these reasons, the. Court should not rely on defense
counsel's eventual cross-examination of these witnesses to
establish their truthfulness, but rather should have the
opportunity, unfettered by the rules of evidence and the
presence of the jury, to determine for itself whether the
testimony of these witnesses bears sufficient indicia of
reliability to permit its presentation at trial.

64 George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and
Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 54 (2000) (attached as Ex. D).
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IV. THE GOVERNMENT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO
ESTABLISH THE RELIABILITY OF ITS COOPERATING
WITNESSES

The government has special obligations when it comes to
their cooperating informants. Courts have established that a
"prosecutor who does not appreciate the perils of using
rewarded criminals as witnesses risks compromising the truthseeking mission of our criminal justice system [and courts]
expect prosecutors and investigators to take all reasonable
measures to safeguard the system against treachery."
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 236
F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Levenite, 277 F.3d at
459-62. This obligation stems from two sources: first, the
government enlists and controls and rewards its informants
and is therefore in a unique position to evaluate their
reliability.
The second is that the prosecutor, as the
representative of the sovereign, has an ethical obligation to
ensure that the defendant is given a fair trial See Bowie, 236
F.3d at 1089 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935)).
Unfortunately, because of the dynamics of this case, the
government is in a weak position to guarantee the reliability of
the cooperators' testimony. From the inception of this case, the
cooperators have been well aware that any hope of lenience
rested on their ability to provide the government with useful
information. The government is thus the primary target of the
cooperators' efforts to escape punishment, and if the
cooperators are lying, they will presumably be particularly
careful not to reveal it to the government.
The Ninth Circuit addressed these issues of reliability and
government obligations in a case with facts startlingly similar
to the instant case. In Bowie, three co-conspirators were
charged with murder and kidnapping. There was some
evidence that two of the three conspired to pin the murder on
the third. The government's failure to fully investigate the
possibility of collaborative perjury caused the Court to reverse
the conviction. In its decision, the Court noted that when the
government makes a deal with an informant, "each contract for
testimony is fraught with the real peril that the proffered
testimony will not be truthful, but simply factually contrived to

9/17/2006 11:05:16AM
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'get' a target of sufficient interest to induce concessions from
the government." Bowie, 236 F.3d at 1095. The Court
concluded that "rewarded criminals represent a great threat to
the mission of the criminal justice system." Id.
Barry Tarlow has likewise documented the significant
difficulties that prosecutors experience in holding their
criminal informants accountable. 65
Tarlow, a former
prosecutor, explains how prosecutors may be drawn in by
informants who have strong motivations to pin responsibility
on others, and notes the heavy pressures on prosecutors to rely
on unreliable compensated witnesses when others are
unavailable.
Given the inherent "peril" of rewarded testimony and the
government's heavy reliance on it in this case, the government
should not be permitted merely to proffer its good faith belief in
the reliability of its witnesses. Rather, it is appropriate to hold
a hearing to establish the reliability of the witnesses through
adversarial questioning and a neutral evaluation by the Court.
V. A PRETRIAL RELIABILITY HEARING IS REQUIRED TO
TEST THE INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY OUTSIDE THE
PRESENCE OF THE JURY
A. The Court has the Authority and Obligation to
Conduct a Reliability Hearing Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence

In this case, the interests of justice and a fair trial require
a pretrial reliability hearing to permit the Court to ascertain
the reliability and probative value of the cooperators'
testimony. The Court has clear authority to hold such a
hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(c), which
provides: "Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in
all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings
on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the
interests of justice require . . . ."
The rules of evidence likewise obligate the Court to scre~n
out unfairly prejudicial, harmful, confusing or otherwise
unhelpful evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides
65

See Barry Tarlow, Perjuring Informants Brought to the Bar, RICO Report,

CHAMPION, at 33-40 (July 2000).
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that "evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." Likewise, Federal Rule
of Evidence 701, limits lay witness testimony to testimony that
is "helpful" to the trier of fact.
At least two courts and one state legislature have
mandated reliability hearings whenever incarcerated
informants ("jailhouse snitches") are proposed witnesses. See
Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Ok. Ct. of Crim. App. Jan. 6,
2000) (Strubhar, J., concurring) (approving lower court
imposition of "reliability hearing'' comparable to Daubert
hearing); D'Agostino v. State, 107 Nev. 1001, 823 P.2d 283
(Nev. 1992) (holding that before "jailhouse incrimination"
testimony is admissible the "trial judge [must] first determine □
that the details of the admissions supply a sufficient indicia of
reliability"). Illinois mandates such hearings by law. See ILL.
COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 5/115-21(c) (2003). Illinois's statutory
requirement is based on the recommendations of the
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, which
concluded that reliability hearings are necessary whenever
incarcerated informants are offered as witnesses. 66 Such
conclusions apply here with equal force. Jailhouse snitches are
incarcerated defendants who provide information to law
enforcement in exchange for charging and sentencing benefits.
The ability of such snitches to fabricate confessions and other
evidence has become infamous.67 Precisely the same concerns
are present where, as here, the informant is in custody, subject
to criminal penalties, and is offering unique, unverifiable
information in exchange for lenience.
B. The Principles of Daubert Support the Holding of a
Reliability Hearing
The law's treatment of expert witnesses further supports
the holding of a reliability hearing in this instance. In Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the
66 See ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, at 30, 122.
67 See id. at 122-123 (detailing the Los Angeles Grand Jury investigation of
jailhouse snitch testimony).
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Supreme Court determined the need for a special mechanism
to evaluate the reliability of expert witnesses because experts
pose thorny problems of cross-examination and persuasion.
Experts, for example, rely on specialized information that is
not directly available to the jury. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
The court held that the concerns underlying Rule 403 are
preeminent because expert witnesses can have such a potent
effect on juries:
Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this
risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against
probative force under Rule 403 □ exercises more control over
experts than over lay witnesses.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Moreover, as Professor Harris
has noted, expert witnesses are compensated, violating the
usual presumption against the use of paid testimony. 68 The
suitability of compensated expert testimony is thus determined
in part by pre-trial judicial examinations of reliability.
Informants pose many of the same special concerns that
expert witnesses do. Unlike typical lay witnesses, they are
compensated, they have personal interests in the outcome of
the case, their testimony is difficult to test on crossexamination, and they are selected and controlled by the
propounding party. 69
Like experts, moreover, informant
testimony can be "powerful and quite misleading." Daubert,
509 U.S. at 595. At least one court has expressly extended the
principles of Daubert to cover informants, imposing a
"reliability hearing'' requirement whenever the testimony of a
so-called "jailhouse snitch" is involved. Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d
778, 784 (Ok. Ct. of Crim. App. Jan. 6, 2000) (Strubhar, J.,
concurring) (approving lower court imposition of "reliability
hearing" comparable to Daubert hearing).
In this case, the cooperators are the sole witnesses to the
crime and their version of the story will carry heavy weight
with the jury. In the same way that courts act as "gatekeepers"
with respect to experts, it is appropriate for this Court to
ensure that unreliable informant testimony does not taint the

G8
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See Harris, supra note 64, at 1-5.
See id. at 49-59.
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jury.

C. A Reliability Hearing is Warranted on the Facts of
this Case
In this case, the cooperators' testimony presents a
substantial danger of "unfair prejudice" because it is the
government's primary evidence against Mr. Doe, because it is
highly unreliable, because the cooperators have overwhelming
motivations to lie, and because their testimony cannot be
disproved. Their testimony may not be helpful to the trier of
fact if it is so biased and unverifiable that no trier of fact can
conclusively determine it is truthful or not.
It is particularly important that the cooperators' reliability
be tested prior to trial outside the presence of the jury. The
cooperators' reliability, their incentives to fabricate, the details
of the crime, and their relationship to the defendant are
matters which may only be susceptible to penetration through
the more informal inquiries permitted under Rule 104, where
the rules of evidence do not apply. Moreover, the Court is
better suited to recognize reliability and credibility concerns
that may elude the jury. The inquiry into such matters also
could be highly prejudicial if heard by a jury and incurable by
subsequent jury instruction.
Finally, as noted above, the procedural requirements set
forth in Levenite can best be met at a preliminary hearing. At
such a hearing, the informant will be subject to crossexamination, and the government can provide to the Court and
counsel any corroboration it might have and provide
assurances that the arrangement with the witnesses indeed
protects against perjurious testimony.
For all these reasons, Mr. Doe moves to exclude the
testimony of the cooperators, and for a pretrial reliability
hearing to evaluate the reliability and probative value of the
cooperators' testimony.
Respectfully submitted,
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
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RULING AND ORDER RE:
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO ARREST JUDGMENT
OR (IN THE ALTERNATIVE)
FOR NEW TRIAL

MARTIN JOSEPH MACNEILL,

Case No. 121402323

Defendant
Judge Derek P. Pullan

A jury convicted Defendant Martin Joseph MacNeill ("MacNeill") of murdering his wife,
Michelle MacNeill, and obstructing justice. Before imposition of sentence, MacNeill moved
timely to arrest judgment or (in the alternative) for new trial. 1
The Court heard oral argument on June 30, 2014. The State of Utah was represented by
the prosecutor, Mr. Chad E. Grunander. The Defendant appeared in custody and was represented
by his attorney, Mr. Randall K. Spencer.
After careful consideration of the arguments and extensive briefing, the Court now enters
the following:

Defendant's combined motion is timely. URCrP 23 (motion to arrest judgment may be filed "at any time prior to
the imposition of sentence"); URCrP 24 (motion for new trial "shall be made not later than IO days after entry of the
sentence). Courts have held that a motion for new trial filed before entry of sentence is premature. However, these
courts were interpreting the prior version of Rule 24 which required such motions to be filed "within IO days after
imposition of sentence." See, State v. Todd, 2006 UT 7, ,i 2, 128 P.3d 1199; State v. Marble, 2005 UT App 350.
1

1

RULING
Background Facts

Violation of The Court's Order to Exclude Witnesses
~

1. On October 17, 2013, the parties stipulated to exclude testifying witnesses from the
courtroom pursuant to Rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (Tr. 53-54).

2. The trial proceedings were being broadcast live by various media outlets. For this reason,

"'

the parties asked that fact witnesses be ordered not to listen to electronic media coverage
of the trial while under subpoena.

3. The Court granted the request, issuing a Trial Witness Exclusion Order on October 18,

~

2013. The Court ordered that:_ "All fact witnesses shall not watch or listen to television,

radio, or internet news coverage of the trial while under trial subpoena." (Order, dated

"

10/18/13).
4. The Court ordered the parties to "inform their respective fact witnesses of [the] exclusion
order." Id

~

5. The State immediately undertook efforts to infonn many of its witnesses of the exclusion
order.
6. However-for reasons that remain unexplained-the State did not inform the federal

~

jailhouse informants of the exclusion order for almost a week. (State's Opp. Memo,
Exhibit K, Jan. 28, 2014 Robinson Affid.,

,r 11) ("First Robinson Affid. ").

7. These witnesses did not receive notice of the exclusion order until October 23 or 24, the
day they arrived at the Utah County Jail. Id.

2

8. After trial, defense counsel filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the Federal
Bureau of Prisons. Defense counsel sought disclosure of Inmate 1's September 2013 and
October 2013 email and telephone conversations.

9. Defense counsel received copies of this infonnation in December 2013. The telephone
conversations clearly indicate that Inmate I-contrary to his trial testimony-was
watching television coverage of the trial.
10. Inmate I appears to have been watching television coverage of the trial on and after
October 18, 2013, the date the Court's exclusionary order took effect.
The Court's Order To Disclose Impeachment Evidence
Related to Jailhouse Informants

11. Before trial, MacNeill moved to exclude the testimony of the jailhouse informants the
State intended to call at trial.
12. The Court denied the motion, ruling that (I) the weaknesses of jailhouse informant
testimony could be exposed through rigorous ~ross-examination; and (2) the jury would
be instructed on how to judge the credibility of witnesses, and may be instructed on the
heightened motive of jailhouse informants to misrepresent.
13. To guard against the very post-trial motions now pending, the Court issued the following
order:
I am of the view that because cross examination provides the mechanism by
which unfair prejudice is avoided, and due process afforded to the defendant,
there needs to be complete andfull disclosure ofany promised benefits to the
inmates. I know there is disagreement between the State and the defense about
whether or not this has been done. Prior to the date of trial, I will order that the
State, in writing, disclose to the defense with respect to each inmate who will
tesnfy, any and all benefit.s promised, expressed or implied, realized now or to
be realized in the future, in exchange for testimony in the MacNeill case,
3

together with any documentation of the deaL It is only by full disclosure of any
and all promised benefits that cross examination can be fully effective, such that

the due process rights of the defendant will be secured. I know the State would
say that has already been done. I want it put in writing so that it's a part of the
record, with respect to each inmate.
(Court Record, Oct. 8, 2013). [Emphasis added].
The State's Notice ofBenefits Offered or Provided to Jailhouse Informants

14. On October 15, 2013, the State filed its Notice of Benefits Offered or Provided to
Jailhouse Infonnants (''Notice"). As to Inmate I, the Notice read:
The State of Utah has no authority over federal inmates and had nothing to offer
Inmate #1 in exchange for his cooperation in the investigation and his testimony
at trial. There is no agreement to exchange Inmate #I's testimony for
consideration from the State of Utah. Nothing has been given him, and there are
no promises outstanding. (If Inmate # 1 were to request a recommendation from
Robinson or the prosecution, that request would be honored. To date, however,
he has not made any requests for any consideration.)
(Notice, p. 5).
15. This statement was not true.
16. On September 27, 2013 and at Inmate l's request, Investigator Jeff Robinson
("Robinson") of the Utah County Attorney's Office called Beth Ford, Inmate l's federal
public defender. Ford asked Robinson to write a letter in Inmate l's behalf after the trial.
Robinson agreed "to write a letter on [Inmate l's] behalf for his willingness to come
forward with evidence in this case and for his cooperation." Robinson contacted Inmate
1 and explained the agreement (First Robinson Affid., 112, 4).
17. Inmate 1 wanted the recommendation letter to support a Rule 35 motion to reduce his
federal sentence. (Ford Affidavit, 15).
18. On the same day that Robinson spoke to Beth Ford, prosecutors filed the State's
memorandum opposing MacNeill's motion to exclude jailhouse informant testimony.
4

19. In the memorandum, the State wrote: "[N]one [of the. jailhouse informants] were offered
anything other than the promise to put in a 'good word' about their help to the federal
authorities . . . . [T]hese inmates will receive nothing other than a favorable
recommendation from the prosecution in exchange for their testimonies." (Opposition
Memo,p. 7).
20. More than two weeks later on October 15, 2013, the State filed the Notice which
expressly disclaimed any consideration being given to Inmate 1 in exchange for bis
testimony.
21. Prior to the State filing the Notice, a prosecutor met with Robinson and asked him what
Inmate 1 had asked for in exchange for his cooperation in [the MacNeill] case. (State's
Sur-Response, Exhibit C, May 14, 2014 Robinson Affid., ,I7) ("Second Robinson
Affid.").
22. Robinson (1) said that Inmate 1 had not asked for anything in return for his assistance; (2)
did not inform counsel that Inmate 1's attorney had asked for a letter or recommendation;
and (3) did not inform counsel that Robinson had agreed to write the letter. (Second
Robinson Affid., ,r7).
23. In summary, contrary to the State's express representation in the Notice: (1) Inmate 1
had-through his attorney-asked for consideration (the recommendation letter) in
exchange for his testimony; (2) the State did have something to offer Inmate 1 in
exchange for his testimony; (3) there was an agreement to exchange Inmate 1's testimony
for consideration; and (4) there were promises to Inmate 1 that remained outstanding (the
writing of the recommendation letter).
24. As to Inmate 3, the State's Notice of Benefits read:

5

The State of Utah has no authority over federal inmates and had nothing
substantial to offer [Inmate 3] in exchange for his cooperation in the investigation.
There is no agreement to exchange [Inmate 3's] testimony for consideration from
the State of Utah. Nothing has been given him, and there are no promises
outstanding. (If [Inmate 3] were to request a recommendation from Robinson or
the prosecution, that request would be honored. To date, however, he has not
made any requests for consideration.)

(Notice, p. 4).
25. As it turns out, some of this statement was not true.
26. On January 3, 2014, the State disclosed to defense counsel a letter written by Inmate 3 to
Robinson. The letter was written in October prior to Inmate 3 testifying. In the letter,
Inmate 3 references having previously "asked [Robinson] to write or call my prosecutor
and give a recommendation for me." (Exhibit 2, Defendant Sur-Reply Memo).
27. In summary, contrary to the State's express representation in the Notice, Inmate 3 had
made a request for consideration related to his testimony.

Inmate 1's Trial Testimony
28. At trial, the State called Inmate 1 as its last witness.
29. He testified that while incarcerated together with MacNeill in 2011, MacNeill confessed
to (1) giving his wife "some oxy and some sleeping pills"; (2) getting her into the
bathtub; (3) "helping her out"---meaning that he held her head under the water for a little
bit; and (4) doing this because MacNeill's wife was "in the way, that she wanted the
house and kids." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 13-14).
30. In response to a question from the prosecutor on direct examination, Inmate 1 testified
that he expected to be incarcerated in federal prison until 2016 (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony,
p.5).
6

31. On cross examination, defense counsel:
a

Caused Inmate 1 to affirm that the Notice was completely accurate. (Tr. Inmate 1
Testimony, pp. 22-23).

b. Caused Inmate 1 to affirm that his only motives for testifying were to (1) protect
others; and (2) to do the right thing as part of Inmate 1's rehabilitation. (Tr.
Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 21-22, 25, 45).
c. Caused Inmate 1 to affirm that besides ''thinking about" a possible benefit to him
for testifying, he had done nothing else to pursue it. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp.
45-46).
d. Repeatedly confronted Inmate 1 with evidence that his true motive for testifying
was to obtain a reduction on his federal sentence. This evidence included:
1.

Inmate 1's statement to his niece, Raven, that (1) he could "testify [for the
State in MacNeill' s trial] and tell them what I know and come home"; and
(2) This [referring to testifying] "might get me home." (Tr. Inmate 1
Testimony, p. 24).

ii. An August 9, 2013 phone call with Inmate 1's mother in which he
admitted that the State was going to cut him a deal, that he was going to

talk to his lawyer "and find out the real deal. If so, then I'm going [to
testify]; ifno, I ain't going to, you know." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp.

53-54).
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iii. In the same phone call, Inmate I described how an SIS Lieutenant at the

prison told him that he "was an idiot if [he did not testify]" and said, "Man

~

you could be home." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 53).
lV.

Inmate 1's statement to his mother, "Let's just keep praying I get home
~

around Christmas." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 54).
v.

An August 10, 2013 phone call in which Inmate 1 tells his mother that he
is ''putting that date, I'm putting Christmas in my head because the thing
G.I

[referring to the trial in Utah] is going from October to November." (Tr.
Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 58).

vi. Inmate l's statement in the same phone call: "He said that the thing is

G,·

going to be going from October 9th to November 9th •2 So then I'm going to
have from November 9th up until Christmas to get out." (Tr. Inmate 1

"'

Testimony, p. 59). In frustration, Inmate 1 then testified "I didn't ask for
anything ... I still haven't asked for anything." Id In response, defense
counsel confronted Inmate 1 with the rest of the conversation with his

~

mother in which he states he is going to 1''talk with Raven and have her
crack down and see what [Robinson] is going to do ... And make sure he
do the right thing, you know.... Because if he ain't, then I ain't" (Tr.

"'

Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 60).
vu. An August 10, 2013 phone call with Raven in which Inmate I states:

"Hey, we've got to start working on [Robinson] and my lawyer next week
too." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 61).

2 This statement was particularly telling because Inmate I had just testified that he did not know when the trial
would be held in Utah. (Tr. Inmate I Testimony, pp. 57-58).
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"

viii. Inmate l's statement to Raven in which he refers to his testimony for the
State as "Operation Utah." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 62-63).

,.J
lX.

Inmate l's concession that he called his lawyer on August 14, 2013 in
relation to "Operation Utah." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 64).

,,,;)

x. Inmate l's statement to Raven that if"they're through [by November 9th ]

(referring to the MacNeill trial)-ifthey're through on the 9th it should
only take them a month to get me up out of here, and then I'm going to get
'<!JI)

home." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 64).
xi. An August 16, 2013 telephone conversation between Inmate 1 and Steve

"°

(his federal defense investigator), in which Steve outlines the plan for
Inmate 1 receiving credit for testifying in Utah. Steve tells Inmate 1 that
his defense team would (1) wait to see if Inmate 1 testified; (2) contact the
prosecutor in Utah; (3) contact the AUSA (assistant U.S. Attorney) and
tell him what assistance Inmate 1 provided to the Utah people; and (4) file
a Rule 35 motion to reduce his federal sentence. (Tr. Inmate I Testimony,
pp. 72-74).

xii. In the same conversation, Steve tells Inmate 1: "I won't say that [the Rule
35 motion] would do away with those two-and-a-half years [remaining on
Inmate l's federal sentence] but it certainly I think would put a big dent in
it ... Who knows, if it's something-if your testimony is really great and
kind of puts the nail in the guy's coffin, then you know, you might get the
two-and-a-half off." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 74).
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xiii. Inmate I's statement in the same conversation that Robinson had told him
he was ''willing to help me out in any way that he could." (Tr. Inmate I
Testimony, p. 74).
XIV.

Another August 16, 2013 email between Inmate 1 and Raven in which
Inmate 1 states "So I talked with my lawyer and they-they say that after
it is over, I should be coming home." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 98).

xv. An August I 7, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and his sister in
which Inmate I reports that he "is excited;' because he spoke to his lawyer
who said "full speed ahead; let's do this" referring to "Operation Utah."
(Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 76).
xvi. An August 17, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and Robinson in

which Robinson tells Inmate 1: "What I really want is to get you out
before, and I just wish we could do that somehow, some way .... Your
[sic] really are one ofmy key, absolute key witnesses. So it's really
important to us to make sure that you are taken care of, and kept safe, and
you know, I just want to make sure that your needs are taken care of."
(Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 83).
xvii. In the same telephone call, Robinson states the he lost the contact
information for Inmate l's federal public defender and defense
investigator, but that he will call them. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p.p. 8385).
xviii. In the same telephone call, Robinson's stated desire to communicate with
Inmate l by phone rather than email to so that MacNeill 's defense team

10

would not learn of these communications. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p.
86).
xix. An August 17, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and his mother in

which Inmate 1 states: "But he's just told me, and I talked to my lawyer
the other day, too, and they were like 'You know, it will be contingent on
how key of a person you are."' (Tr. Inmate I Testimony, p. 87). When
asked whether "it will be contingent" referred to the amount of
consideration he could get on his federal sentence, Inmate 1 responded,
"Possibly." Id.

xx. In the same conversation, Inmate I's statement that Robinson labeled him
his "No. I." Inmate 1 then states: "He told me I was his No. 1, and my
lawyer and them was like 'You know, according to, you know, how much
you know, how good of a key person I am for him, that would decide how
much, you know, downstroke I got off .... They were like, you know,
and then he told me, he said, 'Because of the amount of time I have left ...
I shouldn't even look back, you know what I mean? He said that's the
deal, you know." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 89).

xxi. An August 18, 2013 telephone call between an unidentified woman and
Inmate 1 in which Inmate 1 states he is coming home for Christmas and
that "between October the 5th and November the 5th [Robinson] will be
coming to get me. Then after I get through with [Robinson] it will only be
a matter of, you know, a couple of weeks, maybe a month." (Tr. Inmate 1
Testimony, p. 91).
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xxii. In the same call, Inmate 1 states that "whichever one is first"-referring to

his 18: I Ratio Motion for a reduction in sentence ~r "Operation Utah"-"I
don't care. If that one comes first then I ain't going to Utah." (Tr. Inmate
1 Testimony, p. 93).
xxm. An August 20, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and Raven in which

Inmate 1 states that Robinson is ''talking good" and that he said "he would
do what he could for me, but he really couldn't do anything because this
was a State case. . . . He's going to do whatever he got to do, but you

know, it's still up to the United States Prosecutor." {Tr. Inmate I
Testimony, p. 95).
xxiv. An August 22, 2013 telephone call between Inmate 1 and his mother in
which Inmate 1 states that "[Robinson is] open any time I need him open."
(Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 96).
xxv. An August 30, 2013 email between Robinson and Inmate 1 in which
Robinson says he has "not heard from the Defender's Office or
investigator" and that he will "try and contact them on Monday." {Tr.
Inmate I Testimony, p. 100).
32. This cross examination caused Inmate 1 to make important concessions. For example,
Inmate 1 testified:
a. "Well, if you know, everything works out, [testifying for the State] might work
out to my benefit." {Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 25).
b. If he did not get a deal from Robinson, Inmate 1 would not testify. (Tr. Inmate I
Testimony, p.p. 60-61).
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c. By providing testimony in "Operation Utah" it was possible for him to get all the
rest of his federal sentence reduced. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 74).
d. Inmate 1's concession that he asked his federal defense investigator and his
federal public defender to contact Robinson. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 75-76).
33. On redirect examination, Inmate 1 testified that:
a.

Obtaining a benefit in exchange for his testimony was "in the back of his mind,"
but that his "bigger motivation" was to do the right thing." (Tr. Inmate 1

-..iii

Testimony, p. 103).
b. Ifhe were to benefit from giving testimony, he would accept it. (Tr. Inmate 1
·..J

Testimony, p. 103.
c. His belief he was getting a deal for his testimony changed because he learned that
federal prosecutors are only interested in "something that happened in my area

..,ii)

where I'm from"-in Inmate l's case, Tennessee. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p.
103).

d. He would not lie to get a deal. Id.
.J

e. He was concerned about being physically assaulted or killed by inmates who
discover he acted as a "snitch." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 104).
-J

f. It was still possible that he may receive a benefit in his federal case for testifying

for the State, but that it was "on the U.S. Attorney." (fr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p.
107).
34. On redirect examination. the prosecutor elicited the following false testimony:
Q. Have you struck any deal with Robinson for your testimony?
A. No.

(Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p.106).
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35. On re-cross, Inmate 1 conceded that even though MacNeill confessed in 2010 to
murdering his wife, Inmate 1 did nothing to report this to authorities until 2013 when he
"had a hope that that information would get [him] out of prison.,, (Tr. Inmate I

Testimony, p. 11 I).
36. Finally, during his trial testimony, Inmate 1 claimed that his "18:I Ratio Motion" filed in

federal court was the thing upon which his hopes for early release actually centered, not
any benefit derived from his testimony in this action. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 5456, 91-92, 105-107).
37. When this explanation proved untenable, Inmate 1 took a different tack. He conceded
that in August 2013, he believed that his testimony for the prosecution might result in his

going home by December. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 92, 99). However, he had
recently received a letter from his attorney explaining that this would probably not
happen. (Tr. Inmate I Testimony, pp. 99-100, 102).

Inmate J's Trial Testimony
38. The State called Inmate 3 in its case in chief.
39. On direct examination, Inmate 3 testified that:

a. He was incarcerated with MacNeill at Texarkana Federal Prison sometime in
2011 or 2012. (Tr. 1737, -39).

b. He worked out and ran with MacNeill three to four times per week. (Tr. 1739).
c. He never knew MacNeill to have any physical ailments or problems with his
body. (Tr. 1741).

d. He read part of a magazine article about the case. This prompted a conversation
between Inmate 3 and MacNeill. Inmate 3 said, "Doc, they said you murdered
14

your wife." MacNeill responded, "No, I didn't murder my wife. Ifl did, they
don't have any evidence of it." When pressed about what the article said,
MacNeill again denied killing his wife and said that ''they didn't have any
evidence and couldn't prove anything." (Tr. 1742).
e. After a hearing in which he was denied entry into a half-way house, MacNeill
referred to his wife as a bitch. (Tr. 1745).

f.

MacNeill referred to Gypsy Willis as his wife. (Tr. 1745-46).

g. MacNeill remained healthy prior to his release from prison. (Tr. 1748).
;40. On cross-examination, Inmate 3 admitted that:
a

He had previously told investigators that MacNeill "acted like ... his shoulder
was hurting him," was "walking crooked," and had "bad feet." (Tr. 1752).

b. Other inmates ~atched television coverage of the trial (Tr. 1753).
c. MacNeill was upset that a television narrator had accused him of not performing
CPR on the day Michelle MacNeill died.. (Tr. 1754).
d. Inmate 3 had previously fabricated information about another inmate and reported
it to the FBI. (Tr. 1754-59).
e. Inmate 3 understood the possibility of a reduction on his sentence but was not
promised anything. (Tr. 1760).
41. On redirect, the prosecutor engaged in the following line of questioning:

Q: Okay, have you received any special treatment from prosecutors in this case
for what you're doing today?

A: No, sir.
Q: Testifying. Have you received anything from Federal authorities?

15

A: No, sir.
Q: Is your sentence being shortened at all?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you being paid?

A: No, sir.
Q: Do you have promises that we'll, I guess, ripen, or do you have--do you

have-you know, have we made you promises for when you 're done testifying
that you'll get something?
A: No, sir.
(Tr. 1766).

42. On recross, Inmate 3 again testified that he was not receiving any consideration from the
State in this case. (Tr. 1767).
43. On redirect, the prosecutor raised the issue again:
Q: If you get something beneficial out of this, would that be-would you refuse
it?
A: No, sir, I wouldn't refuse it, but I wouldn't ask for it.
Q: Okay, and you haven't asked for it?
A: No, sir.

Q: To your knowledge, have we offered anything to you for it?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why are you here?

A: Because I've got something to say and it's the truth.

16

(Tr. 1768).

Jury Instructions On Judging Witness Credibility

44. At the close of the evidence, the Court gave two instructions on judging the credibility of
witnesses.
45. Instruction 27 told the jury what factors to consider in weighing the credibility of
witnesses generally. It read:
Witness Credibility

',·,:,

vii

In deciding this case you will need to decide how believable each witness was.
Use your judgment and common sense. Let me suggest a few things to think
about as you weigh each witness's testimony:
• How good was the witness's opportunity to see, hear, or otherwise observe
what the witness testified about?
• Does the witness have something to gain or lose from this case?
• Does the witness have any connection to the people involved in this case?
• Does the witness have any reason to lie or slant the testimony?
• Was the witness's testimony consistent over time? If not, is there a good
reason for the inconsistency? If the witness was inconsistent, was it about
something important or unimportant?
• How believable was the witness's testimony in light of other evidence
presented at trial?
• How believable was the testimony in light of human experience?
• Was there anything about the way the witness testified that made the
testimony more or less believable?
In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, you may also consider
anything else you think is important.
You do not have to believe everything a witness has said. You may believe
part and disbelieve the rest. On the other hand, if you are convinced that a
witness lied, you may disbelieve anything the witness said. In other words,
you may believe all, part, or none of a witness's testimony. You may believe
many witnesses against one or one witness against many.
In deciding whether a witness testified truthfully, remember that no one's
memory is perfect. Anyone can make an honest mistake. Honest people may
remember the same event differently.

17

46. Instruction 29 told the jury what additional factors to consider in judging the credibility
of in-custody informants. It read:
In-Custody Informant

You have heard from witnesses who may be classified as "in-custody
informants." The law allows the use of such testimony. However, the
testimony of an informant who provides evidence against a defendant
must be examined and weighted by you with greater care than the
testimony of an ordinary witness. Whether the informant's testimony has
been affected by interest or prejudice against the defendant is for you to
determine. In making that determination, you should consider:
1. Whether the informant has received anything (including leniency in
prosecution, personal advantage, or vindication) in exchange for
testimony.
2. Other cases, and the number of other cases, in which the informant
testified or offered statements against another, whether those
statements are being used, and whether the informant received any
deal, promise,· inducement, or benefit in exchange for, that testimony or
statement, or believed he was likely to receive some benefit for his
cooperation;
3. Whether the informant has ever changed his or her testimony;
4. The criminal history of the informant, not just limited to number of
convections, but also the level of sophistication gained through the
informant's experience in the criminal justice system; and
5. Any other evidence related to the informant's credibility.
In sum, you should look at all of the evidence in deciding what credence
and what weight, if any, you would give to the jailhouse informant.
You should bear in mind that a witness who has entered into such an
agreement with the government may have an interest in the case different
than any ordinary witness. A witness who believes that he may be able to
obtain his own freedom, or receive a lighter sentence by giving testimony
favorable to the prosecution, has motive to testify falsely. Therefore, you
must examine his testimony with caution and weight it with great care. If,
after scrutinizing his testimony, you decide to accept it, you may give it
whatever weight, if any, you find it deserves.

Closing Arguments

47. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated:
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:

~

The defense challenged [Inmate I] about getting something in return for his trial
testimony. There's nothing that State investigators, State prosecutors can give
this individual. I think it's clear from the record that was established that he was
looking to get something for his testimony. Who wouldn't, quite frankly? But he
testified it didn't look like anything was going to work out. That he wasn't going
to get something in exchange for his testimony, because it's a State case and not a
Federal case....

:-a)

He talked about the risks of coming forward, being killed or stabbed, beaten up ...
Not only was he-is he not getting anything for his testimony, ladies and
gentlemen, he's suffering a significant detriment to come forward and tell the
truth, to make the right decision. Inmate I talked about how he's got another
couple of years on his sentence. He thinks it's part of his rehabilitation. Do the
right thing and come forward....
Inmate No. 3 talked about how he was friends with Doc, with the defendant.
They used to lift weights together, they used to run together. They did pushups,
dips, bench, curls. He used to run four to five miles per day. When asked about
the defendant keeping up with him, he said, "I couldn't keep up with the
defendant."
Then he testified with respect to Michelle MacNeill's death; that the defendant
said ''Nab, I didn't murder her. Ifl did, they don't have any evidence." Again,
just saying, "They don't. have evidence to prove it." Talked about the risk of
being killed, stabbed, raped, or even burned in prison for coming forward. He's
getting nothing for his testimony.

(Trial Tr. 2195-96).

48. In response, defense counsel portrayed Inmate I as a liar, motivated only be a desire for
self-benefit. {Tr. 2245-47).
49. Finally, in rebuttal the prosecutor stated that people are motivated to act for many
reasons. (Trial Tr. 2269). He stated:
Motive. [The Federal inmates] all told you about the risks that they've taken
coming out here. They've told you that they-none of them, not a single one has
gotten anything, or has a guarantee of anything. A couple of them talked about
the possibility of maybe getting something out this; but again, who can blame
them? These are men who are spending decades in prison for having a handful of
crack and a gun; and if doing the right thing can also lead to a benefit for them,
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who would hold that against them? That doesn't mean that they're lying. That
doesn't mean that they're making up-making anything up. (Trial Tr. 2268).

Evidence Discovered After Trial

50. The jmy convicted MacNeill of murder and obstruction of justice.
51. Before trial, defense counsel served a Freedom of Information Act request on the Federal
Bureau of Prisons. The request sought disclosure of Inmate l's August 2013 telephone
and email conversations. These were disclosed to defense counsel during trial on
October 28 and November 1, just five days before Inmate 1 testified.
52. Defense counsel used these emails and telephone conversations extensively during crossexamination of Inmate 1.
53. After trial, defense counsel submitted another Freedom of Information Act request

seeking disclosure of Inmate I's September and October emails and telephone
conversations. These were disclosed December l, 2013.

54. The new emails included the following:
a. A September l, 2013 email from Inmate 1 to Robinson in which Inmate 1 states
that his 18: 1 ratio motion was "dead in the water" and would not result in his

being released.
b. An October I, 2013 email from Inmate I to his mother in which Inmate 1 states
he got a letter from his lawyer who "talked to Utah and things look good."
c. Several statements by Inmate I that he planned to be home by Christmas.
55. The new telephone conversations included the following:

a. Several statements by Inmate 1 that he planned to be home by Christmas.

20

b. A September 16, 2013 conversation between Inmate 1 and his federal defense
investigator. The investigator explains to Inmate 1 that his federal public

i.i)

defender is ''talking with the people out there in Utah and talking with the
prosecutor here, to try to get some time off, and her suggestion to you would be to
~

cooperate."
C.

A September 28, 2013 conversation between Inmate 1 and his sister in which
Inmate 1 states that his lawyer thinks he will be home in December.

...iJ

d. A September 30, 2013 conversation between Inmate 1 and his federal defense
investigator. The investigator tells Inmate 1 that his public defender has ''talked
-J

with the investigator out there, that Jeff Robinson will be providing us and the

U.S. Attorney's Office with information after the trial about what all you did, you
know testimony and assistance."
~

e. An October 1, 2013 conversation in which Inmate 1 tells his girlfriend that he got
~ letter from

his lawyer who talked to "Utah" and "everything looks good."

f. An October 13, 2013 conversation in which Inmate 1 tells his mother that he
,...;)

"likes Nancy Grace" and that he never watched HLN news before being locked
up, but now it's "kind of my favorite."
'..@

g. Conversations from October 17-22, 2013 clearly indicating that Inmate 1 had
been watching television coverage of the trial.

The Post-Trial Benefits Received b)1 Inmates 1 and 3
56. One week after MacNeill' s trial concluded, Robinson wrote recommendation letters for
Inmates 1 and 3.
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57. Inmate l's letters were directed to the U.S. Attorney's Office and Inmate's 1's federal
public defender. In the letters, Robinson describes the evidentiary difficulties the
MacNeill case presented. He states that Inmate 1 was a "very important witness" and that
he "highly recommend[s] and encourage[s] [that] leniency be shown to [Inmate I] for his
truthful and courageous testimony." (Exhibits A and_B, State Opp. Memo).
58. Inmate 3's letter was directed to the U.S. Attorney's Office. In the letter, Robinson

describes the same evidentiary difficulties. He states that Inmate 3 was a ''very important
witness" and that he "highly recommend[s] and encourage[s] [that] leniency be shown to
[Inmate 3] for his truthful and courageous testimony." (Exhibit D, State Opp. Memo).
59. In December 2013, a United States District Judge granted Inmate l's Rule 35 motion

reducing Inmate 1's sentence to 84 months. Inmate 1 was released from federal prison.
The same federal judge dismissed Inmate 1's 18: 1 ration motion because it was moot.
60. Inmate 3's federal sentence was reduced by 5 years.
Conclusions of Law

The Duties of The Prosecutor Relating To Jail.house Informants
The relationship between the prosecutor and the jailhouse informant is a co-dependent
one. In some cases, prosecutors need information only a jailhouse informant can give to convict.
Desperate to secure a promise of early r~lease or some other benefit denied them, informants line
up to fill the need. Because this relationship is one of mutual benefit, jailhouse informants can
tell the story prosecutors want to hear, and prosecutors not look too closely at the reliability of
the storyteller.

22

As one commentator wrote:

[P]olice and prosecutors are heavily invested in using informants to conduct
investigations and to make their cases. As a result, they often lack the objectivity
and the information that would permit them to discern when informants are lying.
This gives rise to a disturbing marriage of convenience: both snitches and the
government benefit from inculpatozy information while neither has a strong
incentive to challenge it.
Natapoff, Alexandra, Comment: Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful

Convictions, 31 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 107, 108 (2006).
In a 2007 policy review, The Justice Project described the problem of the jailhouse

informant in this way:
[T]he motive to fabricate testimony is inherent in a system in which [jailhouse]
snitches are often rewarded for their testimony. J ailhouse snitches, who often
testify at pivotal moments in criminal prosecutions, have been shown to go to
great lengths to deceive and misinform in the hopes of improving their current
situations. With little or nothing to lose, and everything to gain, cunning and
unscrupulous jailhouse snitches invent narratives and crime details that mislead
law enforcement officers and contribute to appalling miscarriages of justice.
Though the legal system is designed to weed out perjured testimony through
adversarial procedures such as cross examination, the protections currently in
place have proven starkly inadequate to safeguard□ against unreliable testimony
by witnesses with powerful incentives to lie.

Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, A Policy Review, The Justice Project, pp. 1-2 (2007).
In this arena-where there is a high risk of pivotal, but perjured testimony-the

prosecutor's professional responsibilities are a critical safeguard to preventing wrongful
convictions. The prosecutor's ''role transcends that of an adversary: [a prosecutor] is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty ...whose interest
... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Doyle,
2010 UT App 351, ~ 12, quoting, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,675, n. 6 (1985). "The
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primary responsibility of a prosecutor is to seek justice, which can only be achieved by the

representation and presentation of the truth." NDAA-National Prosecution Standards§ 11.1, 3d Ed. (2009). [Emphasis added].
Like jurors, prosecutors should "examine [iailhouse informant testimony] with caution
and weigh it with great care." (Jury Instruction 29). In doing so, the prosecutor should bear in

mind that "a witness who believes that he may be able to obtain his freedom ... by giving
testimony favorable to the prosecution, has motive to testify falsely." Id Meaningful efforts
should be undertaken to corroborate the information provided. If a prosecutor reasonably
believes that a jailhouse informant's testimony is false, the prosecutor should refuse to offer the
testimony at trial. U. R. Prof. Cond. 3.3(a)(3) ("A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence ... that
the lawyer reasonably believes is false'').
Once the prosecutor has determined that a jailhouse informant will be called as a material
witness, the prosecutor must fully disclose anything the informant has received or will receive in
exchange for that testimony. Bagley, 473 U.S., at 676 (evidence favorable to the accused
includes impeachment evidence); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). On the
importance of mandatory pre-1rial disclosures, The Justice Project concluded:
Mandatory disclosures create a more transparent process, allowing for meaningful
oversight and adversarial challenge. In fact, the effectiveness of the legal
system's built-in safeguard of cross-examination is almost entirely dependent
upon the level of pretrial disclosures.
Jailhouse Snitch Testimony, The Justice Project, p. 3.
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The Jallhouse Informant Problems In This Case
Here, it is unclear what effort prosecutors took to arrive at a reasonable belief that
Inmates 1 and 3 were providing truthful infonnation. When asked by the defense to disclose
Inmate 1's prison emails and telephone conversations, prosecutors declined. They claimed no
duty to disclose information or records not found in the Utah County Attorney's Office. (State's
Response to Defendant's Seventh Request for Discovery, p. 2, 8/12/13).
Apparently, prosecutors made no effort themselves to obtain and examine Inmate l's
prison communications. Prosecutors do not have a duty to "make an investigation on behalf of
the defendant" or to "search[] for exculpatory and mitigating evidence." State v. Pliego, 974
P.2d 279,281 (Utah 1999). But as ministers ofjustice prosecutors must not call ajailhouse
informant to the stand when there exists a reasonable belief that the testimony is false. U. R.
Prof. Cond. 3.3(a)(3).
Given the powerful incentive informants have to fabricate evidence favorable to the
government and the prosecutor's primary duty to do justice, prosecutors should undertake
meaningful efforts to corroborate information provided by jailhouse informants, and to
investigate informant reliability. Certainly, Inmate 1's prison communications would have been
valuable to prosecutors in assessing Inmate 1's truthfulness. The devastati~g cross-examination
of Inmate 1 is the best evidence of that. Turning a blind eye to known impeachment materials
illustrates the "marriage of convenience" discussed above. Both the informant and the
government benefit from the inculpatory information and neither has "a strong incentive to

challenge it." Natapoff, Alexandra, Comment: Beyond Unreliable, 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev.
107, 108 (2006).
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Investigator Robinson stated that he believed both Inmates I and 3 were telling the truth
because "certain infonnation [they provided] was not yet public,, and the information could only
have been known from MacNeill. (State's Opposition Memo, Recommendation Letters, Exhibits
B and D). Robinson does not say what non-public information was known to Inmates 1 and 3.
Given the national media coverage of the trial over a period of years and Inmate 1's admitted
exposure to the coverage, it is hard to imagine what information could only have been acquired
from MacNeill.3
Before filing the Notice, prosecutors made diligent inquiry. In good faith, they asked
Robinson what promises had been made to the federal inmates in exchange for their cooperation.

What Robinson told them was not true. Under Utah law, there is no distinction between the
prosecutor and police officers working the case. "Information known to police officers ... is
charged to the prosecution since the officers are part of the prosecution team. Neither the
prosecutor nor officers working on a case may withhold exculpatory evidence or evidence
valuable to a defendant. The good or bad faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant." State v. Knight,

734 P.2d 913, 923, n. 5.

In his affidavit, Robinson states that he "did not think to tell [prosecutors]" that Inmate
l's attorney had asked for consideration and that Robinson had promised to give it. Robinson
gives no explanation for his failure to disclose that Inmate 3 had personally asked for
consideration. That this critical infonnation would lapse from Robinson's memory in the face of
direct questioning tests the bounds of credulity.

3

Assuming corroboration efforts were undertaken, the problem is that this process and ''the processes by which
jailhouse snitches are compensated and their testimony is developed are largely hidden from view." Jailhouse
Snitch Testimony, The Justice Project, p. 3. A robust pre-trial disclosure requirement shines light on this otherwise
hidden undertaking, and ensures that cross-examination is an effective tool for testing credibility.
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The best explanation seems to be that Robinson lacked experience.4 He failed to perceive
the gravity of his interactions withjailhouse infonnants and was careless in responding to
inquiring prosecutors. In his affidavit, Robinson concedes that the MacNeill case was "the first
and only case [he] had where federal or state inmate witnesses testified." (State's Sur-Response,
Exhibit B, Robinson Affid., 1 6).
The State's attempt to down-play the importance of Inmate 1's trial testimony rings
hollow. This was a circumstantial evidence case. The evidence collected from the body of
Michelle MacNeill was inconclusive. Post-mortem redistribution made toxicology evidence
subject to serious question. There was strong evidence of motive, but-as the defense arguedbeing guilty of an extramarital affair does not equate with being guilty of murder.
MacNeill' s daughters testified against him, but this testimony did not go unchallenged.
As daughters of Michelle MacNeill they were angered by MacNeill's infidelity to their mother

and the hasty introduction of his paramour into the family circle. This bias against MacNeill was
an undercurrent that could not be ignored by the trier of fact
Evidence that MacNeill had pressed his reluctant wife into cosmetic surgery and then
secured too much medication from her surgeon was telling. So was MacNeill's destruction of
those medications within hours of Michelle MacNeill's death. But the most probative and
damaging evidence admitted against MacNeill was his own confession as rehearsed by his fellow
prisoner, Inmate 1. State v. Rodriguez, 2012 UT App 81, 16 (defendants confession is "probably
the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him"), quoting Skilling v.

United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2916 (2010).
4

It is also plausible that Robinson-a veteran police officer of28 years-did not want to disclose promised benefits
because this information would be used to impeach Inmate l, a pivotal witness in a high-profile case.
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Inmate 1 told the jury that MacNeill had confessed to murdering his wife. Out of
MacNeill's own mouth came the admission that he drugged Michelle MacNeill, got her into the
bath, and held her under water. Like any good trial attorney, the lead prosecutor saved the
damning testimony of Inmate 1 for last.
Finally, the State's non-disclosure was exacerbated by Robinson's silence during trial.
Robinson knew that Inmates 1 and 3 had asked for recommendation letters in exchange for their
testimony. Robinson knew that he had agreed to write the letter for Inmate 1. Yet, he sat silent
during trial, allowing prosecutors to elicit false testimony :from both Inmates 1 and 3. Robinson

sat silent during closing argument. Prosecutors argued that both Inmates 1 and 3 testified only
out of a desire to do right, receiving nothing for their testimony but increased risk of harm in
pnson.
If MacNeill had only to show that the State committed serious errors in the case, his

motion for new trial would be granted. But the law requires more.

Legal Standard and Grounds-Motion For New Trial.
On motion of a party filed not later than 10 days after entry of sentence, the Court may

"grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or ,impropriety which had a ·
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." URCrP 24(a), (c). If a motion for new trial
is granted, the moving party "shall be in the same position as if no trial had been held." URCrP
24(d).
MacNeill moves for new trial on the following grounds: (1) the prosecutor failed to
disclose exculpatory impeachment evidence; (2) the prosecutor violated a Rule 16 order
requiring the State to disclose impeachment evidence; (3) the prosecutor elicited and failed to
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correct testimony the prosecutor knew or reasonably should have known was false; (4) the
discovery of new evidence after trial; and (5) the prosecutor failed to inform the federal inmate
witnesses of the Court's order excluding them from the proceedings, including television
coverage of the trial.
·1$)

Legal Standard and Grounds-Motion to A"est Judgment

A defendant may move to arrest judgment any time prior to the imposition of sentence.
URCrP 23. The Court shall "arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a
public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of
judgment." Id.
Here, MacNeill contends his stated grounds for new trial constitute "other good cause"
for arresting judgment. MacNeill does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
The Alleged Due Process Violations

1.

The Bradv V"wlations

In Brady v. Maryland the United States Supreme Court held that due process of law is
violated when the prosecutor withholds material evidence favorable to the accused, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor. Brady, 313 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Giglio v.

United-States the Supreme Court extended this general rule to include impeachment evidence.
The Court held that ''when the 'reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt
or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the] general rule [set
forth in Brady]. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 154, quoting Napue v. Rlinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959).
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The Court emphasized that non-disclosure is not enough to establish a due process
violation. Rather, "a finding of materiality of the evidence is required under Brady." Id The
Court must determine whether the non-disclosed evidence "could ... in any reasonable
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury." Id, quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271.
Thus, a due process or Brady violation "occurs only where the state suppresses
information that (I) remains unknown to the defense both before and throughout trial, and (2) is
material and exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have created a 'reasonable probability'
that 'the results of the proceeding would have been different."' State v. Doyle, 2010 UT App
351, 15, quoting State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,133.

"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,920 (Utah 1987), citingStricklandv. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Rules of criminal procedure are "meant to
ensure that a trial is a search for the truth and that the verdict merits confidence . . . . [W]hen
error has eroded a reviewing court's confidence in the outcome of a particular trial, we should
start over and conduct a new trial." Id

The salient question-is where on ''the spectrum of outcome probabilities" a ''reasonable
likelihoodn might appear. Speaking to this issue, the Utah Supreme Court explained:
For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. This is certainly above
the "mere possibility" point on the spectrum. If it is "more probable than not"
that the outcome of trial would have been different, then a court cannot possibly
place confidence in the verdict. Furthermore, thoughtful reflection suggests that
confidence in the outcome may be undermined at some point substantially short
of the "more probable than not" portion of the spectrum. It may not be possible to
define "reasonable likelihood" much more explicitly than this, but the foregoing'
should be of some assistance in deciding whether an error requires reversal.
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Knight, 734 P.2d at 920.
Finally, in connection with the alleged Brady violation, MacNeill contends that the State
also violated the Court's Rule 16 order to disclose promises made to the federal inmates. The
State has an obligation to disclose evidence "when required by court order ... pursuant to Rule
16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure." Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, ,r 4, quoting State v.

Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This obligation is independent of the
State's duties under Brady.
The Court should grant a new trial only when the discovery violation affected the
substantial rights of the defendant. Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, ,r 9, quoting Knight, 734 P.2d
913,919 (Utah 1987). Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) ("any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded"). A rule 16 discovery
violation affects substantial rights when, absent the violation, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result Knight, 734 P.2d at 919, quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048
(Utah 1984). Thus, the legal standard for both Brady and Rule 16 discovery violations is the

same.
In this case, the State suppressed exculpatory evidence related to both Inmates 1 and 3.
Robinson knew that both men had asked for recommendation letters, and (in the case of hunate
l) Robinson had agreed to provide a letter. This information remained unknown to defense
counsel before and throughout trial. 5 The issue is whether the information was material-

5

In its memorandum opposing MacNeill's pretrial motion to exclude the testimony of the jailhouse informants, the
State wrote that none of the informants were offered anything "other than a promise to put in a •good word' about
their help to federal authorities." (Memo. Opp. Motion to Exclude Jailhouse Informant Testimony, p. 7). However,
more than two weeks later, the State filed the Notice disclaiming any promises made to Inmates I or 3 in exchange
for testimony. The State filed the Notice in response to the Court's order and MacNeill was entitled to take the State
at its word.
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whether there is a reasonable likelihood that disclosure to the trier of fact would have affected
the outcome.
Disclosure of Inmate 3's request for a recommendation letter was not reasonably likely to
affect the outcome of the trial. On the most important issue, Inmate 3 's testimony was favorable
to MacNeill. Inmate 3 testified that when confronted about murdering his wife, MacNeill denied
wrongdoing twice. In light of this favorable testimony, defense counsel wisely chose to limit
impeachment efforts on cross-examination.
Inmate l's testimony is a harder call. However, after careful review of the record, the
Court concludes that disclosure of Inmate 1's request for a recommendation letter, and
Robinson's promise to provide it would not have been reasonably likely to affect the outcome of
the trial. This is so-not because of the State's pre-trial disclosures, examination, and closing
arguments on the question, which were misleading-but because of defense counsel's withering
cross examination.
By use of Inmate 1's prison emails and telephone conversations, defense counsel painted
Inmate 1 for what he was-a calculating and sophisticated convict, ready to say or do anything
necessary to get out of prison early. This was the sole objective of what Inmate 1 called
"Operation Utah."
On cross examination, Inmate 1 conceded that if he did not get a deal from Robinson, he
would not testify. He admitted: (1) calling his federal public defender in relation to Operation
Utah; (2) directing both his federal defense investigator and federal public defender to contact
Robinson to determine the real deal; (3) that any reduction in his federal sentence would depend
on how important a witness he was for the prosecution; (4) being told by his federal investigator
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that if Inmate 1 ''put the nail in MacNeill's coffin" he might get the whole two-and-a-half years
knocked off his federal sentence.
Knowing that Inmate l had asked for a recommendation letter and Robinson had agreed
to provide it would not have changed the verdict because it was clear Inmate I had every
intention of asking for this benefit. The jury knew Inmate I would not testify in Utah without
consideration. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 60-61). The key components of"Operation Utah"
were presented at trial in detail-Inmate l's federal defense team would (I) wait to see if Inmate
1 testified, (2) contact the prosecutor in Utah, (3) contact the AUSA and tell him what assistance
Inmate 1 provided to the Utah people, and (4) file a Rule 35 motion to reduce Inmate l's federal
sentence. (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, pp. 72-74).
This is not a case in which the State acknowledged the truth of the undisclosed promise
or benefit in closing argument See, Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, ,r 3. Here-notwithstanding
Robinson's knowledge to the contrary-prosecutors argued that the jailhouse informants
received nothing in exchange for their testimony. Raising facts in closing argument that
undisclosed Brady material could refute is troubling. But closing arguments must be considered
in their entirety. During closing, prosecutors were compelled by the evidence to concede that
Inmate 1 was "looking to get something for his testimony." They also acknowledged that
jailhouse informants appeared in court with mixed motives-to do the right thing, but also to
serve their own interests.
The State also failed to disclose an email from Inmate 1 to Robinson in which Inmate 1
states that his 18:1 Ratio Motion is "dead in the water." This belief was important because it
contradicted Inmate l's trial testimony. Confronted with the clear objective of Operation Utah,
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Inmate 1 testified that his hopes for early release were really tied to the pending 18: 1 Ratio
Motion.

G

After careful review of the record, the Court holds that a jury possessed of this additional

information would not have rendered a different verdict. Cross-examination demonstrated
Inmate 1 was ready to procure and accept early release by whatever means it could be
obtained-whether by "Operation Utah" or the 18:1 Ratio Motion. His communications from
prison demonstrated a strongly held belief that he would be home by December and that
testifying for the prosecution in Utah was the catalyst for his early release. Inmate l's belated
attempt to pin these hopes on the 18: 1 Ratio Motion was so inconsistent with his prior statements
that jurors surely saw the attempt for what it was--a recent fabrication to evade impeachment.

Additionally, the Court told the jury what factors might be considered in judging the
credibility of witnesses, including what the witness had to gain or lose from the case. (Jury
Instruction 27). If a witness testified falsely-which Inmate 1 clearly did-the jury was free to
disregard his testimony entirely. Id. The Court also instructed the jury to weigh the testimony of
jailhouse informants with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. (Jury
Instruction 29). Jurors understood that the interests of Inmates 1 and 3 in the case were different
than any ordinary witness, and that both had motive to testify falsely. Id. Armed with this
instruction, the jury surely looked on the jailhouse informant testimony with a cautious and
critical eye.
Viewing the record as a whole, this is a case in which "the effective advocacy of [defense
counsel] rendered [the Brady violation] harmless." See, Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, 'i[ 3
(considering the effectiveness of cross-examination in assessing whether non-disclosure of
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exculpatory evidence undermined confidence in the outcome of trial). For these reasons, the
Court concludes that the State's failure to disclose Brady material related to Inmates 1 and 3 was
not reasonably likely to affect the outcome of the trial.

2. Eliciting and Failing to Correct False Testimony
Due process has long prohibited the prosecutor from obtaining a conviction through the
''presentation of known false evidence." Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935);6 Pyle v.

Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942). The Mooney Court explained:
It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and
hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which
in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a
deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to
be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction and
imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of
justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.

Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112; State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 (Utah 1984) (criminal conviction
obtained by use of false testimony violates due process under both State and Federal
Constitutions).
The usame result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it
to go uncorrected when it appears." Napue, 360 U.S. 264,269. See also, State v. Gordon, 886

P.2d 112, 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (due process oflaw requires that when a prosecutor is aware
that tes~ony is false, he or she has a duty to correct the false impression).
As with Brady violations, it is not enough to show that the testimony offered was false.

There must also be a finding of materiality. "A conviction obtained by the knowing use of false
6

Brady was an extension of the prior case law related to the knowing use of false testimony. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86.
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testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the jurfs verdict." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680, citing Napue, 360
U.S. at 271; State v. Doyle, 2010 UT App. 351, ,r 3 (declining to set aside conviction obtained in
part by the use of false testimony because there was not a reasonable likelihood that the
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury); Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah
1981) (conviction obtained by knowing use of false evidence violates both State and Federal due
process if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury) .
Defendant argues that the harm.less error standard is more exacting and should apply
here. This standard requires the State to prove that admission of the false testimony was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. State ofCalifornia, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967);

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679-80 (knowing use of false testimony "is considered
material unless failure to disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt'').
The language used to articulate these two standards of review-''reasonable probability
of a different result" and "hannless beyond a reasonable doubt''-has introduced some confusion

about what the State must prove to prevail. However, the United States Supreme Court has held
that "there is little if any difference" between these two standards. See, Chapman, 386 U.S. at
23-24; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680, FN. 9. (Blackmun, J. opinion,joined by O'Conner, J.). The

Doyle court seems to acknowledge this, referencing both standards in the same breath. Doyle,
2010 UT App. 351, ,r 3.
At trial, the State elicited false testimony from both Inmates 1 and 3. On direct
examination, Inmate I testified that (1) he had not asked for anything in exchange for his
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testimony; and (2) that he had not struck a deal with Robinson for his testimony. Inmate 3
testified that he would not ask for anything in exchange for his testimony.
This testimony was false and Robinson knew it. Because Robinson is a member of the
prosecution team, his knowledge is charged to the prosecutors. Knight, 734 P.2d at 923, n. 5.
Therefore, the Court concludes that prosecutors knew or should have known that the foregoing
testimony of Inmates 1 and 3 was false. Robinson-and prosecutors to whom his knowledge is
imputed-did nothing to correct the false testimony either during trial or closing argument.
The question is whether there is a rea~onable likelihood that the false testimony affected
the outcome of the trial. The Court holds no. As explained, defense counsel made a strategic
decision to limit impeachment of Inmate 3 on cross-examination. He did so because Inmate 3 's
testimony on the key question was favorable. Inmate 3 testified that MacNeill denied killing his

wife. Cross-examination of Inmate 1 was long, pointed, and devastating. Inmate 1's true
motives for testifying in Utah were revealed. It was clear that he had every intention of asking
for and accepting anything he could get from to secure his early release.

3. Violating the Order Excluding Witnesses
At a party's request, the court must order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear
other witnesses' testimony, or the court may do so on its own. URE 615. Violation of an
exclusionary order can be grounds for a mistrial, but "the burden is on the accused to
demonstrate that he has been prejudiced to the extent that a mistrial should be granted.'' State v.

Curtis, 2013 UT App. 287, citing State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, 112. The violation must be so
likely to have influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial. State

v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5,144. Thu~, to prevail on his motion for mistrial, MacNeill must prove
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nonspeculative facts showing that a witness changed his testimony after hearing court
proceedings, thereby prejudicing MacNeill to the extent that he cannot be said to have had a fair
trial. Curtis, at 'if 22.

MacNeill has failed to prove prejudice. The lion's share or Inmate 1's testimony was
consistent with what he had told Robinson prior to trial. The only meaningful difference was
Inmate 1's retreat from his first report that MacNeill used "Oxycontin" to drug his wife. At trial,
Inmate 1 identified the drug only as "Oxy." When asked ifby "Oxy" he meant "Oxycontin,"
Inmate 1 stated: "Oxycontin and Oxycodone are the same thing. Basically one of them has
Tylenol or Acetaminophen, the other one doesn't. I've had both of them, so I might have said
Oxycontin or Oxycodone, either one." (Tr. Inmate 1 Testimony, p. 32).
There is nothing in the record demonstrating what it was Inmate 1 purportedly watched
about the trial on television, or that his change from "Oxycontin" to "Oxy" was motivated by
what he saw. Moreover, defense counsel impeached Inmate I with this inconsistency on crossexamination. Clearly, the State should have informed the federal inmates sooner about the
exclusion order, especially because the source of jailhouse informant knowledge is so important
to reliability. However, the Court is not persuaded that the State's delay prejudiced MacNeill.

Newly Discovered Evidence
Newly discovered evidence must meet three criteria in order to constitute grounds for a
new trial: (1) it must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and
produced at the trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; and (3) it must be such as to render a
different result probable on the retrial of the case. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 5, ,r 66, quoting State

v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, 'if 11.
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Evidence is not "newly discovered" if it is known to some degree to the defense before
trial, or if the infonnation is obtainable, or can be made obtainable, prior to the conclusion of
trial through reasonable diligence. Pinder, at 'tl'tl 73, 75-76. Evidence is cumulative if it is of the
same character as existing evidence and supports a fact established by the existing evidence.
State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App. 264, citing Black's Law Dictionary 458 (abr. 7th ed. 2000).

Moreover, "newly discovered evidence does not warrant a new trial where its oajy use is
impeachment" Pinder, at 'if 66.
Finally, a new trial should not be granted unless the newly discovered evidence is
material. The Defendant must show that the new evidence is admissible, credible, and would
have such a substantial impact or weight on the jurors that it probably would change the verdict
in a new trial. Id. at Ttf 60-99; Montoya, at ffll 12-27; State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 'tI 29. Trial

judg~ are afforded a wide range of discretion in determining whether newly discovered
evidence warrants the grant of a new trial. Montoya, at 1 10.
During trial, MacNeill's Freedom of Information Act request was answered. MacNeill
was provided with the August prison emails and telephone conversations of Inmate I. Defense
counsel could have asked for a continuance so that Inmate 1's September and October
conversations could be obtained, but did not do so.
Moreover, the September and October material is cumulative. Like the August 2013
emails and telephone conversations, the September and October communications detail Inmate
I's continued efforts to advance Operation Utah-testify in Utah, get a letter from Utah, move
for early release, and be home by Christmas. Cumulative impeachment material would not be
reasonably likely to affect the outcome of the trial.
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Double Jeopardy
Having denied MacNeill's motion for new trial and motion to arrest judgment, the Court
need not reach the question of whether double jeopardy bars retrial.

Other Arti.culated Grounds
The Court concludes that any and all other grounds articulated by MacNeill for new trial
and to arrest judgment are without merit

ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the Court enters the following ORDER:
•

MacNeill's motion for new trial is denied; and

•

MacNeill's motion to arrest judgment is denied.

As to these two motions, this is a final order. No further action of the court is required.
The parties shall appear before the Court on Tuesday, September 2, 2014 at 1:00 p.m.
to schedule a sentencing date.

Fourth District Court
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MacNeill's motion to arrest judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial.

STATE1\1ENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On or about June 26, 2013, the Utah County Attorney's Office notified MacNeill that it

intended to call Michael Buchanan, a federal inmate as a witness.
2.

On or about July 25, 2013, MacNeill filed his Seventh Request for Discovery and

requested information regarding Buchanan and other inmate witnesses.
3.

On or about August 2, 2013, the UCAO responded to MacNeill's Seventh Request for

Discovery and claimed that it did not "possess" the information about the inmates that
MacNeill's counsel believed would be exculpatory.
4.

In August, 2013, MacNeill's counsel made numerous contacts with the federal prison

system to determine how to attempt to obtain the exculpatory information he was seeking, and on
September 2, 2013, delivered a subpoena/Freedom of Information Act Request to the Federal
Bureau of Prisons.
5.

On September 12, 2013, MacNeill filed a motion to exclude testimony of the federal

inmates which the Court subsequently denied, but ordered the UCAO to provide a written
pleading setting forth any benefits given to the inmates for testifying.
6.

On October 15, 2013, one day before the trial, the UCAO filed a pleading titled,

"Plaintiffs Notice of Benefits Offered or Provided to Jailhouse Informants."
7.

In the October 15, 2013 pleading, the UCAO stated in relation to Michael Buchanan who

was designated as Inmate # 1:
Inmate # 1 was incarcerated in a federal prison in Louisiana when he volunteered
information about Defendant's case to law enforcement. Investigator Jeff Robinson
interviewed him telephonically on May 29, 2013. This interview was audio recorded and
2

reported by Investigator Robinson. Inmate # 1 's professed motivation for disclosing
Defendant's statements to police was, "I just, to me I don't want it to happen to his
girlfriend, because ifhe did it once, he'll do it again."
The State of Utah has no authority over federal inmates and had nothing to offer
Inmate # 1 in exchange for his cooperation in the investigation and his testimony at trial.
There is no agreement to exchange Inmate # 1 's testimony for consideration from the
State of Utah. Nothing has been given him, and there are no promises outstanding. (If
Inmate # 1 were to request a recommendation from Investigator Robinson or the
prosecution, that request would be honored. To date, however, he has not made any
requests for any consideration.)

8.

On October 28, 2013, MacNeill's counsel received email correspondence between

Michael Buchanan and his family for the month of August of 2013.
9.

-~

On the evening of November 1, 2013, MacNeill's counsel received recordings of inmate

Michael Buchanan's telephone conversations from the federal prison for the month of August
2013.

v;J

10.

On November 6 & 7, 2013, Buchanan testified during the trial of Martin MacNeill.

11.

During Buchanan's testimony, he affirmatively stated the following material facts:
A. (Direct Examination) He expects to be incarcerated until January 2016.
B. He hasn't talked to anyone about MacNeill's case (other than investigator Robinson)
C. (Cross Examination) He hasn't asked for any deal in exchange for his testimony.
D. In August of2013 (the month from which MacNeill's counsel had recorded telephone
calls and emails) Buchanan believed there was a possibility that he could receive
some benefit for testifying against MacNeill, but that he had not asked to receive any
benefit.
E. He was testifying against MacNeill because it was part of his rehabilitation-'Just
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trying to do the right thing."
F.

As of the date of testifying, nothing has been given him, and no promises have been
made in exchange for his testimony, and he has not requested any consideration in
relation to his testimony.

G. He hasn't seen Nancy Grace. One time, his family emailed him about it, but he didn't
watch it because he didn't want it to "cloud his memory."
H. He isn't planning on any benefit to him, and "besides thinking about it," he didn't do
anything to pursue any benefit.

I. The various emails he wrote in August, wherein he was talking about getting
released, were in relation to a motion he filed regarding a federal case addressing an
"18:1" ratio for crack cocaine that could cut time offhis sentence, and not about
receiving consideration in exchange for testifying against MacNeill.
j. When confronted on cross-examination about an August conversation with Steve

Speelman, an investigator for his federal attorney, Elizabeth Ford, Buchanan testified
that he did not ask for a deal, but asked Jeff Robinson to talk to his lawyers about a
possible deal.
K. Buchanan testified that his subsequent contacts with Robinson were not about getting
a reduction in his federal sentence, but were only about his concern about the trial
being televised.
L. In August of 2013, he believed that Robinson's statement of Buchanan being his # 1
witness was significant in relation to a possible reduction in sentence, but [at the time
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of trial], he was just counting on his pending 18: 1 motion to get him out by
Christmas.
M. He reaffirmed that he did not lmow he would get anything by coming to Utah to
testify.

N. Robinson said he would do what he could, but really couldn't do anything because
this was a State case, and he's a federal inmate. Robinson said he "possibly'' could do
something, but probably not.
0. He thought, in August 2013, that coming to Utah would help him, but recently
learned in a letter from his lawyer that he probably would not get any benefit from
testifying in Utah.
P. (Redirect Examination by Prosecution) At first, he came forward because he thought
he could possibly get out, but the bigger motivation is "it's wrong-something like
murder is wrong, not acceptable." In the back of his mind, he thought "maybe he
could benefit."
Q. The federal prosecutors won't do a deal unless the state case happens in his area, and
he's from Tennessee, not Utah.
R. He is still expecting to get home because of his 18: 1 motion, "still waiting on that
y)

motion."
S. Q: (by Prosecutor Grunander) Have you struck any deals for your testimony with Jeff

,j)

Robinson?
A: No Sir.
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Q: Have you struck any deals for your testimony with the UCAO?
A:No
Q: Have you struck any deals for your testimony with the federal prosecutor?
A:No
T. Buchanan's lawyer told him to only plan on the pending motion (18:1 ratio motion),
and didn't know if his testimony in Macneill' s case would help at all.
U. Right now, his expected release is still January of 2016.
12.

After the trial concluded, MacNeill's counsel submitted another subpoena/FOIA request

to the United States Attorney to get more information.
13.

On or about December 4, 2013, a federal Judge in Tennessee signed an order pursuant to

a stipulated sealed motion filed by Elizabeth Ford on behalf of Michael Buchanan ordering his
release from prison.
14.

On or about December 4, 2013, the same federal judge dismissed Buchanan's motion

pursuant to the 18: 1 ratio because it is moot in light of the motion to dismiss being granted
because of Buchanan's substantial assistance in the MacNeill case.
15.

On or about December 6, 2013, MacNeill's counsel received additional information from

the United States Attorney's Office which included some emails and telephone calls made by
Buchanan in September and October of 2013. MacNeill's counsel did not immediately review
the new information due to other pressing matters.
16.

On December 20, 2013, MacNeill's counsel checked Buchanan's inmate status out of

curiosity, and learned that Buchanan had been released from federal custody as of December 13,
6

2013. MacNeill's counsel then reviewed the emails and phone calls in earnest, and discovered
the following:
(Newly Discovered Emails)
17.

On Sepember 1, 2013, Buchanan emailed Jeff Robinson at the UCAO and said:
looks like the release thing is dead in the water. the courts reversed the decision that I was
going to get my action on. So it looks like you will have to have to come and get me.
:( ..... .i am still ready and willing and I am happy to lmow that you will be able to keep
us off of court tv. Please continue to try and contact my lawyer, Beth Ford, or her
investigator Steve. Thank you very much and I am glad that you figured this system out
because so many people have a hard time doing it. I look forward to keeping in touch.
Michael

18.

On September 2, 2013, Robinson emailed the following back to Buchanan:
I am sorry to hear about your court issues! I was also hopeful you would be released. I
really appreciate your continued willingness to assist in this c~e. I will do my best to
contact Steve and your attorney tomorrow. I'll be back in contact soon. Take Care, Jeff.

19.

To MacNeill's counsel's lmowledge, these September 1 & 2 emails between Robinson

and Buchanan were not disclosed by the UCAO in discovery even though they are exculpatory
because they show that, at least as of September 1, 2013, Buchanan knew that his 18: 1 ratio
motion was not going to lead to his release.
20.

The September emails contain numerous communications with women named Jamie,

Alisha, and Daphne. Buchanan describes numerous explicit sex acts he wants to do with each of
them and discusses marrying at least two of them. He repeatedly tells them that he will be home
by Christmas of this year, and asks them to "just hold on till then," "I hope you have not dumped
me yet," "I have not promised you anything till now, but ill be home in December!!" etc.
21.

On September 12, 2013, Buchanan emails Jamie that he will "call his lawyer tomorrow."
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22.

On September 16, Buchanan emails his mother that he "had to do lawyer calls."

23.

On September 17, Buchanan emails his mother, "I want to come home bad!!!!!"

24.

On September 18, and multiple other days, Buchanan emails his mother and says, "I'm

coming home!!!"
25.

On September 30, 2013, Buchanan's mother emails him and says, "plan to watch Jane

Valez-Mitchell and Nancy Grace this week ... SHOULD BE WORTH WATCHING ... "
26.

On September 30, Buchanan emailed Daphne, and said, "talked with my lawyer this

morning, things are looking good as planned."
27.

On October 1, 2013, Buchanan emailed his mother, "got a letter from my lawyer today.

She said she talked to Utah and things look good!!!!!!"
28.

Buchanan continued to email Jamie, Daphne and Alisha about his homecoming plans,

and that "the closer I get to home the slower this time rolls," "im not doing nothing but counting
down the days!!!," "!just got finished cleaning out my locker and getting things slimmed down
to only the things I need to survive 2 more months!!!!!!!," and "I'll be home in late December."
(Recently Received Telephone Calls)
29.

On September 13, 2013, in a telephone call with his mother and father, Buchanan states:
I'm trying to do all this shit, trying to come home .... I was trying to call my
lawyer today, because they supposed to be telling me what's really going to, you
know, yea, or nay, before I go up there, but they wasn't in, so it was kind of a big
let down ....Hopefully, I'll be home around Christmas, that's what I'm hoping.

30.

On September 13, 2013, in a telephone call with his niece Raven, Buchan states, "Just

hold on 'til December chick, I'm trying to be out of here in December .... Once I fmd out that, it
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be a green light chick, hopefully December, I'll be home and we'll be getting us apartment in
Montgomery, having a bangfest up in there, naked chicks everywhere, poppin the mollies."
[Molly is a party drug similar to Ecstasy].
31.

On September 13, 2013, Buchanan speaks to another woman named "Rhonelle" and told

her that he would be getting out "hopefully, before Christmas ... .It's pretty much definite .... This
shit's going down .. .It's going down this time. This is it."
32.

On September 14, 2013, Buchanan speaks with an unknown male and says, "Better clear

your calendar for December, cause it be poppin"'
33.

On September 16, 2013 Buchanan speaks to investigator Steve Speelman with the federal

defender services:
MB: So what do you think I should do, do you think I should go ahead and do it?
S: Well that's going to be up to you, uh, hold on. Let me see if Beth is in, and see what
she might suggest for you [Steve puts down the phone] ....Hey Mike, she was in, and she
said she was working on it, in terms of talking with the people out there in Utah and
talking with the prosecutor here, to try to get you some time off, and her suggestion to
you would be to go ahead and cooperate.
MB: Okay, so she thinks it's going to be okay then.
S: I guess so, with that.
34.

On September 17, 2013, Buchanan calls Raven back and says, "Jeff's talking right

still .... He's going to see all of us. There's more than me ....I'm the ringleader though."
Regarding coming home, Buchanan and Raven discuss the following:
R: So after that, what's going to happen?
MB: Probably around December?
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R: So, like regardless of the decision, that's what they're going to go with?

M: Yeah, regardless, win or lose, December.
35.

On September 22, 2013, Buchanan calls one of his girlfriends, who is also the mother of

his daughter. Buchanan not only tells his girlfriend that he is coming home in December, but
speaks to his daughter and also tells her that he is coming home. Buchanan then tells his
girlfriend, after she gets back on the phone, that "she must know it is true" [that he will be
released] because Buchanan told his daughter.
36.

On September 28, 2013, Buchanan calls his sister and tells his sister that his lawyer

thinks he will be home in December.
37.

On September 29, 2013, Buchanan calls another one of his girlfriends, and she asks if"he

got one"-referring to a deal, and Buchanan replied excitedly, "You know I did!"
38.

On September 30, 2013, Buchanan calls his attorney and speaks with Steve Speelman

again. Speehnan tells Buchanan:
Steve: Beth has talked with the investigator out there, that Jeff Robinson will be
providing us and the U.S. Attorney's Office with information after the trial about what all
you did, you know testimony and assistance... and she'll send that to Dave Jennings, one
of the supervisors, at the U.S. Attorney's Office and when he gets that, he'll act
accordingly. When you testify and you get back, let us know that for sure too because
you told us that it would be the first of November. You might get in there early. We'll
get in touch with that investigator and go from there.

MB: Sounds good.
S: Yes it does sound good. (Both Buchanan and Steve chuckle).
S: Hang in there.
39.

On October 1, 2013, Buchanan speaks to one of his girlfriends and tells her that he got a
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letter from his lawyer, in which the lawyer says that she talked to "Utah" and "everything looks
good." His girlfriend then expresses her sexual excitement. Buchanan then says something that
was not completely decipherable about Bruce Richardson still being in the hole.
40.

On October 2, 2013, Buchanan speaks to his mother and expresses his happiness about

getting a letter from his lawyer.
41.

On October 5, 2013, Buchanan calls his mother, and they speak about watching the Dr.

Drew special about the MacNeill case.
42.

On October 9, 2013, Buchanan calls one of his girlfriends and says, "Did I tell you what

Jeff said, Utah? Going in a couple weeks ... " "Shouldn't be long at all when I get back." "I'll be
banging up in that [explicit sexual act]."
43.

On October 11, 2013 Buchanan speaks to another girlfriend and discusses his excitement

about coming home and seeing his daughter.
44.

On October 13, 2013, Buchanan calls his mother. She discusses her concern that

MacNeill may commit suicide, and they are concerned that Buchanan would not be able to do
what he is going to do. They discuss that MacNeill "aint guilty yet," and Buchanan said, "he will
lose." Mom asks: "What if Nancy Grace calls and offers big bucks to say something?" Buchanan
answers excitedly, "Take it!...When I come home, I'll give you a phone# to call Nancy Grace.''
Buchanan again says that Robinson told him that he is ''# 1."
45.

On October 13, 2013, Buchanan called his mother again and says that "no one is by the

phone, so he can talk now." Buchanan says, "I aint worried about any repurcussions." "He's just
an old shriveled up doctor." "He aint mafia." Buchanan says that he likes Nancy Grace-she
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tells the truth. His mom says, "I hope they pay me" because she needs the money. Buchanan then
instructs his mother to tell Raven to only talk if they pay her. Buchanan then explains that he
never watched HLN news until he got locked up. Now, "its kind ofmy favorite."
46.

On October 13, 2013, Buchanan spoke with his sister Stephanie and explained that he has

talked to the prosecutor, and his face is going to be blanked out, and that it is supposed to start
next week, and ''whatever it talces to get home ....Hopefully, we'll all be together for Christmas."
Buchanan says that he "Needs [Martin's] ass alive and well," and that "he can hang himself'
after he testifies against him.
47.

On October 13, 2013, Buchanan spoke with Raven and told her to "tell the press

everything they want to know if the money is right, and that hopefully, he'll be home in
December, and that his lawyer said everything looks good, so it just talces a couple weeks after
they do it to put the motion in and they grant it ....After I get out, I don't give a fl'*k .... I'm a
little nervous and a little excited. I ain't scared, just excited."
48.

On October 14, 2013, Buchanan called his Dad and said that he turned on the TV and

saw somebody that he knew [MacNeill] and that he had lost a lot of weight and was looking
stressed, and Buchanan laughed.
49.

On October 16, 2013, Buchanan called a girlfriend and told her that he was about to come

home, and asked her if she was going to come and pick him up because he is getting released.
50.

On October 17, 2013, Buchanan called his parents and his mother mentions that the news

"is loaded," and Buchanan says, "I kn.ow, I've been watching them .... Prosecution called their

first witness .. .I saw some of it." His mom said the defense lawyer is smiling at the witnesses and
12

asking ''tricky questions."
51.

On October 18, 2013, Buchanan called his parents. Buchanan said that he got up at 6:00

a.m. and walked into the TV room, and the trial was on two TV's. Buchanan further said, every
time he walks by, and every time he turns on the channel, it's on. His mother said that he had to
be very consistent in his testimony, and "stick to what you know" and what you say. Buchanan
then said that Martin told him that he gave the bitch some oxycodone, some promethazine, and
some sleeping pills. "That promethazine stuff... that kills ...." Buchanan's mother then said that
the sleeping pill was Ambien.
52.

Buchanan did not refer to promethazine in his interview in May of 2013 nor in his trial

testimony. His reference to promethazine is clear evidence that Buchanan is getting information
from the media.
53.

On October 20, 2013, Buchanan called his mother, and reports that he "saw a little bit of

the trial this morning." "They had the bath tub." "Tall skinny man is asking the questions." "I
saw the neighbors testify."
54.

On October 20, 2013, Buchanan spoke to his niece Raven, and she tells him to ''be

careful, the dude is going to eat you alive .... You have got to stick to your story." Buchanan says
that he "saw a little bit this morning."
55.

On October 21, 2013, Buchanan called his mother, and discussed that he was leaving

soon. His mother said ''that guy is going to try and shake you and rattle you" and that it is going
to "ruin your chances" if you get rattled.
56.

On October 21, 2013, Buchanan called his girlfriend, Daphne, and said, "If you put [TV]
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on Nancy Grace at 8:00 o'clock. There is an update on it every morning on HLN." "Every time
you cruise the channels, cruise by there and you '11 see it." Later in the call, Daphne says that she
is hoping that this is it for ''us"-no more separations. Buchanan responds and says "I'm hoping
for that too." Daphne asks, "are you going to marry me? Buchanan responds "of course, why
not." (Buchanan has at least three women expecting him to marry them when he gets out).
57.

On October 22, 2013, Buchanan calls Raven. He told her he saw [MacNeill's trial] that

morning. Raven asks if it will take more than two weeks for the paperwork after he is done, and
Buchanan responds that it just depends on how fast they get in touch with Jeff, and how fast Jeff
tells them what went on.
58.

On October 22, 2013, Buchanan called Daphne and said that hopefully, it wouldn't be

long until he gets home. Daphne said that she watched the trial ''today,"and Buchanan asked
what they were talking about.
(Post-trial Disclosure From UCAO)
59.

On December 23, 2013, MacNeill's counsel received a letter (which wasn't actually seen

until December 24, 2013) from Chad Grunander which was dated December 18, 2013, and
postmarked on December 20, 2013. Included in the letter was a suicide note written by MacNeill
on or about December 5, 2013 professing his innocence in his wife's death. The suicide note was
apparently written shortly before MacNeill lacerated his femoral artery with a razor blade
expecting to die. Also included in the letter from Mr. Grunander was a letter from Jeff Robinson
to:
W. Brownlow March, Esq.
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U.S. Attorney Office
800 Market Street, Suite 211
Knoxville, TN 3 7902
60.

Robinson's November 15, 2013 letter was written just a week after the conclusion of

MacNeill' s trial.
61.

In Robinson's letter, he informs the U.S. Attorney that "Mr. Buchanan was a very

important witness in the case. While I understand this is a state case and may have little impact
in the federal system, I highly recommend and encourage leniency be shown to Mr. Buchanan
for his truthful and courageous testimony in our case ... .I appreciate any consideration you can
show Mr. Buchanan as a result of him assisting in our case."
62.

Also enclosed in the UCAO's letter and disclosure received by MacNeill's counsel on

December 23, 2013, was a letter from Buchanan's attorney, Elizabeth Ford, to Jeff Robinson,
dated December 10, 2013. Ms. Ford writes to Jeff regarding Buchanan as follows:
Dear Jeff:
I thought that you would like to see what happened as a result of the very complete letter
you sent to the United States Attorney's Office. Michael's time was reduced to time
served. He should be released on Sunday. Thank you so much ....Elizabeth B. Ford.
63.

Consistent with the Robinson's representations in his November 15, 2013 letter, the

UCAO relied extensively on Buchanan's testimony during MacNeill's trial. Buchanan's
testimony was a significant part of both the prosecution's opening statement and closing
argument. The prosecution also questioned Dr. Grey about the possibility of Michele MacNeill
dying pursuant to a hypothetical consistent with Buchanan's testimony.

64.

The little impeachment evidence (August 2013 emails and phone calls of Buchanan) that
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MacNeill's counsel was able to obtain prior to trial was not enough for the UCAO, and likely,
the jury to seriously question Buchanan's credibility.
65.

The newly discovered evidence referenced above shows that Buchanan testified falsely

about a number of material facts; it also demonstrates UCAO investigator Robinson was actively
involved in planning a deal for Buchanan that MacNeill suspected, but could not prove at trial
based on the information that had been disclosed or obtained by his counsel.
66.

The circumstances surrounding consideration given or promised to Buchanan is similar to

the UCAO's handling of another inmate witness, Jason Poirier. As set forth in MacNeill's
motion to exclude Poirier (filed on or about September 14, 2013), in January of 2013, based on
recorded jail conversations subpoenaed by MacNeill, Poirier understood the deal he was going to
receive in exchange for his testimony. In June of 2013, Poirier was treated consistent with his
understanding of "the deal" even though the UCAO claimed it did not formally give Poirier a
deal that could be used to impeach him. Similar to the Poirier deal, the UCAO apparently
established a framework for Buchanan's deal before trial, but did not consummate it, and
therefore, did not disclose it before trial. The new evidence confirms that prior to MacNeill's
trial, Buchanan understood that Robinson was actively speaking with Buchanan's attorney about
the manner in which Buchanan would receive consideration for his testimony.
67.

Apparently due to the perception that Buchanan's deal had not been completed, the

UCAO presented Buchanan as a witness testifying against MacNeill as a result of his supposed
moral obligation to society and in furtherance of his own "rehabilitation." Buchanan presented
himself, as did the UCAO as one who had lost hope of any potential benefit to himself as a result
16

of his testimony.
68.

In reality, Buchanan, like Poirier, had a plan to benefit--to get out of jail--as a result of

testifying against MacNeill. Contrary to his trial testimony, Buchanan firmly believed that, win
or lose, his cooperation was going to lead to his release from prison before Christmas.
Consistent with those beliefs, the UCAO fulfilled its bargain and wrote the post-trial letter
consummating the deal.
69.

Robinson was present in the courtroom throughout the trial as the State's designated case

officer exempt from the exclusionary rule. If the prosecutors did not know of Buchanan's
perjured testimony, as a member of the UCAO, Robinson had a duty to inform the prosecutors
during the trial.
70.

On or about July 11, 2012, Robinson submitted a sworn affidavit to Judge Howard in

support of a wiretap of MacNeill 's electronic communications. In his affidavit, which was read
and approved by at least three members of the UCAO, Robinson described in great detail all of
the evidence he had collected against MacNeill, and proclaimed that it did not amount to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he could not proceed with the case against MacNeill without
the evidence he hoped to obtain from the wiretap. Pursuant to Robinson's affidavit, Judge
Howard signed an order authorizing the wiretap and stated that the UCAO had stated the case

,.J

against MacNeill could not proceed from an evidentiary standpoint without the information it
hoped to obtain from the wiretap.
71.

The wiretap took place, and no incriminating evidence against MacNeill was obtained.

The UCAO filed charges against MacNeill anyway based on the fact that it only needed probable
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cause to ethically file charges against MacNeill rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
72.

Through the course of pre-trial motions, much of the purported evidence which Robinson

included in his July 11, 2012 affidavit was excluded from being presented to the jury-further
weakening the case which he admitted did not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Additionally, significant portions of Robinson's July 11, 2012 affidavit contained inaccurate
statements of evidence).
73.

The only significant new evidence that was presented at trial that was not known to the

UCAO in July of 2012, was the inmate testimony.
74.

Five inmates testified at trial. Neither Christifa Knowles, Johnny Vaughn nor Gilbert

Barrera testified that MacNeill admitted to harming Michele. Jason Poirier testified that
MacNeill told him three days after meeting MacNeill, that "he had gotten away with killing his
wife," and that he was "glad the bitch was dead" After subpoenaing records from the Utah
County Jail, MacNeill was able to effectively impeach Poirier and demonstrate that Poirier was a
liar and fraudster. On cross-examination, the defense played a recorded phone call for the jury
where Poirier discusses setting up a friend of his to be falsely accused of committing a crime.
75.

Michael Buchanan was the only person who provided any evidence to the jury about

what allegedly occurred between 9:30 and 11 :00 a.m. on April 11, 2007-the time frame in
which the UCAO argued during its closing argument--that MacNeill must have killed Michele.
The materiality and importance of Buchanan's testimony cannot be overstated.
ARGUMENT

MacNeill has repeatedly brought to the court's attention (Judge McVey) the UCAO's
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discovery violations throughout the litigation in this case. In each instance the UCAO has relied
upon the notion that a discovery violation discovered prior to trial is not actionable under Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The current discovery violation was not discovered until after
MacNeill' s trial, therefore an analysis under Brady and its progeny is appropriate.

I.

THE UCAO FAILED TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

Evidence which might be used to impeach a government witness, particularly if
the witness is important to the government's case, falls within the definition of
exculpatory evidence. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); United States v.

Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Suppression of exculpatory evidence violates Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16 as well as state and federal law. Rule 16 provides, in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge: ....
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment[.]
The "prosecution" referred to in Rule 16 includes the police and all members of the
prosecution team. State v. Knight, 734 P .2d 913, 918 n.5 (Utah 1987). The prosecution's
duty is a continuing one. See Id. at 917. The right to discovery is an essential element of
the due process oflaw in criminal cases. E.g., State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 784 (Utah
1980), and State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1983). As the United States
Supreme Court held some 45 years ago in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
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(1963),"[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87.
Under the Brady doctrine, reversal is required if exculpatory evidence is unknown
to the defense prior to or during the trial, if the evidence is material, such that there is a
reasonable probability of a different result had the evidence been disclosed. See State v.
Eisner, 2001 UT 99, ,r 33, 37 P.3d 1073. The good or bad faith of the prosecution is not

determinative. E.g., Tillman v. State, 2012 UT App 289, ,r 13, 288 P.3d 318; State v.
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 162 P.3d 1106.

"The Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained
by the knowing use of false evidence." Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). Lawyers owe
a professional duty of candor to the courts, (see Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.3), and when
they lmowingly present or fail to correct false evidence, this is accurately viewed as a
"fraud" on the courts, E.g., Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 n.6 (Utah 1989). When a
prosecutor obtains a criminal conviction through the knowing presentation of or failure to
correct false evidence, this violates both article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24 and
nn. 1 and 2 (Utah 1984). In Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981), the court
explained the relevant law in this specific context, stating:
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It is an accepted premise in American jurisprudence that any conviction obtained
by the knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair and totally
incompatible with "rudimentary demands of justice." The proposition is firmly
established that a conviction obtained through the use of false evidence known to
be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, Section 7, of the Utah State Constitution,
if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury. The same result applies when the State, although not
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. This
standard derives from both the prosecutorial misconduct and, more importantly,
the fact that the use of false evidence involves a corruption of the truth seeking
function of the trial process.

Id. at 690-91 (footnotes omitted). See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)
(the Court must determine if there is any reasonable likelihood that the evidence that was
tainted could have affected the jury's verdict).
In the present case, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Buchanan
lied about having not seen media stories about the trial; he lied about not asking for and
seeking a deal in exchange for his testimony; he lied about his plans to come home in
December being related to his "other motion" about the 18: 1 ratio; he lied about not
talking to other people about his testimony in the MacNeill case; and he lied about not
learning about relevant information about MacNeill from the media (i.e., promethazine
statements to his mother, etc.).
The newly discovered evidence also demonstrates that the UCAO failed to
disclose the existence of a deal given to Buchanan and its own involvement in that deal
by contacting Buchanan's federal criminal defense attorney and possibly the assistant
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United States Attorney handling Buchanan's case. The UCAO also failed to disclose that
it planned to submit a request to modify Buchanan's federal sentence after the conclusion
of the MacNeill trial-win or lose.
The facts of the present case are similar to the facts in Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972) where the prosecution failed to disclose information helpful to the
defense in cross-examining a government witness. MacNeill, through his counsel's
efforts, not by way of disclosure by the State, gathered some evidence to cross-examine
Buchanan. Despite MacNeill's attempts to attack Buchanan's credibility, he did not
possess definitive proof of Buchanan's deal or other lies which is demonstrated in the
newly discovered evidence. The case against MacNeill is a circumstantial one, such that
even the UCAO, just over a month prior to filing charges, submitted an affidavit to the
Fourth District Court declaring that it did not have proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
could not proceed with prosecuting MacNeill from an evidentiary standpoint. The most
significant addition to the evidence since the UCAO's declaration in July of 2012 is the
testimony of Michael Buchanan. Indeed, the UCAO referred to him as its #1 witness.
IfMacNeill had the newly discovered information available to him during the
trial, he could have definitively demonstrated that not only was Buchanan untruthful, but
also that the UCAO concealed the truth about consideration given to Buchanan. The
UCAO's concealment of information about Buchanan's anticipated consideration for his
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testimony is a violation of Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Crim. Proc.; Brady v. Maryland;
and this Court's order requiring the UCAO to provide written disclosure of benefits to
inmates for their testimony. The UCAO filed the statement of benefits as ordered by the
Court, but did not disclose the deal in the works for Buchanan which was known at least
to Jeff Robinson, the chief investigator for and employee of the UCAO. IfMacNeill had
lmowledge of the newly discovered evidence in this case, the probability of a different
result is very high, and according to the UCAO July 2012 affidavit, is nearly certain.
II.

MACNEILL'S DISCOVERY OF MICHAEL BUCHANAN'S PERJURY IS
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Assuming arguendo that the prosecution did not fail to disclose exculpatory evidence

related to Michael Buchanan as argued in section I above, MacNeill's due process rights to a fair
trial were still violated based upon perjury committed by Michael Buchanan. In State v. James,
819 P .2d 781 (Utah 1991 ), the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying James's motion for a new trial based on similar facts as the present case.
James learned after trial, that a material witness for the prosecution was overheard telling another
inmate that he fabricated his testimony in an attempt to get better treatment from the prosecutor.

Id. at 793. The Utah Supreme Court applied a three part test and granted James a new trial:
(1) It must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and
produced at the trial;
(2) It must not be merely cumulative; [and]
(3) It must be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case.

Id.
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In the present case, MacNeill could not have discovered the information demonstrating
Buchanan's perjury with the exercise of reasonable diligence. MacNeill' s counsel acted
reasonably within their power to obtain exculpatory information. MacNeill requested the UCAO
to obtain Buchanan's phone calls and emails from prison. The UCAO refused to do so. When
MacNeill was forced to obtain the information, his counsel learned that he could not simply
subpoena the federal government. The United States Supreme Court held in Touhy v. Ragen, 340
U.S. 462 (1951), that a subpoena served on the federal government must be treated as a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request. One of the many restrictions ofFOIA is that a party cannot
request records that will be created in the future. Accordingly, when MacNeill first prepared his
FOIA request to the federal government about Michael Buchanan at the end of August of 2013,
he was limited to requesting only information that had been created up to that point in time.
MacNeill did not know what, if any, information he may receive about Buchanan. Due to
the United States government shut down, the processing of MacNeill' s request was delayed. He
did not receive Buchanan's August emails until October 28, 2013 and his August phone calls
until the evening of November 1, 2013. MacNeill requested information from December 2012 to
August 31, 2013, but only received emails and phone calls for one month--August of 2013.
Because MacNeill's trial was coming to a close, MacNeill's counsel and those assisting,
worked "around the clock" before Buchanan took the stand on November 6, 2013 to digest the
information received. Under the circumstances, counsel for MacNeill did the best job he could
to cross-examine Buchanan. The trial ended on November 8, 2013, and MacNeill's counsel did
not have a reasonable opportunity to submit another FOIA request before the trial ended.
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After the trial concluded, MacNeill submitted another FOIA request and obtained the
additional exculpatory information that is the subject of this motion.
Second, the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative. MacNeill's counsel
suspected that Buchanan was not telling the truth during trial, but lacked the information to prove
it. When MacNeill confronted Buchanan with his email from May of2013 (which was provided
by the UCAO) and emails from August of 2013 suggesting that Buchanan was contemplating
consideration in exchange for his testimony, Buchanan admitted that it was only in the "back of
his mind" in August. Later, on redirect, Buchanan testified that after August, he learned that it
wasn't really possible for him to benefit because MacNeill's case was a Utah State case, and
Buchanan's charges were Tennessee federal charges. Buchanan went so far as to testify that his
lawyer had sent him a letter stating that it was very unlikely that he would get any benefit from
testifying against MacNeill. MacNeill had no ability to prove otherwise at trial.
The newly discovered evidence indicates that the letter from Buchanan's lawyer was
exactly the opposite of Buchanan's trial testimony. The new evidence shows that Buchanan's
lawyers and UCAO investigator Jeff Robinson had a plan in place at least as early as September
2013 wherein Buchanan would testify, and when the trial was over, Robinson would write a
letter to the federal prosecutor seeking consideration for Buchanan. Accordingly, Buchanan's
lawyer recommended that Buchanan testify. The plan materialized exactly as discussed in
September, and an order was signed releasing Buchanan from prison on December 4, 2013.
Similarly, during the trial, MacNeill was not able to substantially impeach Buchanan
regarding his claim to have never watched media coverage about MacNeill' s case. With the
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newly discovered emails and phone calls, it is clear that Buchanan perjured himself.
Like James, the newly discovered evidence identified in the facts above is not simply
impeachment evidence. Rather, it is independent evidence demonstrating a deliberate
commission of perjury with the intent to subvert the trial process to Buchanan's own ends.
Third, the newly discovered evidence renders a different result probable in the retrial of
MacNeill' s case. Buchanan's testimony was the only' direct evidence presented at trial regarding
what MacNeill allegedly did on the morning of April 11, 2007 to cause Michele MacNeill's
death. The UCAO relied on his testimony in opening statement, in examination of expert
witnesses, in closing arguments, and acknowledged to the federal judge in Buchanan's case that
his testimony was "very important." Independent of the Brady arguments set forth in section I,
MacNeill is entitled to a new trial based on the newly discovered evidence of Buchanan's perjury
at trial and his clear plan to commit fraud on the court in order to benefit himself.

ID.

MICHAEL BUCHANAN VIOLATED THE COURTS ORDER APPLYING
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO ALL FACT WITNESSES
In addition to the discovery rules addressed above, either the UCAO or Michael

Buchanan violated this Court's order that the exclusionary rule applied in this case. The Court
instructed counsel for both sides to instruct all of its non-expert witnesses to refrain from
watching television coverage of the trial. The application of the exclusionary rule in this case
was especially important because MacNeill's case was the first case in Utah where cameras were
allowed inside the court with the proceedings being streamed nationwide.
This newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Michael Buchanan violated the
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Court's order in relation to the exclusionary rule. As was discussed at trial, there are a number of
ways that the UCAO could have communicated with Buchanan that would not have been
recorded by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The newly discovered evidence does not contain any
communication from the UCAO advising Buchanan of the Court's order relative to the
exclusionary rule. Either the UCAO failed to advise Buchanan in violation of the Court's order,
or Buchanan knowingly violated the Court's order. Either way, Buchanan admitted in his
communications with his family and girlfriends that he was watching parts of the trial up until he
was transported from Texas to Utah on or about October 22, 2013.

IV.

THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ARRESTED AND THE CASE DISMISSED;
ALTERNATIVELY, MACNEILL IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL
The Court should arrest the judgment and dismiss this case. The standard for determining

whether to arrest judgment is the same as an appellate court considering an appeal for
insufficient evidence. State v. Giles, 966 P.2d 872 (Utah 1998) (trial court may arrest a jury
verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or
so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element).
In MacNeill's case, the UCAO presented testimony from three medical examiners. Dr.
Frikke found that Michele MacNeill died of natural causes. Dr. Grey, after initially agreeing with
Dr. Frikke, amended the manner of death to be undetermined. Dr. Perper, the State's hired
expert, found the manner of death to be undetermined. The testimony of Jason Poirier and
Michael Buchanan was the only significant evidence obtained after the UCAO 's affidavit
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admitting that it lacked proof beyond a reasonable doubt to proceed with prosecuting MacNeill.
Without the testimony of Jason Poirier and Michael Buchanan, even when the evidence
presented at trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the State failed to
prove a critical element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt-that Michele MacNeill died
due to the actions of ano~er. The testimony of Jason Poirier and Michael Buchanan is the only
evidence presented during the trial that Michele MacNeill died as a result of the hands of
another. Jason Poirier's testimony was so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained doubt regarding the truthfulness of his testimony. In light of the newly discovered
evidence, it is clear that Michael Buchanan's testimony, like Jason Poirier's, is so inherently
improbable, that reasonable minds must entertain doubt regarding its truthfulness. MacNeill
respectfully requests the Court to arrest judgment and to dismiss the charges against MacNeill.
In the alternative, the Court should grant MacNeill a new trial. The authority cited in
section I & II above supports MacNeill's request for a new trial due to the lack of fundamental
fairness of the original trial. Under the Brady doctrine, MacNeill is entitled to a new trial
when exculpatory evidence was unknown to the defense prior to or during the trial, and
the evidence is material, such that there is a reasonable probability of a different result
had the evidence been disclosed. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,133, 37 P.3d 1073. In
addition to the UCAO's Brady violations, its violations of the exclusionary rule further
support MacNeill' s request for a new trial even though, standing alone, exclusionary rule
violations may not be sufficient to obtain a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
The UCAO failed to disclose material evidence known to it prior to and during
trial. The UCAO filed a pleading with the court stating that Michael Buchanan had not
asked for or been promised consideration in relation to his testimony; the UCAO
pleading was false. Michael Buchanan committed perjury during MacNeill's trial
pursuant to a plan to benefit himself by testifying against MacNeill. Michael Buchanan
violated the Court's exclusionary rule, and watched parts ofMacNeill's trial on multiple
days as well as news coverage of the trial prior to taking the witness stand himself.
Without the testimony of Michael Buchanan, the evidence presented by the UCAO
at Martin MacNeill's trial is so inherently inconclusive, that the Court should arrest the
judgment in this case. Alternatively, pursuant to the Brady violations committed by the
UCAO, and Michael Buchanan's perjury, the Court should grant MacNeill a new trial.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

Dated this the 27th day of December, 2013.

Randall K.. Spencer
Attorney for Defendant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered a copy of the foregoing: Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment or for a New Trial to the Utah County Attorney's Office,
100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah, 84606, this 27th day of December, 2013.
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